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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-188
Thursday
27 September 1990

Daily Report
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FBIS-EEU-90-188 *27 September 1990*

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Nation Ready To Send Military Forces to Gulf

AU2709101290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Today is the last day of President Zhelyu Zhelev's visit to Washington. Later this afternoon he and the officials accompanying him will depart for New York, in order to take part in the 45th session of the UN General Assembly and the UNICEF summit meeting.

Our special correspondent Aleksandur Gotsev reports from Washington that, after many important meetings with U.S. representatives, the following results have become known:

[Begin Gotsev recording] Bulgaria is ready to send a limited military contingent to Saudi Arabia, within the framework of the international security forces. In front of dozens of representatives of diplomatic and political circles in Washington, Zhelyu Zhelev explained that this related to a small sapper unit, who may be engaged in clearing mines from the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and along the Saudi Arabian border.

Valentin Stoyanov, the spokesman of the president of the Republic, further explained to Bulgarian journalists in Washington that such a decision is within the powers of the head of state as chairman of the National Security Council. According to the president's spokesman, our country's readiness to join the multinational security forces in the Persian Gulf was greeted with satisfaction by the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Department of State.

It has also become known that the 100,000 tonnes of U.S. corn which are already on the way to Bulgaria are only the first consignment of 1 million tonnes of feed corn offered as material aid. In addition to this, I will mention the assurances of Senator Robert Dole and the State Department that our country can count on substantial amounts of petroleum as aid from the United States and Western Europe, which we will receive through Saudi Arabia in order to cover our urgent needs during the approaching winter.

We may regard all these heartening pieces of news as a response to the real democratic changes underway in Bulgaria, combined with a principled and long-term stance in relation to the main international problem today, namely the crisis in the Persian Gulf. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Denies Food Delivery to Iraq

AU2609150490 Sofia BTA in English 1446 GMT 26 Sep 90

["Embargo Against Iraq Strictly Observed"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 26 Sep (BTA)—The deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Filip Ishpekov, has refuted the allegations that Bulgaria delivered lamb to Iraq, thus violating the embargo against Saddam Husayn.

Mr. Ishpekov stated that Bulgaria strictly adheres to the decisions of the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions against the aggressor, for which the country received congratulations. Bulgaria has not delivered and will not deliver any goods to Iraq, lamb included, Mr. Ishpekov underlined.

The Bulgarian high-ranking diplomat made the above statement in reply to an interpellation made by an opposition M.P. who insisted that the issue should be included in the agenda of the Bulgarian parliament.

In this way Mr. Ishpekov refuted the propaganda broadcasts of the Iraqi television, to which the BBC referred in its emission early this morning.

Mr. Filip Ishpekov backed up the proposal for submitting the question of Bulgarian troops' joining the contingent in Saudi Arabia for discussion to the respective parliamentary committees.

Zhelev Continues U.S. Visit in Washington

AU2509210190 Sofia BTA in English 1748 GMT 25 Sep 90

[Text] Washington, 25 Sep (BTA correspondent)—The business part of the program of Bulgaria's president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev has begun.

His first meeting today took place at the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, where the Bulgarian president had important talks with the president of the chamber, Dr. Richard Lesher. As it is well-known, a team of U.S. economic experts headed by Dr. Richard Rahn, vice president and chief economist of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, is completing its work on an economic reform project for Bulgaria. The two sides discussed the possibilities for the expansion and concretization of the economic and business relations between Bulgaria and the United States. Special attention was paid to the problem of encouraging American investments in Bulgaria.

Later on Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev visited the Department of Agriculture, where he was received by Mr. Clayton Yeutter, secretary of agriculture. Good prospects are opened for an important cooperation in the field of agriculture which will be very useful for Bulgaria. The problem of rendering technical assistance to Bulgaria was also considered.

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev had a meeting at the Department of State with Undersecretary Lawrence Eagleberger. The American side showed great interest in the development of the political processes in Bulgaria. An opinion was expressed that as a result of the deepening of the democratic processes in Bulgaria, prospects for the activation of the all-round Bulgaro-American dialogue were

opened. Some current problems of the international situation were discussed and the Gulf crisis in particular. It was pointed out that the crisis in that region had severely and directly damaged Bulgaria's economic interests.

Today President Zhelev will hold meetings with Ms. Carla Hills, permanent trade representative of the United States, and with the leadership of the National Republican Institute.

The president of the Republic had a meeting with the Bulgarian community and with American citizens of Bulgarian origin. He told them about the situation in the country and the purpose of his visit to Washington. He underlined that "Bulgaria is no longer a communist state".

'Greatly Satisfied' With Talks

AU2709074090 Sofia BTA in English 2036 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Washington, 26 Sep (BTA correspondent)—The talks the president of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, held with U.S. officials passed in an atmosphere of constructiveness and goodwill. President Zhelev, who made the same assessment of his meetings, told the BTA correspondent in Washington: "Today was a very successful day and I am greatly satisfied with the talks that were held, especially with the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Mr. Richard Lesher, and with the whole management of the chamber. Mr. Michael Boskin, chairman of President George Bush's Council of Economic Advisers, also attended the meeting. He spoke in favour of Bulgaria's cause and promised all-round assistance to help Bulgaria overcome the crisis and implement the transition to a market economy."

Asked if he shares the relatively optimistic evaluations and predictions made by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, namely, that Bulgaria could overcome the serious economic crisis in a comparatively short term, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev said: "I am not a specialist nor an economist, but I share this opinion. After all Bulgaria has got certain structures—economic and industrial, the country has got funds, or in other words a basis from which it can begin. And, second, we have a sufficiency of trained personnel for the production and of qualified labour who, being offered adequate conditions by the market economy, can pull the country forward".

When evaluating the talks held at the U.S. Department of State, the spokesman for the president announced that Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleberger delivered a letter to Dr. Zhelev. The letter states the approach of the U.S. foreign policy department to the conditions on which the relations between the relations between Bulgaria and the United States can be expanded and on which the United States will give its support and aid: complete democratization and a radical transition to a market economy. Besides Mr. Lawrence Eagleberger announced that the United States will deliver to Bulgaria a relief quantity of forage maize amounting to 100,000 tons.

Bulgaria's president had a meeting with Ms. Carla Hills, U.S. special representative for trade negotiations. The two sides discussed the ways of expanding the two country's trade relations and paid attention to the question of granting Bulgaria the status of most favoured nation in her trade with the United States. It was pointed out that this is a real prospect which will be considered during the negotiations on the working out of a bilateral trade agreement.

Today Mr. Zhelev had a meeting with Dr. Lewis Sullivan, secretary of health and human services, and with Undersecretary for International Trade Mr. J. Michael Farren.

Before the end of the day the Bulgarian president will meet Mr. Robert Dole—one of the most influential U.S. senators and leader of the Republican Party in the Senate, with Attorney General Richard Thornburgh and with one of the most famous American politologists, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinsky.

Economic Negotiations With Iran Reported

AU2609152090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1420 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] The official protocol on the results of the Seventh Session of the Bulgarian-Iranian Joint Committee for Economic Cooperation is expected to be signed soon during the upcoming visit by an Iranian Government delegation to our country.

The preparatory stage of the session which ended today also appears promising.

Four working subcommissions mapped out opportunities for more constructive relations in the spheres of trade, banking, agriculture, transportation, and industry.

The two countries expect their exchange of goods to achieve a value of $500 million within a year.

In exchange of our industrial goods and tobacco products, the Iranian side commits itself to deliver 1 million tons of oil, Renault automobiles made in Iran, and other goods.

The greetings exchanged between Stefan Polendakov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, and (Sader Kiebani), Iranian deputy minister of agriculture, following the signing of the documents, were an eloquent expression of the spirit in which the negotiations proceeded and of the readiness for a further development of mutual cooperation. Let us hear a few excerpts from the statements:

[Begin Polendakov recording] Our agreements in the sector of agriculture and transportation justify our intentions and hopes that Bulgarian-Iranian relations will

continue to develop at accelerated rates. The documents we already signed and the agreements reached at different levels will certainly be implemented. This I can confirm on behalf of the Bulgarian side.

Considerable constructive cooperation took place between our two countries, following the Islamic revolution, which represents a solid basis for our further progress along this path. [end recording]

[Begin Iranian deputy minister recording, fading into Bulgarian translation] Without waiting for the official signing of the protocol which will take place during the visit of our minister, we are already beginning our work, (Sader Kiebani) declared. Our Bulgarian colleagues expressed their readiness and willingness for joint work and we shall report this to our government. We intend to work in the spirit of our traditionally good relations. We would like to sign new agreements for cooperation, and we congratulate the Bulgarian people on the changes they are implementing, (Sader Kiebani), deputy minister of agriculture of Iran, stated. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Discusses Emigres' Status

AU2609165890 Sofia BTA in English 1522 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 26 Sep (BTA)—Half a million Bulgarians, who left the country in different periods of its history, live in the Soviet Union now; the Bulgarians in the United States and Canada are about 200 thousand, it has been announced by the head of the Consular Department with the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yordan Velichkov, at a news conference here. According to Mr. Velichkov, the Bulgarians in Australia are several tens of thousands.

There are 24 Bulgarian Orthodox churches in the United States, and while in Bulgaria only one city is called Sofia, in the U.S.A. there are three towns of the same name. They were founded by Bulgarian emigrants.

Mr. Velichkov highly evaluated the activity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church for the preservation of the spirit and the national traditions among the Bulgarian emigrants in the North American continent. More than 60 percent of these people have never set foot in their motherland; most of them emigrated at the beginning of the century, and yet they have preserved their Bulgarian national identity, the Bulgarian diplomat, formerly Bulgaria's consul in Canada, said.

According to the head of the Consular Department, the majority of Bulgarian emigrants come from Macedonia a fact he defined as one of the most convincing pieces of evidence revealing the actual demographic character of this area at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, when the biggest wave of emigrants made for America.

Mr. Velichkov characterized the policy of the totalitarian regime by saying that it was narrow-minded and amateurish and that it ignored the problem of the rights of one million 200 thousand Bulgarians in Yugoslavia who were subjected to total pressure in order to change their national identity. Among all other things, the silence which was kept for decades and which was dictated by phony "internationalistic" considerations, stimulated the impudent claims for a non-existent "Macedonian minority" in Bulgaria, he said.

BSP Supreme Council Elects Presidium Members

AU2609133390 Sofia BTA in English 1226 GMT 26 Sep 90

["BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) Elects Presidium: Concession to Radicals"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 26 Sep (BTA)—At its first meeting yesterday the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] elected deputy chairmen of the BSP and members of the Presidium. Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, who is the only leader of a reformist tendency to win a seat on the new Supreme Council, became deputy chairman of the BSP, as did Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov, a pre-November 10 member of the Glasnost and Restructuring Club and representative of the young Bulgarian opposition at the first sessions of the roundtable negotiations. Mr. Dimitur Yonchev, previously spokesman for the BSP, who joined the ruling party leadership at the 14th Congress of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], was also elected deputy chairman of the BSP, along with Mr. Lyubomir Kyuchukov of the BSP central apparatus.

Mr. Anzhel Vagenshtayn, a screenwriter, Mr. Svetlin Rusev, a painter, Mr. Ivan Dinkov, a poet, and Mr. Georgi Bliznashki were elected members of the Presidium of the BSP Supreme Council. Mr. Filip Bokov and Mr. Ivan Stanev retain their positions as members of the Presidium.

It was decided that each ideological trend in the BSP should be able to send one representative to the Presidium. The leaders of the reformist tendencies, who were not elected to the Supreme Council, will be able to attend its meetings.

The writer Mr. Stanislav Stratiev, the journalist Mr. Ventsel Raychev and the historian Ms. Iskra Baeva yesterday said they were leaving the BSP Supreme Council.

The 39th Congress of the BSP did not become a congress of an essentially new Socialist Party, says the Movement for Radical Reform of the BSP in a press release published in today's "DUMA." The radicals believe that the Socialists' congress approved a good platform but adopted rules which cripple the ongoing democratization of the party. They say the congress failed to reveal completely the recent past of the BSP and to adopt a resolution on it, on the party property, on personnel changes and did not make a critical assessment of the actual condition of the BSP and its leadership.

According to the radicals, the congress failed to realize how vital it is for the BSP at this point to acquire a new public image through its leader. The Movement for Radical Reform finds that the congress passed under the sign of "fears deliberately brought home by the BSP chairman." The newly elected BSP Supreme Council was only nominally new but did not give the party a new image, and this is reinforced by the fact that the newly elected chairman is actually placed beyond the control of the BSP Supreme Council.

Supports Public Peace Measures

AU2709122590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] shares the assessment of the danger of the increasing political confrontation and social tension in the country which was expressed at the meeting of the chairman (president) of the Republic with the members of the National Security Council, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the leaders of the BSP, Union of Democratic Forces, and Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.

The Supreme Council fully supports the measures agreed to by the participants in the meeting for guaranteeing normal conditions for the development of the democratic processes and transformations in Bulgaria. It suggests that the party organs, primary party organizations, members and sympathizers should actively cooperative, through these measures, in consolidating civil and social peace and preserving the peaceful nature of the Bulgarian transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

Lilov Tries To Clarify Results of BSP Congress

AU2609163690 Sofia BTA in English 1534 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 26 Sep (BTA)—The newly elected leadership of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) today tried hard to clear up all doubts as to the character of the 39th BSP Congress which ended here yesterday. At the news conference held on this occasion, the leader of the BSP, Mr. Aleksandur Lilov, directly appealed not to believe in the allegations that the conservatives had won. If in some way the line of the "hardening" of the structures gains the upper hand, the present party leadership will leave the political scene, he underlined.

Mr. Aleksandur Lilov said that the non-election of the leaders of the radical ideological platforms and movements and of the Alternative Socialist Association faction in the BSP Supreme Council by the congress was a serious shortcoming. Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, leader of the Demos [Movement for Democratic Socialism] movement who was appointed deputy chairman of the BSP, stated that in actual fact the representation of radicals in the BSP governing bodies was broader than what it might seem to be at first glance. According to him more than 20 people who had unambiguously identified themselves as adherents of one of the radical movements were elected members of the BSP Supreme Council and another 60 of its members gravitate to the radicals by persuasion.

Mr. Aleksandur Lilov expressed his conviction that the BSP would not split and disintegrate. Commenting on the national conference of the BSP radicals to be held on 29 this month at which they are expected to take a stand on the congress, the re-elected leader of the BSP said he hoped that common sense and the understanding that the BSP should not split but reform would prevail.

Mr. Aleksandur Tomov (Demos is part of the Movement for Radical Changes) considers, that if the radicals leave the BSP, the radicalization of the whole party would be hindered, which ruin the movement for radical changes itself.

The new BSP leadership explained that at the congress a qualitatively new understanding of the problem of the unity was achieved. It will be no more the monolithic unity of the past, but a unity formed around the concept of a new party.

Lilov's Political Report to 39th BSP Congress

AU2609073590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 23 Sep 90 pp 2-5

["Political Report" submitted by Aleksandur Lilov, Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) Supreme Council chairman, at opening of 39th BSP Congress in Sofia on 22 September]

[Text] Comrades, the 39th Congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is a regular congress of exceptional importance. It is expected to discuss and resolve the question of the BSP's transformation into a new party, a question which is of decisive importance for the party's future. If the congress should reform the party, it will make it even stronger today and will guarantee its future on a long-term basis. Should the congress fail to transform the party—this would mean its decline and political breakdown. We, the delegates to this congress, should all realize our historic responsibility in this matter.

Naturally, people in Bulgaria today are more concerned about empty shops, about increasing prices, and inflation, about the question, whether they will have enough food, heating and electric light during the forthcoming winter, than about anything else. These problems of everyday life are becoming crucial political issues. The economic difficulties are rapidly developing into negative moods on a mass scale. Our party is a ruling party and cannot help paying the price for the growing discontent over the deteriorating market situation. This price is also rapidly increasing. The crucial topical problem is no longer a philosophical or ideological dilemma, but the requirement of overcoming the contradiction between

the dwindling purchasing power of the citizens' family budget and the increasing shortage of basic foodstuffs and consumer goods.

A difficult winter is awaiting us. The people should be frankly and unmistakably told the truth. We are facing a number of difficult years. These questions which prevail in our everyday discussions cannot fail to be at the center of our congress debates, otherwise the congress would proceed in isolation from the vital problems of the people and of society today.

Nevertheless, in order to find a lasting solution for the problem of bread and cheese shortage, we must successfully resolve the general problem of reforming our society, our economy, and our party. There is no place for demagogy today. The easiest method would be to adopt populist attitudes. The most difficult task, however, is to engage in resolving the problems whose solution will determine the country's and party's rescue from the current crisis.

We should try to avoid both the doctrinaire and the populist approach at this congress, because both are likely to lead us to a dead end. The correct method is to focus our discussion on crucial problems whose solution is of vital importance for a positive change in our society and in the people's everyday lives. Our 39th BSP Congress should become a congress of practical action, a congress of change. The first of the vital problems is the party's reform.

Comrades, we must realize that our party's transformation into a new party is not a matter of discussion, but an urgent requirement. The type of party which the BSP represents today is already outdated. This fact should be clearly stated. Our society needs a new party today, both from the international and the national point of view, a party which should respond to the new realities, the new problems, and to the new developments both on a national and on a worldwide scale. Bulgaria, at the end of the 20th century, needs a left-wing party likely to become an integral part of the progressive, worldwide, and European left-wing movement. Our country cannot possibly keep abreast of time, as long as it does not have a modern and strong party representing the values of democratic socialism, such as **peace, freedom, democracy,justice, and solidarity** among people, social groups, and nations. The BSP is capable of most promptly and fully developing into this kind of party.

We should not be afraid to part with the present nature of our party. This is a natural process. The party does not exist for its own sake, outside society and time. The world of 1990 totally differs from the world of 1919 when we adopted the present type of party. A change is called for under the present circumstances. It is the party that should adjust to the requirements of the epoch and of society, and not vice-versa. A basic difference exists between the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the BSP. This is a fact which we, the Socialists, and our political opponents should both realize.

I would like to mention three decisive reasons which require that the BSP should be transformed into a new party:

The first reason is related to worldwide changes. In the 20th century, and especially, during its second half, unprecedented revolutions and evolutions have taken place in the world's development which have confronted mankind with **new realities.** I would point out the following revolutions as the most important ones: The post-industrial technological revolution in production, the social revolutions (people's democratic, socialist, and anticolonial revolutions), the scientific revolution, the revolution in the development of military weapons, the revolution in conquering space, and so forth. The following evolutions can be described as the most important ones: The realization of the threat of thermonuclear and ecological disaster and viewing mankind as an homogeous planetary community.

On a political scale—the worldwide changes are of utmost importance for a small European Balkan country such as Bulgaria. The most important of these changes have been the following: the end of the "cold war," the end of the polarized world division, the end of anachronistic, militarist structures, the advancing process of Europe's unification, Germany's unity, and the development of new principles in international relations.

The great challenge of the contemporary world is not a third world war, but the establishment of a peaceful, universal, and European community.

The great challenge which Bulgaria is confronted with today is the following: Will our country be capable of reform, of successfully contributing to the construction of a new Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals— or will Bulgaria become a backward province of Europe in due time?

The BSP cannot turn into a new party unless it joins the new world and it cannot do this unless it has realized and correctly understood the new realities.

The second reason why the BSP should be transformed into a new party is the crisis of totalitarian socialism.

It is the task of the generations in the near future to analyze and thoroughly examine the roots and causes of the crisis of socialism as an actually existing society. This is the great theoretical, historical, and political task of socialist thought. The present analyses made in our country and abroad are unsatisfactory in this respect because of their excessive politicization and ideologization.

Historical experience did not confirm the capacity of the societies built in the USSR, Bulgaria, and other countries belonging to the "worldwide socialist system," to implement the principles and values of socialism in practical life.

The totalitarian socialist societies are involved in a serious political, economic, and moral crisis. Profound

and radical processes of transformation are under way in the majority of these societies.

Our party once more confirms its deep appreciation for the restructuring process initiated in the Soviet Union, where a democratic and humanitarian socialist society is in the process of development. It is a process of universal importance which exerts a positive influence upon the overall contemporary, international development. The 39th BSP Congress wishes success to "perestroyka" in the USSR, hails its leaders, and regards this historically important cause with optimism and confidence.

We particularly stress the tremendous impact of "perestroyka" upon the innovative processes in Bulgaria.

Fundamental processes of transformation are under way in all East European countries today. The totalitarian socialist societies are disappearing from the historical scene as incompatible with socialist values, such as freedom, democracy, justice, solidarity, and prosperity for all people.

The end of totalitarian socialism, however, does not mean the end of socialism. Socialist values remain the most progressive and humanitarian results of progress in the history of mankind. A new evaluation and understanding of socialism is required. It will mark a new stage in our theoretical development. The world is facing a qualitative change in the development of human civilization. Socialism itself—both as the people's idea of socialist society and as a socialist concept of world development—is undergoing qualitative changes today.

We are at the threshold of a theoretical leap in defining socialism under the circumstances of the post-industrial development of mankind. The future world will totally differ from the present one. It cannot possibly be described in today's concepts and categories. Social theory must make a great revolutionary leap in order to explain the new realities and the decisive processes of history's future progress.

The Stalinist model of socialist society has failed, but socialist values are alive and shall undoubtedly play a major role in building the foundations of the future world and of European civilization in the 21st century, otherwise mankind will be confronted with insoluble and disastrous problems.

The BSP must adopt a new view of socialism. The problem is not whether we should remain a Marxist-Leninist party or become a social democratic party, as some representatives of the two extreme poles within our party propose. This is an outdated two-dimensional way of thinking which is behind the times. Our task is to become a party based on modern ideas of socialism, a party which embodies the future of socialism.

The problem which the BSP is expected to solve at the present moment is the total dismantling of internal totalitarianism and of all totalitarian elements in our society, while embracing the values of democratic socialism. This is the correct path, and the one which the party should embark upon without any hesitation or delay.

The achievement of genuine rights and freedoms, justice, democracy, and solidarity for all citizens in our country is the party's immediate goal—and this goal should be achieved here and now, not in the "bright" future.

The third reason for turning the BSP into a new party are the fundamental processes of transformation which are underway in Bulgaria's present-day development.

Our society is trapped in a serious political, economic, and moral crisis today, but is also undergoing a process of radical reforms at the same time. The crisis is a result of the totalitarian nature of society in the past and of the incorrect policy conducted by the long-standing, authoritarian, one-man regime which ruled our country. The current radical reforms are aimed at a global democratization of society in all spheres, at the introduction of a market economy, and at a moral catharsis in our society.

On 10 November 1989 the BSP initiated the democratization process in our country by a "peaceful revolution from the top." Our party's stand remains irreversible: We insist that it is impossible to go back to the past, that we should proceed without delay, without imitating other countries' democratization processes, that we should proceed along the path of radical reform. The reform should be genuine and total.

The BSP must radically reform itself in order to be capable of playing its role as a major factor in the process of introducing reforms and a democratic spirit in our society.

The transformation of the BSP into a new party is a historical requirement and must be implemented today, because tomorrow it will be too late. Our 39th congress must fulfill its historical task. The democratization of our society requires a modern left-wing party based on democratic socialism. This is the kind of party that our BSP should become.

Comrades, on 10 november 1989 the opportunity for a peaceful transition from a totalitarian to a democratic society in our country was opened. This change was prepared over many years by various social processes and forces. It has assumed diversified dimensions and is exerting its impact on our society. It was prompted by different causes, circumstances, and by different personalities who are promoting it. We have no time to further analyze all the aspects of this phenomenon in this report.

However, it would be a gross and deliberate distortion of history to underestimate the significance of the 10 November 1989 events.

This date marked the beginning of genuine, radical changes in our social and state structures. Over the last 10 months events and developments in our country have assumed a scope and dimensions which permit us to describe them as revolutionary changes.

A **peaceful revolution** is essentially under way in Bulgaria today. It marks the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic society.

The opposition, frequently although vaguely, hints that Bulgaria should follow the example of other Eastern European countries and introduce the "velvet revolution." This thesis is absolutely untenable, because the processes in our country are such that they developed under our own specific circumstances, and should not be forcibly directed toward a new imitation of foreign models.

The opposition has always declared its negative approach to the import of "models" for our development from abroad. Today, however, some of its leaders propose that we should import the "velvet revolution" without revealing at **what price and for the sake of what goals this method should be applied in our country.**

It is true that the "velvet revolution" actually marked the initial phase of the democratic processes in Eastern Europe. However, the conditions were different from ours. Democratic traditions are more highly developed in those countries, their political culture is greater, their economic and market situation is more favorable. Democratic and free elections, and new institutions were the results of the revolution. In our country, the democratic processes, although prepared over a long period by various forces, were prompted by a **change from the top** within the ruling party, which renounced its monopoly on power and decided to engage in a dialogue with the opposition. This situation established the necessary prerequisites for political pluralism, the freedom of the press, and for the Grand National Assembly elections which have already taken place. The institution of the Presidency is chaired by the opposition leader.

All this considered, who needs a belated "velvet revolution" and what for? How and at what price should it translate the mid-European "velvet" into the language of Balkan traditions and political realities? Why should the peaceful revolution in our country be replaced by a Balkan-style "velvet revolution?" The most crucial problem in this respect concerns the **price** at which this intention should be implemented and this cannot possibly be the substitution of parliamentary democracy with the diktat of the street, the substitution of civil peace by civil war. The goal does not justify the means in this case.

"Velvet revolution" actually turns out to be a dangerous and demagogic slogan under the conditions existing in our country. It is as unnecessary as it is absurd. It can only result in **violence, bloodshed, civil chaos, and pogroms.** Then, the same propagandists, who are now noisily and widely advertizing the "velvet revolution" will put the blame on the victims, or on the legacy of the totalitarian regime. They will try to persuade us that there was no other alternative, no other choice.

We still have the chance to preserve civil peace. Our goal is **parliamentary work** and not **chaos.** Our choice is a **broad dialogue, social consensus, and agreement, and not an escalation of social tension and political confrontation.**

The necessary prerequisites exist in our country for implementing these goals **with common efforts**—namely a working parliament, the institution of thje presidency, a government, and political parties. Local elections are imminent. We are facing real opportunities to pursue **the peaceful revolution** which has been under way in our country over the last 10 months.

Our peaceful revolution marks the end of isolation and the beginning of Bulgaria's integration with the new European and world realities.

Our peaceful revolution means the elimination of totalitarian structures through radical changes and reforms, the establishment of parliamentary democracy, of a socially just civic society, and of a market economy.

Our peaceful revolution means the rejection of pressure outside parliament in connection with the solution of major social problems.

Our peaceful revolution not only proposes the dismantling of the old system, but the construction of a new democratic society through dialogue and cooperation with all political forces.

Ours is not a violent revolution, forcibly dividing people into righteous and unrighteous ones, it is not a revolution of destruction and human sacrifice. It is a radical change which rejects political discrimination under any form whatsoever.

Involving society in an escalating civil conflict is a deadly blow against the very foundations of our nascent democracy. Such actions can only evoke repressive measures. The BSP is neither interested in, nor does it wish for, or allow, a relapse into the past.

We call on the opposition and on all sensible people to **assume political responsibility and adopt a realistic attitude** for the sake of our nation's survival and future. Our party supports a **compromise for the sake of universal human values.** It tries to avert the disaster of civil conflicts unleashed for the sake of petty party interests. The party is doing so in the conviction that the results of a new wave of national violence concern **all of us, regardless of who is ruling the country, in respect of our sharing a common responsibility for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people.**

Comrades, peaceful revolutions are slow, but no less radical than violent revolutions. They strive for reforms and restructuring, and not for destruction, they do not start from zero in building up the society which they are aspiring to.

The goal of the peaceful revolution in our country is to establish a democratic society.

We are in the initial phase of peaceful revolution. This initial phase can be positively evaluated as a whole. What are the reasons for our positive assessment?

—Political reform has greatly advanced—it has so much advanced that we are facing a discrepancy between political and other reforms, especially economic reform, which involves serious dangers, as a matter of fact.

—The peaceful transition from totalitarianism to democracy as a basis for the radical changes which are under way in our country has been consolidated.

—Civil peace has been preserved.

—Political pluralism, namely a multiparty system, exists in our country.

—Broad glasnost, freedom of speech and of the press were introduced.

—Free and democratic elections were held under extensive international observation.

—The Grand National Assembly which, despite all its shortcomings and peculiarities, is engaged in useful work, was elected.

—The presidential and government crises were overcome.

—Free elections for local government organs are expected to take place in the near future.

A process of dismantling the totalitarian structures and replacing them by democratic ones is expanding on a large scale and with great intensity in our country. The advanced stage of development which this process has reached makes it irreversible. Only extreme situations and extremist actions could obstruct its normal development, but even they could not reverse its general trend. There is no alternative to the democratization process in Bulgaria.

The political forces which are resisting this process, or are planning to expose our country to the dangers of extremism are doomed to failure and to disgrace.

Bulgaria is ripe for democracy. The Bulgarian people are striving for democracy—this is the present and future of our society and of our state.

Nevertheless, this by no means signifies that we have overcome our social crisis. This would be a wrong evaluation and a wrong policy.

The crisis persists in our country. The situation has even deteriorated in certain spheres, such as the economy, ecology, political culture, and moral standards. It applies to the critical situations emerging in various sectors, such as in political life, economic affairs, and ecology. Confrontation, production difficulties, inflation, increasing pollution, and so forth are the results of this. The situation is reflected in our social life. Empty stores, long lines in front of newsstands, rallies, strikes, demonstrations, the emergence of innumerable new parties, organizations, and movements, the "brain drain" of immigration to the West, and the gassing of Ruse—all these facts are symptoms of a profound crisis, which we are all aware of, but which not all of us understand—and what is most important—not all of us are acting in a responsible way to rescue our country from this crisis.

The opposition's approach to the crisis is particularly incomprehensible and unjustified. Its parties, leaders, and press organs are endlessly and noisily discussing the crisis, even talking about a "third national disaster," and calling for a "trial against the culprits," but are unwilling to assume their share of responsibility today and to participate in rescuing the country from the crisis. Such an attitude can hardly be described as being inspired by a sense of responsibility toward the nation.

No one should delude himself about the dimensions and the extent of the current crisis. What do we mean by this?

In the first place we should point out that this is by no means a superficial crisis, but a crisis **affecting the fundamental principles, the structures, and all strata of our society.** It is not sufficient to say that we lived in a totalitarian society. It is necessary to add that this society qualitatively differed from all other existing societies. It was a society based on planned development and premeditated control, on state property and on a symbiosis between the party and state, on the monopoly of a single ideology. Entire generations sacrificed their lives and their youth to the faith in the "construction" of a society ruled by the principles of social equality and justice. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria achieved great progress in its economic, social, and cultural development during that period, compared with 1944. The total denial of all these achievements is a great mistake on the part of the opposition. The truth is that we achieved considerable successes, but did not reach the goals we were aspiring for. The experience of "ruling" history, of making it move according to the "leader's" will and not according to its own methods and laws was actually a failure.

In the second place, the totalitarian society reproduced **ideas, ways of thinking, and values which were characteristic of the totalitarian system.** No one was immune to them, not even our young opposition. The dismantling of the totalitarian system is accompanied by the disintegration of the relevant mentality which results in a **specific, painful, socio-psychological situation.** Every day we are confronted with extensive manifestations of hatred and intolerance, we watch the destruction of normal, human relations.

The controversial nature of such processes, however, does not only affect human relations, it seems to dominate the **people's thoughts.** Totally opposed extremes coexist in one and the same mind: We are all in favor of a market economy, but we demand a general wage increase and the freezing of prices at the same time. We are talking about democracy, but are longing for a

"strong arm," for law and order, for discipline. We insist on political pluralism, while we cannot tolerate other opinions and different political views.

The disappearing totalitarian system seems to take a peculiar form of revenge by bequeathing us the **cliches** it has created. Thus, the totalitarian regime has departed, but its **shadow**—namely, our incapacity to think on different dimensions— remains with us. Instead of embarking upon the path showing us the way out of the crisis, we get entangled in a vicious circle which even more deeply involves us in the crisis. Compromises at the lowest level, hostile propaganda, party bias, and authoritarian mentality are more alive than ever today.

The disintegration of the monopoly position of certain ideological, intellectual, moral, and cultural values is accompanied by a vacuum in the world outlook, in the ethical, and psychological standards and criteria of the individual. The authority which determined the rules and judged his behavior no longer exists. The old values have collapsed after prolonged erosion, but have not been replaced by better and more humanitarian ones. **Everything is possible** under these circumstances.

In the third place, the crisis is neither a straightforward, nor a one-dimensional process. It is full of **contradictions and extremes which mutually exclude each other:** On the one hand, we are confronted with an unprecedented upsurge of civic initiative, spontaneous politicization of broad strata, and a powerful expansion of democratic processes. On the other hand, however, we are confronted with a reproduction of old cliches, a deteriorating political culture, a vacuum of power, the exacerbation of social tensions, manifestations of violence, the black market, and corruption.

The country's political situation is explosive. Not only a vacuum of power, **but symptoms of "multiplicity of power"** prevail in our country. The increasing confrontation, the manifestations of political, moral, and psychological terror, of vandalism, and violence are contributing to this situation. Last, but not least, we should point out the passive attitude of certain state institutions and public order organs, and the duplicity of some political parties and leaders in this connection.

How far political extremism can go and the dramatic dangers it involves clearly appeared on the occasion of the pogrom and arson attack against our party headquarters. The party should draw all the necessary conclusions from this event and prepare for confrontation with the emerging extreme right-wing, extremist, and neofascist forces in our society.

The contradiction between the stormy, radical political changes and the critical economic and market situation, the drastic deterioration of the people's living standards, and the escalation of political tension are particularly dangerous. This is the "powder keg" on the brink of which our society is living today.

If we were to describe briefly the essence of the situation under which we are living today, the most appropriate expression would be border line—either nationwide consensus on sensible action for overcoming the crisis, or civil disorder and economic disintegration.

Civil peace, or civil war—this is the historical dilemma we are facing today. This dilemma can only be resolved by the **joint** efforts of all political forces, and not by one at the expense of the others. There should be space for **all Bulgarian people** to cross the narrow bridge over the abyss, and not only for some of them, or for select political groups.

The BSP is for civil peace, it advocates a peaceful transition to democracy. We have a clear concept of the outcome of the crisis. It can be achieved by rallying the nation, mobilizing our national forces and internal resources, by implementing realistic and radical reforms. It is not the right time for political confrontations among parties, for dividing and instigating the people against each other. It is high time to rally political and national efforts for the sake of rescuing Bulgaria from the crisis.

We must close the page of hatred, retribution, and violence, and start building up our new Bulgaria with a combined effort. Let us not repeat the tragic lessons of our unfortunate history, but learn from the sensible, positive example of the European countries which accomplished the transition from the totalitarian system to democracy on the basis of civil peace.

The BSP shall further proceed along the path of civil peace and radical reforms—the most efficient way to rescue Bulgaria from the crisis and the only useful and civilized path. The party will unrelentingly urge all political forces in our country to join us in our progress along this path.

Comrades, political reform in our country has progressed to an advanced stage. Positive changes which led Bulgaria on the path of democracy and integration with the advanced and civilized European societies were implemented over the last 10 months.

The party's main tasks in the sphere of political reforms is its most active participation in establishing a democratic and rule-of-law civic society, which will prevent the democratization process in our country from being distorted by biased political forces and the party's efforts in learning how to exercise its power won in free elections under the conditions of pluralism and democracy.

It is particularly important to alleviate and gradually to overcome the political tension and the bipolar political confrontation in our country. They were exacerbated to a breaking point which jeopardized civil peace and the citizens' security. This situation should be evaluated as dangerous for the peaceful transition to and unfavorable for the further development of democratization.

The BSP appeals to the other political forces for their contribution to the normalization of the situation in our

country. It is high time to replace the "enemy image" with the "partner image" in building a democratic Bulgaria. **We propose to the leadership of the Union of Democratic Forces** [SDS] **and to the other political forces in our country to conduct roundtable talks discussing *appropriate measures for an alleviation of political tension* and for preventing political extremism in our country.**

The BSP insists that the organs of state power, namely parliament, and the institutions of the government and the Presidency, should adopt all necessary measures for the protection of civil peace and for guaranteeing the security of every individual Bulgarian citizen. The present instability is likely to produce dramatic situations and events.

As far as the BSP itself is concerned, the party will continue to participate with every effort in the further expansion and intensification of democracy in our country.

It is of particular importance for our party to complete the process of ideological and political disassociation from the totalitarian past and from the culprits who are responsible for the distortions and crimes committed in that era.

Following the events of 10 November 1989, the BSP assumed historical responsibility for all achievements and failures in the years of its rule. The shortcomings, abuses, and crimes of the past were severely denounced. Numerous specific culprits were expelled from the party. Nevertheless, we must admit that this process is not only still incomplete, but that it is unjustifiably protracted not only at the level of the high party ranks, but also at the level of the middle and lower ranks.

This provokes the people's discontent and distrust. Numerous members and party officials who abused their power, committed offenses against the law, or are personally responsible for severe deformations, remained unpunished. The political disassociation from the most inveterate exponents of the totalitarian methods of government and administration are still incomplete.

This process should be completed without any delays and hesitation. We are talking about punishing certain individuals and dissociating us from others whose **personal guilt** in connection with abuses and crimes **has been confirmed.** The party organs and organizations should resolutely get rid of corrupt and disgraced members and party figures.

In addition to this, the party cannot allow entire generations of BSP members and cadres to be eternally condemned just because they happened to work for the party over the last 40 years. This would be a cruel injustice and a gross political mistake.

On the other hand, certain political forces are trying to turn the question of guilt from a subject of specific legal, political, and moral assessment into a **global criterion** for judging the BSP. As far as the SDS is concerned, this issue has become an **instrument of extensive manipulation** serving the union's ultimate goal—namely the isolation of the Socialist Party from sociopolitical life.

The following tactics were adopted by the SDS: Not *individual personalities, but the "party as a whole is* guilty and should apologize," and voluntarily step down from the political scene.

"Down with the BSP," "The BSP is a mafia," "Assassins"—these are the most frequent slogans "denouncing" the party as a whole and all its members, regardless of their views, political convictions, and biographies.

This is how guilt is not linked to specific deeds, **but to party affiliation.** If an 18-year-old youth should join the party today, he is automatically accused, and even his children are considered guilty in due time. Is this not similar to the class-party approach which prevailed in totalitarian society and predetermined the destinies of hundreds and thousands of human beings?

History repeats itself. One upon a time some people accused the Jews of all crimes, others accused the kulaks. Both groups of accusers were suspicious of the intelligentsia. Today the socialists and communists are accused of every crime.

The subject of guilt has assumed preposterous dimensions. From specific legal dimensions it assumes general social dimensions being turned into **social guilt.** The nation is divided into "pure" and "impure" citizens, BSP being the guilty side while the SDS members are the innocents.

Whenever some members of the Socialist Party discard their membership cards and join the ranks of the opposition, when children of former leaders are becoming the most ardent SDS supporters, then they are considered as "having expiated their guilt," while honest and innocent Socialists who remain in the party ranks are being denounced.

At the same time, not only the party, but **Marxism** as such is considered an exponent of guilt. Marx is held responsible for the results of acts committed by his followers, and the socialist idea is condemned for its historical role.

Thus, individual guilt is transformed into a collective guilt and justifies the political, moral, and physical abuses against the party, as a whole, against its members, and supporters. The accusations are "transferred" to all dimensions of time and space. The party today is not only "guilty" of its own past, but also of the repressions to which it was subject prior to 9 September 1944. Tomorrow it may even be held responsible for the results of the opposition's actions!

The barbaric arson attack against the party headquarters was the physical expression of the moral terror existing in our country. Even this event did not prevent the

opposition from accusing the party once more. The scenario according to which the victim is blamed for the crime is well known.

The issue of the manipulation of the collective guilt prepares the ideological and socio-psychological ground for violence, concealed behind the concept of "velvet revolution." By manipulating facts, the **opposition is trying to shift the solution of the question of guilt from the sphere of law and democracy to the particularly dangerous sphere of national fragmentation, political discrimination, moral and psychological terror.**

Not only the question of dismantling the totalitarian structures and of building the democratic structures of our state and society, but the question of their **effective functioning as democratic structures** is assuming a particular importance today.

The role of the Grand National Assembly is a particularly significant example in this respect. Its establishment through free and democratic elections, recognized throughout the whole world, was a great success of democracy in our country. It is a particularly gratifying fact that the Assembly began its work and has acted as a tribune of real pluralism and democracy over the last three months. Some important parliamentary bills were adopted during the sessions. However, the Grand National Assembly, as a whole, has not yet become a democratic parliament likely to create the legal foundations of civil peace, democratization, and reform in our country. Political confrontation is still replacing political partnership in the parliament's legislative functions.

The BSP appeals to all its organizations and leading organs, members, and functionaries, to all political forces within and outside parliament: **Let us learn democracy!** Let us learn how to work under democratic conditions and with democratic institutions. Let us improve our political and democratic culture, and observe the rules of democracy!

These BSP appeals should not be regarded as slogans. They are most essential requirements for our young and fragile democracy. Unless our party, the SDS, and the other political forces learn to understand and implement these requirements, we might throttle democracy, which we are so ardently longing for, in our Balkan bear hug.

Bulgaria needs democracy more than ever today. It is the task of the BSP to become a truly democratic political force, capable of working under the conditions of pluralism and democracy.

Comrades, it is no secret that the confrontation between the BSP and the SDS is the basic reason for political tension in our country.

How can these relations be normalized without destroying the political identity of both sides and without disrupting the principles of democracy?

This question cannot be resolved either in an opportunistic, or in a compromising fashion, and even less in an emotional way. It is a basic issue of the entire policy of democratization in our society and state.

The question of principle which we should never forget is that in the first place **the existence of an opposition is an objective requirement, considering that there can be no democracy without opposition.** In the second place, **the opposition is an objective reality,** and in the third place, **the transition from totalitarianism to parliamentary democracy is impossible without the opposition. Opposition is one of the agents and one of the chief promotors of democratic processes in our country.**

The opposition, in turn, should not forget the peculiar circumstances of the process of change in Bulgarian society, such as the fact that the BSP is just as important as a political force and is the ruling party, as a result of free and democratic elections, and in addition to this, is also an essential factor in the country's progress. The efforts to destroy the BSP and to remove it from political life are as undemocratic as they are unrealistic. Democratization in our country cannot be accomplished without the BSP—this is what the SDS should finally understand.

The party and the opposition are committed by time and by the people's vote to act and work side by side. The great test of life experience will prove whether we are capable of doing so.

Like the opposition, we also embody the contradictions of the current situation and we are influenced by the logical results of the disintegrating totalitarian socialism. Therefore, it is particularly important that **our actions and the actions of the opposition should be evaluated solely from the point of view of the current situation, and in a more extensive context—only from the point of view of the processes and trends they are promoting within our society.** Only in this context can we distinguish between **sensible and necessary political compromise and unscrupulous deals, or deviations from our principles.**

Only this point of view can serve as a guideline for both sides in drawing the correct conclusions and actions permitting them to place national interests over party interests.

However, what is the **major difficulty preventing us from applying this correct approach?**

Following 10 November 1989, our society faced the real necessity of **restoring private property.** The requirement to introduce pluralism in the forms of ownership emerged. The dramatic character of our situation is precisely determined by the fact that the BSP, as a party with revolutionary traditions, is forced by the objective requirements of our epoch to restore the system of market economy and civic society which it had already eliminated.

This objective contradiction exerts a strong impact on the party as such, on our members, and supporters. The majority of them cannot understand this situation and

accuse the party leadership of deviating from its principles and even of "restoring capitalism." No one can and should try to preserve totalitarian socialism in the historical scene, or restore the capitalist system of the past in our country. The way out is to search for **new methods** by taking into consideration both the achievements of human civilizations and our peculiar national features.

The danger for society not only stems from the existence of two political forces, but from the nature of their mutual relations.

Neither the BSP, nor the opposition are **monolithic formations.** Both of them embody a number of essentially differing, and under certain aspects, even totally opposed trends, processes, and forces.

Our approach to the opposition should be **flexible** and **differentiated.** We are seeking dialogue and cooperation with all constructive and democratic forces and leaders within the opposition.

In addition to this, we should not underestinmate either the **right-wing, but essentially non-totalitarian forces,** nor the **negative trends in the strategy and tactics of the opposition.**

The main fact we are concerned about is that certain opposition leaders are trying to play **a double game.** On the one hand, they are advocating democracy and civil peace, while on the other hand, they are constantly instigating tension, directly or indirectly supporting the acts of civil disobedience, the efforts to exert extra-parliamentary pressure. This is a dangerous form of **playing with fire.**

In view of the aforementioned circumstances, what are the **guarantees** that constructive policy will prevail over the destructive methods, that consensus will prevail over confrontation? Which of the two opposition leaders' two faces will prevail—that of the sensible, realistic politician, or that of the extremist and antidemocratic one?

We are concerned about the **unpredictable elements in the opposition's behavior, about its permanently changing attitudes.** We are resolved to pursue our efforts **for mutual confidence,** we shall continue to seek **honest partners and opponents.**

Nevertheless, we cannot help being concerned about the image of our party and of Socialists, generally speaking, as it emerges from the opposition press. It is the typical image of the enemy, the opposition papers describe them as inveterate criminals. This is **ropaganda of the most primitive kind dating back to the era of primeval anticommunism** which no longer exists anywhere in the West and which certainly does no honor to its authors and their supporters.

We are disturbed by the **extremely negative attitude** and the total rejection of all achievements in our country's development over the years following 9 September 1944. The opposition is striving to create the image of a society whose history has been "interrupted," to "deprive" people of their biographies, and to convince millions of people that their past lives were meaningless. However, the ambitions of a certain political group, regardless of how great they are, are incapable of depriving millions of people of their lives' meaning.

We are amazed at the fact that **the members of the opposition, of all people, are showing relapses into the recent past** by striving for monopoly over the truth and over all democratic processes, by manifesting intolerance toward other people's views', and by trying to prevent other groups from participating in these processes. The opposition press self-confidently claims to be the highest authority over the ultimate truth. Representatives of the opposition are posing as the only protectors and defenders of democracy claiming all the rights and prerogatives of architects and builders of new Bulgaria. Such political behavior is not only incorrect, but also painfully familiar.

The BSP was "denounced" and "rejected" by the opposition for being "a prisoner" of its past, being allegedly incapable of changing and having no future. Its victory in the parliamentary elections was declared as "unfair," while parliament itself was turned into a penal court of justice.

What is this supposed to be: democracy, or unrestrained striving for **total power?**

Such are the realities. However, we do not renounce and cannot renounce dialogue and cooperation. Numerous comrades and supporters of our party, especially after the elections, accused us of defeatism and criticized our unjustied spirit of compromise. Evidently, we have provided some arguments to justify their accusations. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the trend toward confrontation is not only a political mistake, but that **it is particularly dangerous.** It is not only marked by outdated ways of thinking, but represents a major threat against peaceful transition in our country.

Our people are divided. The split even affects family relations. We should not allow this feud to develop into a profound abyss filled with intolerance and hatred.

This does not mean that contradictions and differences between us should disappear altogether. It does not mean that we should renounce the political struggle altogether. The question is about the standards and the democratic essence of our relations.

We need mutual confidence and a civilized dialogue more than ever today. **A change for the better in our political, moral, and psychological atmosphere is called for.** The people can no longer stand this state of fear and anxiety about their own and their children's safety. The people can no longer live under constant pressure and terror.

We have accumulated considerable positive experiences since 10 November 1989. We have learned from the 29

November events, the roundtable negotiations, the parliamentary elections, the president's election, and the establishment of a new government.

Is it not high time for all of us to engage in joint efforts aimed at **reducing the level of confrontation and at alleviating political tension! Instead of engaging in mutual accusations, let us give priority to joint work for the solution of crucial economic and social problems.**

It is necessary to point out as follows: **The party attaches primary importance to its relations with other parliamentarian and extra-parliamentarian parties, with creative public organizations and movements, with trade unions, youth organizations, civic associations, and initiatives.**

Our policy can be described as follows: It is an open-minded and honest dialogue with all people, based on mutual respect and on observing the independence of all political and other groups, on a constructive approach and cooperation for the country's democratization.

We extend our hand to all those who are striving for civil peace and security, for the promotion of radical reforms, and for the people's prosperity. The BSP is widely opening up for cooperation with other forces existing in our society.

Our party, its leadership, and the BSP parliamentarian group should considerably intensify their efforts for the establishment of new relations and permanent contacts with parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political forces. In this respect our party needs radical renewal. Without this renewal, the party would be incapable of successfully acting under the circumstances of political pluralism as it exists in our country today.

The BSP is resolved to pursue its policy of dialogue and partnership and of civilized democratic relations and tolerant political discussion and struggle with the SDS and with all political forces in Bulgaria. We have once and for all renounced the monopoly on power and on truth, but we shall not accept the existence of a new type of monopolism.

Comrades, one of the most serious assessments which the 39th BSP Congress should make is that the economic crisis in our country has reached **critical limits;** that the material foundations of our society are endangered.

The party was late in analyzing and drawing conclusions about the whole truth of our country's economic situation. The lack of this analysis is the reason for the dangerous delay in implementing a radical economic reform.

Unless we adopt the necessary and timely measures in the economic sphere we should expect the most unfavorable and most unpredictable results, which could even lead to a social cataclysm. We should assume the responsibility and tell the people the truth about our economic situation. **This truth is that we are on the brink of economic ruin, facing the real danger of vitally important socioeconomic functions.**

It is absolutely necessary to admit that this harsh truth was not revealed on time in all its specific and dangerous aspects by the relevant, responsible party and state organs.

The country's economic situation is characterized by a deteriorating and exceptionally acute crisis. What are the most distinctive features of the crisis?

In the first place, we should point out the profound **structural crisis.** The basic feature of this crisis is the lack of a definite structure of economic interests stemming from the devastated structure of property. We are also facing a strong deformation of production and technological structures. It is expressed by the large number of existing production plants which are totally ineffective in regard to their raw material supply and their final products.

The structure of our export and import potential is also ineffective.

A strong deformation in the structure of the distribution of incomes can also be observed. This fact affects civil peace in our country day by day and every hour.

In the second place, we are affected by a deteriorating **recession in production.** During the first seven months of 1990 the amount of goods produced was 9.4 percent less compared with the same period of 1989. The diminishing of production is particularly alarming in the industrial branches producing basic raw materials. The reduction amounts to approximately 18 percent in ferrous metallurgy; to approximately 10 percent in nonferrous metallurgy; to 17 percent in chemical industry, and to more than five percent in the food processing industry.

The most alarming fact, however, is that all stabilization measures adopted so far are related to prices, financial affairs, and taxation, rather than to the improvement of the production situation.

In the third place, the structural deformations and production recess resulted in an **economic imbalance.** On a macro level this situation is reflected by a disastrous disruption in the "comodity to money" proportion. This is the reason for the endless lines in front of food stores. On a micro level this produces an imbalance between the financial incomes of the companies and their consumption in the production process, and also seriously affects family budgets. This situation, in turn, seriously affects the people's confidence in our economic institutions and increases their uncertainty about their own future.

In the fourth place, we should mention the **financial and currency crisis.** Our country's foreign debt amounts to $10.8 billion. The amount of our domestic debt and of our people's savings in domestic currency is also enormous. Our national currency is very unstable which led to speculation and use of foreign currency for domestic payments.

The structure and normal development of our foreign economic relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and with the Western world were also disrupted. The upcoming transition to payments among Eastern European countries in convertible currency and the considerably reduced supplies of goods and raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular, the current Persian Gulf crisis, and the diminished possibilities for Bulgarian exports—all these factors are preventing our country from taking advantage of external factors and sources for free economic development and for overcoming the crisis.

All these facts show the extremely dangerous scope of the crisis. There is no sector of our economy which has remained unaffected.

The reasons are numerous. They were pointed out on several occasions and analyzed at various forums, the Grand National Assembly included. As a matter of fact, the long domination of the totalitarian system and of the authoritarian regime caused a deformation of production relations and led to the working people's alienation from property and management. As a result of subjectivism and arbitrary actions which were allowed to occur in connection with the solution of economic problems, inefficient production capacities were established. Scientific and technical progress was considerably delayed, regardless of the constant protestations in support of it. The one-sided development of our economic relations with a certain group of countries and our isolation from world markets and from international economic relations and institutions contributed to this situation.

We could list numerous other reasons for the crisis attributed to the past. However, we should admit that no significant changes have occurred since 10 November 1989 in this respect. It is particularly disturbing that our pledge to the constituents during the election campaign about radical economic reforms and the promise that we would not allow a deterioration of the working people's situation are being implemented too slowly. Actually, these pledges are not being fulfilled at all and this fact exerts a negative influence on the people's confidence in the party and the government.

We should realize all this harsh truth and admit it frankly to the people, considering that the people are daily bearing its consequences, while the opposition is taking the greatest advantage of it.

The BSP sees a way out of the crisis in speeding up a radical economic reform which is expected to provide for the following measures:

—**Transition to market economy.** Experience shows that there is no alternative for our country in this respect. The BSP is in favor of a broad discussion about clarifying the methods and means of introducing market economy and it advocates the involvement of the country's total intellectual potential, such as specialists, leaders, economic managers, and the entire people in these efforts. The party also recommends that the experience of other countries should be applied on a large scale.

It is particularly important, in our opinion, to draw up a precise and clearly defined economic program containing specific measures expected to be consistently implemented within a schedule.

Public finances must be decisively restructured and strengthened. The entire system of tax deductions, budget plans, financial stimuli, public orders and investments, and the monetary and credit policy must be mainly directed toward achieving high efficiency and profitability with a view to increasing the prosperity of the population and guaranteeing the social functions of the state within the limits determined by the law.

A market economy can be successfully introduced only if the equality of all forms of ownership is guaranteed and the personal, cooperative, and public initiatives are equally encouraged.

The BSP supports the implementation of radical structural changes in our economy and directing them toward making production highly efficient and profitable based upon the country's resources, national traditions, and the qualifications of the manpower.

This means that our existing production must be restructured to accommodate new technologies. This requires that a long-range program be worked out based upon, primarily, the developments of the scientific-technical progress and scientifically-based forecasts of the international market. If we are to become a country open to the world we must expand the geography of our economic relations. We must especially strengthen relations with the developed Western countries without weakening the existing economic relations with the USSR and the other Eastern European countries. However, we must restructure those relations on an economic basis and on the basis of mutual interest.

The structure of revenues requires significant changes. We must ensure that those who work better and show profit earn more.

The implementation of a radical economic reform requires the acceleration of the adoption of new legislation. This is a task that poses a challenge to the Grand National Assembly and requires greater initiative and insistence in the activity of the BSP parliamentary faction.

Pointing out the necessity of consistently implementing a radical economic reform, the BSP simultaneously thinks that certain pressing issues must be resolved. Failing to resolve them on time could lead to unforeseeable social conflicts and losing the confidence of the people.

What are those pressing issues?

First, providing the population with foodstuffs, heating, lighting, and transportation. Urgent measures are necessary to stimulate the production of consumer goods, and to ensure that the production capacities of the light and food industries are fully utilized, that national resources are better utilized, and that priority is given to ensuring the availability of foreign currency for purchasing the most essential raw materials from other countries. It is necessary to decisively strengthen production and labor discipline. Everyone must understand that stocking the stores and eliminating the lines in front of them depends first of all on the production and on the labor activity of all.

Second, the entire system of trade and distribution must decisively improve. This should be done by attracting private capital to this activity, reassessing the channels of state trade, and adopting decisive measures against speculation while simultaneously eliminating economic crime through economic, and administrative-judicial measures.

Third, immediate anti-inflation measures must be adopted. These measures must guarantee the balance between money and goods.

Fourth, a radical agrarian reform must be implemented. It must give the green light to the interests, stimuli, and initiative of the people individually or collectively engaged in agriculture.

Finally, a political consensus for implementing the economic reform must be achieved. The economic shocks must be made as small as possible by political cooperation. The first condition for achieving this is to oppose every **social demagogy** and every attempt to utilize the inevitable reaction to the price increase and the deterioration of the standard of living for the accumulation of political capital. The party will consistently strive toward seeking national consensus on the basis of common belief in the necessity of a market economy, and not as was done in 1946.

Comrades, the crisis sharply posed the issue of **the nation's unity, national security, and sovereignty.**

History has left us an **exceptionally grave heritage in connection with the nationality issue. Almost 2 million Bulgarians still live outside the borders of the Bulgarian state which was restored in 1878.** The bourgeois parties wasted the chance of resolving the nationality issue and twice brought the country to a national catastrophe.

From the historical point of view our party's policy on the nationality issue marked a **complex and contradictory development**—from active support and participation in the national liberation struggles to the adoption of nihilistic postulates. During the years of totalitarianism, grave mistakes were made and they had difficult political and moral consequences for the Bulgarian nation. Toward its end, the authoritarian regime began to implement the so-called "revival process," which extremely exacerbated the ethnic problem in the country.

The BSP rejected those deformations and condemned the methods by which they were implemented.

The party understood the exceptional importance of the problems related to the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation. We understand that resolving those problems is a task of great importance in implementing the peaceful transition toward the democratic society. At our initiative, and with the cooperation of the other political forces, immediately after 10 November 1989 urgent measures were adopted in order to prevent the development of ethnic conflagration. However, the ethnic fire is still alive. History provides many bitter examples of how social contradictions can be transferred to the ethnic area and develop into conflicts that are very difficult to control.

Today more than ever before, Bulgaria **needs a lasting all-national policy and program of action in the realm of the nationality issue,** coordinated with the democratic traditions of our people and international experience, and based on a profound scientific analysis. The BSP opposes speculation with these issues because of narrow party interests and declares its readiness to actively cooperate in implementing a uniform national policy.

The BSP will consistently follow the **line of achieving national consensus and unity on the basis of citizens' equality, regardless of their religion and to which ethnic group they belong. Simultaneously, the BSP firmly and decisively opposes all attempts to instill separatism** through Islamic fundamentalism, Macedonism, or other anti-Bulgarian ideas.

The BSP will defend the rights of Bulgarians abroad and will make efforts to protect and develop their patriotic and national feelings. We shall defend the national dignity and honor of Bulgarians—something that was neglected for decades. We shall decisively oppose the attempts to breed disunity in the Bulgarian nation and falsify and rob our national history and culture.

The present situation is characterized by a high degree of internal and international **destabilization.** Not only are basic national structures and values being dismantled and destroyed without new ones being formed, but this process **is accompanied by fundamental changes in the principles and character of our mutual relations with the world.** It is not only that we are opening ourselves to the world, but the world is bursting into our social space. The world itself experiences the historical transition from a bipolar confrontation to multidirectional polarization and simultaneous integration. In this unstable world, in which the political blocs of the past are disintegrating and new structures, principles, and norms of international life are emerging, we can preserve our national and state identity only if we conduct a new policy, corresponding to the contemporary realities.

Defending Bulgaria's **national sovereignty,** the **territorial integrity** of the country, and the **security** of the Bulgarian people has always been and remains a primary task of the BSP.

Comrades, as is well known, as a result of the elections for the Grand National Assembly held on 10 and 17 June this year, the BSP won a majority of the seats and formed a parliamentary group which was strong in its potential capabilities.

Our people's deputies have accumulated some experience under the difficult conditions of continuous political antagonism. They are participating constructively in the parliamentary debates. The Socialist deputies are succeeding in retaining their self-control in serious critical situations, even including cases when they were subjected to direct provocations and gross pressure outside parliament. By their responsible attitude to the problems discussed in the Grand National Assembly, the BSP deputies are demonstrating in practice that they set the interests of the country above party interests.

The BSP parliamentary group displays a desire for constructive cooperation with the political forces represented in the Grand National Assembly. They are gradually foiling the attempts of the forces of the right to place the party on the defenders' bench and to lynch it politically. Thanks to our party's flexibility and realism, a number of important, mutually acceptable decisions have been reached in the Grand National Assembly on issues of national importance.

However, the BSP parliamentary group is still a long way from what it should be. The criticisms leveled by the voters against the group are in many respects well-founded. The group's activity in parliament may be considered from several aspects: participation in the debates; participation in the commissions; work in the lobbies; and, outside parliament, participation in the mass media; political activity outside parliament; and cooperation with the Supreme Party Council and the government.

The group is not participating uniformly, or sufficiently actively, in the discussions in the Grand National Assembly. It often loses the initiative, or beats a retreat for no good reason. A considerable number of the delegates remain passive observers during the debates. Because of the unjustified absences of certain deputies, the party found itself in the minority on certain issues, which, moreover, were not the subject of dispute or disagreements within the group. Information is available concerning inactive participation in the commissions, ranging from unexplained absences from the work of the commissions to a lack of activity in certain of them. In the lobbies our deputies usually associate among themselves and do not seek to make active contacts with the delegates of other groups. Usually the same people keep making appearances in the mass media, mainly the spokesmen of the group. One does not sense to the necessary extent the organizing and political role of the group's leadership. No permanent groups of experts have been formed to advise the people's deputies.

As a whole, our people's deputies maintain links with the electorate, and there are no particular complaints in this respect. As far as relations with the Supreme Party Council and the government are concerned, parliamentary activity poses a number of new problems. This activity is an extremely important factor in determining and implementing party policy. In addition, it has its own independent role. The people's deputies are the party's political potential, but they are first and foremost the elected representatives of the people. With the transfer of the center of national political life to the Grand National Assembly, the role and importance of the parliament group will grow. The parliamentary group has become a permanently functioning organ, and, for this reason, ways must be sought and found to synchronize its activity with the work of the Supreme Party Council and the government. With regard to the Supreme Party Council, the possibility must be provided for it to issue pronouncements (with the participation of the people's deputies, a practice which has already been established) on fundamental and especially topical issues which are about to be examined in the Grand National Assembly. More BSP ministers could play a considerably more active part in the work of the parliamentary group. The government, in its turn, can hardly continue to count on the uncritical attitude toward its work which has prevailed so far. The Socialist deputies have the constitutional right to criticize the work of the government and the individual ministers.

The reasons for the state of affairs in the BSP parliamentary group vary in their nature. The absence of parliamentary experience and traditions may provide an explanation, but not a justification. It is evident that modern parliamentary work takes much time and effort and requires a high level of parliamentary professionalism. The people's deputies will have to give much more attention to their activity in parliament and the parliamentary commissions, make serious preparations for the debates, and display greater activity and boldness. In addition, the leadership of the parliamentary group must engage in speedily resolving a number of problems concerning the normal work, professional obligations, and everyday conditions of the deputies, especially those from the provinces.

This it is even more necessary now, when the country is soon to hold elections of the local organs of state power. The BSP will face serious trials in the forthcoming elections. The opposition will attempt to make the BSP completely responsibile for the deepening economic and social crisis on the one hand, and, on the other, will try to take revenge for its defeat in the general elections.

The situation before these elections is quite different from that preceding the previous ones. There are grounds to assume that there will be a considerable increase in the number of people who do not vote. Some people are becoming apathetic; others will calculate that it will be more sensible not to take part, given the existing polarization of the political forces; still others are fearful—especially after the burning of the party building. The party which succeeds in mobilizing to the

maximum its members, sympathizers, and supporters is the one which has prospects of success.

A further feature of the elections is the creation, together with the other political forces, of interim councils in the townships and interim executive committees in the municipalities and oblasts.

Apart from fully mobilizing the party organizations, it is necessary to put forward as BSP candidates for the local organs of authority experienced and predominantly younger, competent people, people of the managerial type, people who have emerged as local leaders, who are not discredited, and who enjoy trust and respect. Some of them emerged during the elections for the Grand National Assembly.

The election campaign will center on unresolved local problems. In the medium-sized and large towns, the food supply problem will be uppermost. The party must demand that the government adopts effective measures to overcome the severity of the food crisis. Problems connected with the commodity funds, unemployment, prices, social welfare, and ecology will also come to the forefront. The problems of municipal self-government, budget independence, decentralization, and support from the state will be of particular importance. The campaign against speculation and illegal incomes will also be one of the most acute problems. Our candidates must come out with programs which include granting land to the peasants, encouraging private initiative, creating municipal companies and links with foreign firms, outlining the possibilities for investments, a well thought out taxation policy, and a program on the sensible and profitable utilization of the resources of the particular populated area. Here, there will be no place for value-based arguments, but only for specific proposals.

The tasks which the party must set itself in the local authority elections is **to gain the trust of the population and win a majority in the local organs of power together with the independents and other allies.** This is a realistic task, and it can be achieved if the party enters the election campaign transformed and mobilized, if it develops modern, highly effective, honest and frank political and propaganda activity, and if it reaches every person and every voter.

Comrades, the party finds itself in a period of crisis. This crisis has two aspects. On the one hand, it is a crisis of **the old, totalitarian type of party,** of its ideology, policies, organization, structures, activity, composition, and leading cadres. It was precisely this type of party which was rejected at the 14th extraordinary congress. For this very reason, we set ourselves the task of radically changing the party, of transforming it into a new party, a party of democratic socialism.

On the other hand, it is the critical process of the party's renewal. The crisis has still not been overcome by **the new party which is being formed.** Without underestimating everything which we have achieved during the first phase of renewal, we must recognize that the renewal is being delayed; it has not developed to the necessary extent and depth, it has not encompassed the whole of the party—from the Presidium of the Supreme Party Council to the basic party organizations. It is primarily here that we should seek the reasons for the exacerbation of the crisis within the party following the parliamentary elections.

At present we face two chief dangers: splitting and disintegration. Both threaten the party with ruin.

Within the party there are circles which are openly calling for a split. Some are attempting to prove that there is no other way to create a new socialist party except through organizationally splitting off the reformist tendencies into a separate party. They are also taking specific actions in this direction, such as forming parallel structures. Others call upon those who do not share their views to leave the party and form their own separate party. Both of these groups are putting ultimatum-type demands to the entire party. They threaten to leave the party's ranks unless their ideological and political platform is adopted. The same aims are also served by the demands to purge the party of dissidents, including the reregistration of party members.

The party must develop a clear position on these issues. Splitting would imply disaster for the party, precisely what the opposition is hoping for. The fate of allied parties in other countries demonstrates this. The party has a chance of preserving its role as a principal political force only if it entirely transforms itself, not if it fragments into individual small parties. What is needed now for the democratization of Bulgarian society is a politically strong party of the masses, containing different tendencies within it. The danger to the party's unity comes not from the presence of differing ideological tendencies, platforms, and associations, but from lack of tolerance and displays of hostility in relations between these tendencies, and from the attempts of some of them to split off and shut themselves up within themselves, creating parallel structures and inciting splits.

We must also recognize that, even if a split can be prevented, the party is threatened with **disintegration.** Calls and proposals are being made for the party to disband itself and a new party created in its place, a party which will categorically renounce the present party, as well as the assets and, most of all, the liabilities of its century-long history. We must unconditionally dissociate ourselves from such views and attitudes. They are an expression of a lack of faith in the party's ability to radically renew itself, and then lead the party toward its actual destruction. Similar attempts in other countries also had the same consequences.

The signs of another process of destabilization of the party, a process which has already started, are also extremely dangerous.

In a number of places, especially in the large towns, certain municipal party councils find themselves unable to adapt to the new conditions and carry out their

functions successfully. The links between the Supreme Party Council, the municipal party councils, and the primary party organizations are seriously hampered and are ineffective. The functioning of the party at the regional and local level has been disrupted to a large extent. Its actions are sluggish and produce inadequate results. Recently certain Socialists have been showing confusion and fear in the face of the aggressiveness of the opposition and the threats of physical violence, especially following the vandalistic burning of the party building in Sofia.

However, the party also faces other dangers, dangers which we must take into account. The serious economic situation, the political and social tension, and the provocations of extremist forces may provoke a political and ideological gravitation to power of the "strong hand," toward conservatism in the party, and toward nationalism, all of which, combined with the rooted egalitarian traditions, might turn the core of the party in the opposite direction. The danger of conservatism is a great and real one, and it cannot be neglected. We must be completely clear that the BSP will lose every chance and prospect if it starts along this path. Conservatism can bury the party, regardless of whether the burial ceremony is a solemn and stirring one.

The way to overcome the crisis, to overcome the danger of splitting, disintegrating, or becoming ossified, is to renew the party around its platform for transforming it into a new party of democratic socialism.

The platform submitted by the Supreme Party Council to the party for discussion was assessed by the party as corresponding to the demands for a new left party of democratic socialism, at one and the same time a parliamentary and a mass party. This platform reflects the ideas of the reformist forces in the party. The platform does not reflect the ideas of those party members who view the renewal as a piece of window dressing, as a clinging to concepts which have outlived their time, or as a tactical means of blunting the criticism of the party coming from the opposition. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the participants assessed the platform as a basis in principle for rallying and transforming the party.

Compared with the Manifesto approved at the 14th (extraordinary) congress, the platform defines in specific terms the idea of democratic socialism; elucidates the party's attitude to Marxism-Leninism; brings the concept of the party's social base up to date; reveals the ineffectiveness of the party's present organizational structure; poses the question of new structures; and, together with the draft statute, reestablishes certain important organizational principles, such as the right of punishment from above as the prerogative of the Central Control Commission, not of the Supreme Party Council or the Presidium—a more democratic principle. The platform also more clearly reveals the party's place and role in the democratic state.

The discussion on the platform—both in the press and at the party meetings and conferences of the municipal party organizations—categorically proved, including by written resolutions, that the idea of transforming the party into a modern socialist party enjoyed the greatest support among the membership. The platform was adopted by the majority of the party members.

However, the platform was subjected to two diametrically opposed schools of criticism.

One section of the members want the BSP to become a social democratic party. They believe that the party must reject Marxism completely and take as its model certain social democratic parties. For them, the party should become merely a movement, a movement which should renounce its structures and principles of organization, especially its vertical structures.

A second section of the membership want the party to completely return to Marxism-Leninism, and to restore the principle of democratic centralism. No matter how much they may call for a creative development of Marxism-Leninism, for a democratization of centralism, these critics of the platform are unable to outline the path for the party's renewal.

There also exists a third school of criticism of the draft platform. This school expresses approval for the draft platform, but goes on to make a multitude of sensible and constructive proposals for improving and perfecting it. At the 10,273 meetings and conferences which were held, over 100,000 proposals were made, over 270 articles published in the press, and thousands of letters sent to the party councils.

It is clear that the congress should examine and evaluate all three groups of assessments and proposals. The Supreme Party Council considers that the first and the second concepts on the party's future should be rejected as unacceptable in principle. We cannot remain the same kind of party that we were before, but neither should the transformation of the BSP amount to its social democratization. With regard to the numerous valuable suggestions for improving the platform, we feel that they should certainly be taken into consideration.

There is every ground to make the assessment that, following the all-party and congress discussion, the BSP will have available a solidly based political program document for transforming it into a new party of democratic socialism. The question remains, how is this transformation to be implemented in practice?

The formula "left, right, and center" or "conservatives, radicals, and center" does not suit our conditions. The issue is not one of uniting the party's forces around some center which will balance the two extremes. The party's renewal has made considerable progress. The question is **to rally all the reformist forces and the majority of the Socialists around the platform for transforming the BSP into a modern left party of democratic socialism.** We

require not a center, but the unity of the reformist forces and all who support radical change of the BSP. This is what we need now.

There are reformers, as well as conservatives, incidentally, among all the generations.

We must undoubtedly and unhesitatingly open the way to the younger generations, including the youngest, namely the 30-35 year-olds. Young faces should predominate in both the work and the leaderships of the party.

However, this does not at all imply restricting or isolating the older generations, the party veterans included. They are needed for the reform, and they will take part in the change.

The conclusion which must be drawn is that all the reformist forces within the party are needed for the renewal and transformation of the BSP, irrespective of the generation or tendency to which they belong. The main thing now is to consolidate these forces and, together with this, make a start on a determined rejuvenation of the party and its leadership, from the top to the bottom.

The practical course of this process shows that four dangers pose the greatest threat.

First, conservatism. This is a reluctance and inability to change. Conservatism is not a mass phenomenon in the party. The overwhelming proportion of Socialists recognize the need for change. They support change, and are striving and struggling to change the party.

However, at the present conservatism presents the main danger, because it **is delaying the change, holding the party back, and threatening it with falling fatally behind the development of the social processes in Bulgaria and the world.**

We cannot fail to be alarmed when we encounter conservatism in articles in the press, expressed in the familiar style of outdated thinking with the familiar anathemas pronounced against everything new. It is indicative of the personal theoretical and political drama of party members, some of whom are honorable and have performed great services in the past, but do not understand the new realities. Because of this, they are unable to do what Lenin did at the end of his life—to rethink the new reality from a new viewpoint.

We, their party comrades, can understand them, but we cannot permit their personal drama to become a drama of the party. The party cannot allow itself to fall behind the progress of life. That would mean its ruin.

Second, there is the danger of **pseudoradicalism.** The radical change of the party is a vital necessity. The radicals are of great value now, because they are the standard-bearers of the change, but only the true radicals, not the pseudoradicals, who think that the change can be accomplished in 24 hours. Their problem is that they are cut off from reality. The danger of pseudoradicalism lies in the fact that it underrates the mass nature of the party (and hence the difficulty of the change,) and may provoke endless internal party conflicts and struggles.

The radicals must be supported. Most often, they are young Socialists. We must not be afraid of radicalism, it is a positive phenomenon. It is needed in order to counteract pseudoradicalism, because the supporters of the latter are most often interested not in changing the party, but in their own fates in the change.

Third, delaying the process of bringing to account those specifically responsible for the committed violations of the law and party ethics. This delay is destroying the people's faith, by shedding doubt on the sincerity of our intention to change ourselves. Every crime, every breach of the law, every infringement of morality is a specific act and is committed by a specific individual. It is precisely this specific perpetrator who must bear the relevant responsibility and endure the penalty, of course, only after his guilt has been proven. We cannot make use of the methods of totalitarianism in the fight against totalitarianism.

The party assumes the political responsibility for the period of its government, but it cannot assume the collective responsibility for the illegal acts of its officials and leaders. The party consists of hundreds of thousands of honorable and worthy Socialists, worthy citizens and builders of Bulgaria.

Fourth, there is the **appearance of an original kind of Robespierrism** among certain Socialists. They are ready to condemn and reject everything and everyone; to subject everyone to the guillotine of extreme assessments and epithets; and to cast out of the party everything which runs counter to their own assessments. They have no place in the party for the confused, the frightened, the traditionalists, the radicals, and the doubters. They insist on turning the party organizations into courts of law, in order to cast out everything which, according to their own criteria, is unworthy of the party.

It is clear what kind of self-destructive struggle will ensue tomorrow in the party if, God forbid, it starts along this path—what self-animosity, self-incrimination, and suspicion. We already know this from the guillotining of Danton, from the millions of victims of Stalin, from the horrors of the "cultural revolution," from the hunt for "the enemy with a party ticket."

The party should resolutely reject this path, unless it wants to blow itself up.

The whole of our society now stands on the threshold of profound socioeconomic changes.

First, changes in ownership, especially in state ownership and in the development of private ownership, will promote three types of interests. They will create a class of **property owners**, both individual and collective; a class of **workers**, producing a value-added product; and the class of those who **service** this production.

Second, denationalization and privatization will lead to the formation of the interests of the **small** and **medium-sized** owners. Some of the present marginal sections of society will gravitate toward these groups.

Third, the development of the shareholding and cooperative forms of production will change the status of some of the worker-producers and draw them close to the middle class, while those who do not own shares will gravitate toward the socially weak strata.

Of course, we are referring to a general trend, because the supply and demand of manpower in the market will also be associated with other possible consequences.

However, these trends show that social differentiation in the country will deepen. This differentiation is dual in nature. On the one hand, it sets apart the above-mentioned social classes; on the other, the dividing line according to political affiliation and political standpoint runs **across** these large social groups. As the elections showed, workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia cast their votes for both the BSP and the SDS. In such a situation, we cannot fail to ask ourselves what the social base of our party will be.

a) The BSP—party of the working people.

The working people—both intellectual and physical workers—form the natural social base of the BSP as the flag-bearer of the socialist idea. At the same time, our party cannot remain a party only of the workers class, nor again can it claim to be a "nationwide" party. In the first case, we would constrict the broad humanitarian content of the socialist idea, which extends beyond the bounds of individual class interest. In the second case, we will lose our image as a political party. As a modern left party, the BSP draws its support from the sections of today's workers, peasants, and intellectuals who rely exclusively on their own labor, not on exploiting another's labor. This naturally includes physical and intellectual labor, the labor involved in carrying out a task, and also entrepreneurial labor. The party will help and encourage entrepreneurial labor, the labor of initiative, of the bold stroke. The BSP will not be a party of the nouveaux riches, nor of the struggling proletariat. By protecting the interests of the people of industrial, agricultural, and intellectual labor, our party protects the interests of the majority of the Bulgarian nation.

b) The workers will defend their political interests through the BSP.

Although it declared that it was a workers' party, the party in fact turned its back on the interests of the workers in material production and services. As a result of the party merging with the state, the party in fact took the part of the administration against the workers themselves.

This isolation from the workers' class is disastrous not only for the party's present, but also for its future. The workers of material production and services will continue in the future to form the backbone of the BSP. The values which the BSP defends reflect the real interests of the workers concerning freedom, democracy, participation in the management of production, fair distribution, and humane working conditions. We will fight not only for proper social assistance in the event of unemployment, but also, first and foremost, for protection of jobs through investments which create jobs, instead of being aimed solely at profit.

The removal of the BSP organizations from the enterprises does not imply that the party is disengaging itself from protecting the workers' social and professional interests. It will continue to do this in the future, in cooperation and dialogue with the trade union organizations, while respecting their independence. At present, the cooperation with the trade unions is beneath criticism, and this is abnormal for a left party with traditional links with the workers' movement.

c) The peasants will continue in the future to hold an important position in the social base of the BSP.

The substantial support which the BSP received among the agricultural workers is of strategic importance. To a large extent, the workers in this dynamic and promising sector of the national economy are emerging as agents of the new entrepreneurial activity which will bring the country out of the crisis and modernize it. The laboring people in the country supported the BSP's demand for the land to the granted to those who cultivate it. They supported us because they rely on their own labor, and know that the Bulgarian countryside will not become rich if a handful of rentiers again make their appearance and if the practice of hiring day laborers makes a comeback.

However, this support is not automatic. In order to retain and increase it, the BSP will have to develop an active policy for the countryside, which means giving political protection to both the independent farms and the cooperatives. This means applying a policy in the village communities which accelerates the modernization of the villages and improves living conditions there. Finally, this means that the Socialists from the villages must engage actively in politics and actively defend the interests of the agricultural workers.

d) The intelligentsia—generator of ideas for the BSP.

The intelligentsia holds a special place in the BSP's social base. It forms the party's intellectual potential and is the bearer of the new theoretical and political thinking in the party. We have always been, and must continue to be a party of the most talented representatives of intellectual and creative labor. The BSP is open to every intellectual, because it is a party of reason, social criticism, and social creativity.

The party needs a revived policy in the fields of science, culture, and education. This policy must be based on freedom of creative work, increasing state and public

financing of the intellectual sphere, and opening Bulgaria widely to the world. On the other hand, the Socialist intellectuals must be creators of ideas and intellectual circles which will formulate the most up-to-date directions in national culture and the intellectual atmosphere.

The BSP cannot be transformed into a new modern party unless it becomes a center for the latest developments in the world of intellectual creativity and manages to attract into its ranks representatives from all branches of the intelligentsia.

e) The BSP will always be on the side of the youth.

The BSP must finally renounce paternalism in its attitude to the youth. The premise that the youth organizations are "a reserve and assistance to the party" is wrong. The youth are the most revolutionary and innovative force for restructuring society and the party. It is not the youth who should provide assistance to the party, but the party which should provide assistance to the youth.

Youth will be most vulnerable to the blows of the economic crisis. We are concerned with the fact that many youth, specialists with higher education, and students are leaving the country. This is a professional and intellectual loss for the nation. The party's influence among the youth will depend to a decisive degree on its ability to propose a clear policy that will correspond to the interests of the various groups of young people. In this context we must utilize the experience of the alternative movements in the West.

The party has a future only if it sharply rejuvenates its composition, cadres, and political energy and implements broad contacts and cooperation with all democratic youth organizations on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

Comrades, important organizational changes took place in the party after the 14th (extraordinary) congress. The most important among them were: a) eliminating the party organizations at places of work; b) establishing clubs on the basis of interest; and c) eliminating democratic centralism.

Consequently, the methods of exercising power within the party rapidly began to disappear, and the organizations felt freer. Simultaneously, the party's organizational situation sharply deteriorated. The restructuring of the power bases was not sufficiently prepared from the organizational point of view. The interest clubs mostly exist on paper. The BSP Supreme Council proved incapable of constantly working with the municipal party councils. We witness an organizational crisis and self-emasculation in the party.

All this poses the issue of effecting serious changes in the party's organizational and cadre work and policy.

First. We need a vital, modern, and efficient organizational party structure. The existing situation is abnormal and unacceptable. Actually, the basic party organizations are left to themselves. The municipal party councils do not regularly obtain information from the BSP Supreme Council. The BSP Supreme Council with its reduced apparatus, cannot maintain a direct connection with all basic and municipal party organizations. The experience that was accumulated after the 14th extraordinary congress clearly shows that there cannot be an integral party based on horizontal structures and links only. We also need vertical structures and links and regional coordinating units, which will have a clear public nature without too many payroll employees. A part of the municipal party councils strengthen their cadres and modernize their activity. We also must consider the fact that they employ too many cadres. The BSP Supreme Council and its Presidium also require strengthening and renewal.

The party's new character requires that it has at its disposal a system of influential basic organizations based on places of living. They must be constructed within the framework of the election constituencies, and have a relatively small number of members. The existing clubs based on interest, profession, and proximity of ideological views, should be preserved and turned into active centers of human communication.

Second. We need cadre renewal and rejuvenation.

Our attitude toward the cadres directly responsible for the deformations that have been allowed, and guilty of corruption and crimes, is categorically clear: Harsh political and legal responsibility must be sought from them, regardless of the post they have had in the past or have now. This process cannot be delayed or protracted any longer.

This does not mean a "witch-hunt." Not everyone who was a party official until 10 November should be presumed guilty. The guilt always is direct and specific. The party will make a cardinal mistake if it subjects thousands of cadres, who have worked in the party, state, public, and economic leaderships in the last four decades, to total incrimination.

Simultaneously, the party needs a **new cadre policy.** The party finds itself in an unprecedented cadre vacuum. This situation was produced by the fact that our party, as it was during the period of totalitarianism, did not train professional politicians. Now we need many cadres ready to make politics their profession. Some of them must be directed toward the Grand National Assembly, others—toward direct party work. From this point of view the congress must decide whether the limited term of office system must be used under conditions of pluralism. This system can turn into a barrier, stopping the influx and growth of professional politicians.

The training and qualification of cadres must modernize. Young and capable specialists must be systematically sent for study and specialization to the most famous educational establishments in Bulgaria and abroad, at the expenses of the party.

Third. We cannot exist without an ideological pluralism, precisely as we cannot exist without political and organizational unity. We are united by the manifesto, the platform, and the party charter. We can differ in many things and yet be united in the main factor—restructuring the party into a modern leftist party of democratic socialism. Our charter must determine in principle what the various ideological currents and associations can or cannot do from the viewpoint of the party's political and organizational unity.

Everything that was said until now shows that it is necessary to decisively strengthen the party from a political and organizational point of view. This must be done rapidly and energetically. **The program of action** that was presented to the congress, is devoted to this goal.

Comrades, I shall not speak about the international situation, the international reality, or the party's international relations not because we underestimate them, but because we must discuss and decide internal issues. Of course, we shall discuss those issues in the context of the international processes and tendencies and in integral relation to them.

I shall only point out that the BSP is an organic part of the European leftist forces, and from this position it must analyze the international situation and implement its international activity and policy.

I would like to end the report by expressing a deep and pure belief in the future of socialism and the BSP and with the following words: **Keep your heads up, dear delegates and guests of the 39th BSP Congress and dear Bulgarian Socialists! By restructuring the party we shall make it even stronger, more attractive, and more essential to Bulgaria!**

Thank-you for your attention!

Opposition Makes Conditions for Joining Coalition

AU2609121590 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Georgi Spasov article: "Will the Bulgarian Socialist Party Remain a Millstone Round the Neck of the Bulgarian People?"]

[Excerpts] Despite the BSP's good-natured preelection promises concerning success, calm, and peace for Bulgaria during the gradual transition to a market economy, double and triple leaps across chasms, and God knows what other magic spells, miracles, and conjuring tricks, events are following their objective course, and the country is entering the apocalypse of a third national disaster. Throwing away the last $1.2 billion on repaying our $12 billion debt (instead of declaring a moratorium on payments and using the money to buy the necessary raw and other materials for our industry) was such a blow below the belt of our tottering economy that it might enter the Guinness Book of Records as an example of an advance knockout of a political opponent who in your view was certain to win the elections, had he not committed the blunder of losing them.

Although the punch was not precisely calculated, it was delivered, and the scenario prepared in advance is developing successfully. Production is falling rapidly, and prices are rising at lightning speed. Everything which is eaten, drunk, used for clothing or footwear, makes life easier, or keeps one warm is either scarce or not available. Speculation and the black market are spreading like a plague. [passage omitted]

Any normal party in any normal country would have swallowed the bitter pill, even if it was intended for one and all. However, the BSP is not a normal party, and Bulgaria is not a normal country. Therefore, instead of forming its own government in order to carry out its election campaign program, or admitting that it has no program to bring the country out of the quagmire into which it has plunged it, and giving the opposition a chance to form a government without BSP participation, it is seeking partners in order to form and head a coalition government.

What are the advantages for the BSP?

First, maintaining its leading role and its control of power.

Second, decapitating and neutralizing the opposition, by making it its own ally.

Third, usurping and utilizing the program and intellectual potential of the opposition and its electors.

Fourth, dividing the responsibility for the unpopular measures which will inevitably accompany the fulfillment of the program.

Fifth, taking for itself all the credit for the final success!

Sixth, and last, sending the opposition way to a closet to study the lessons of politics.

If the opposition had agreed this, it would have been tantamount to signing its own death sentence, putting its own neck in the noose, and then knocking the chair away from under its own feet.

In his concern over the country's fate, President Zhelyu Zhelev has proposed the formation of a government to carry out a program adopted by parliament.

The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] might participate in such a government under certain conditions.

What are these conditions?

First, the ruling clique in the BSP should acknowledge that the country has entered a third national disaster, and accept the entire responsibility for this.

Second, the need to adopt a parliamentary program shows that the BSP does not possess its own program to

bring the country out of the disastrous situation. It must admit that its preelection program was a bluff, and accept the main principles and provisions of the SDS program.

Third, the BSP is still the party-cum-state which possesses political, economic, and repressive power in the state. In order to overcome this difficulty, it must completely divorce itself from the state in the political, economic, and property aspects. In order to achieve this, the following must be carried out:

—The complete depoliticization must be effected of the Army, militia, the courts, prosecuting service, and the ministries and departments which are responsible for foreign political and foreign economic relations and which deal with state property.

—The BSP must return all property which has not been acquired with the receipts from membership subscriptions or gifts from its members, and also carry out a complete audit of all its income and expenditure from September 1944 to the present.

—No BSP member or representative should participate in the government who served as a member of its central leaderships or the government before 10 November 1989. [passage omitted]

Assembly Passes Pension Bill, Decree on Children

AU2709084890 Sofia BTA in English 2054 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 26 Sep (BTA)—Today the Bulgarian parliament passed a bill updating some pensions and amending the Pension Law.

This is the first bill passed by the Grand National Assembly since it began its work two months and a half ago. It took the standing parliamentary committees a long time to discuss the draft law. Today the government gave guarantees that with this bill a temporary solution to the problem was sought by making it possible to compensate the pensioners, to some extent, for the rise in the cost of living and the inflation. A lot of national representatives stated they cast their votes for the bill in the hope that in this way the working out a new social security law at an early date would be stimulated and the Pension Act would be entirely changed. The government also guaranteed that the funds for increasing the pensions were available and that it would not trigger a further growth of the inflation.

The amendment is based on the following guiding principle: "equal labour—equal pensions." A lot of pensioners in the country will benefit from it, especially agricultural workers.

On the strength of the bill the incomes of people who qualified for pensions, old-age pensions and the pensions of civil and military invalids are updated depending on the year they were pensioned off.

The M.P.'s today approved a declaration addressed to the participants in the world summit meeting on the problems of children which opens in New York on September 29 this year. "The decisions of this meeting will be given priority in determining and pursuing the country's policy and in all activity with regard to children, young people and families," it is said in the declaration. The Bulgarian parliament expresses its respect for the initiative launched by the presidents of Canada, Egypt, Mali, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden and for the activity of the UN secretary general, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar who were instrumental in convening the summit meeting. "We believe that the time has come when through the common efforts of all nations and people a 'grand alliance in the name of the child' will be formed," it is said in the declaration in conclusion.

Today opposition M.P. Solomon Pasi moved for Bulgaria's sending a small military contingent of volunteers to the region of the Persian Gulf. The proposal will be discussed in the parliamentary committees for foreign policy and for national security which should come out with a stand the soonest possible.

Within few days the parliamentarians will debate the draft law for combating profiteering. A draft law on the police is also debated at the parliamentary committees.

Government Urges Accord on Interim Local Bodies

AU2709120290 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 26 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] The first agreed interim executive committees of the municipal People's Councils are to be approved within the next few days, announces the Council of Ministers. However, a considerable number of the protocols on the consultations of the main political forces are being submitted to the government with dissenting opinions.

The approval of the memberships of the interim executive committees of the municipal people's councils in cases of dissent between the main political forces would create conditions for their work to be impeded. The appearance of sharp contradictions would affect the preparations for the forthcoming elections and the solving of the population's most immediate problems.

Guided by this assessment and after consulting the president of the Republic and representatives of the main political forces, the government recommends as follows:

The consultations should continue during the next two or three days to overcome the differences, and the agreed protocols should be submitted to the Council of Ministers by 28 September at the latest.

As well as the other criteria employed in determining the compositions of the interim executive committees of the municipal People's Councils and the numbers of representatives of the main political forces, one should bear in

mind the principle of proportional representation, i.e. the relative influence of each political force in the territory of the particular municipality.

At the meeting between the president of the Republic and the main political forces a recommendation was made to select persons who possess the necessary civic and executive qualities and who enjoy the trust of the population.

No political force or coalition may impose a decision on the others—this principle of the law must be borne in mind when agreeing the memberships of the interim executive committees. This presupposes that consensus should be reached on questions of substance when forming the executive committees, as well as when they are functioning.

DEMOKRATSIYA Reporters Protest to Readers

AU2609152790 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 11 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "To the Readers of DEMOKRATSIYA: The Ones Responsible for the Situation"]

[Excerpts] As is well known, the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] "appointed" a new editor in chief and a new political director for the daily, DEMOKRATSIYA, and adopted the aggressive decision that the paper should become an organ of the SDS Coordinating Council. The latter is very reminiscent of a semi-legal letter of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party which aimed at ensuring that the Central Committee retained its positions in the regional press after 10 November 1989. The similarity is striking.

The publishing council of DEMOKRATSIYA has begun a discussion of the situation which has been created. A total of 32 members of the editorial collective voted "against" the technique of imposing this decision "from above," nine abstained, and four voted "for."

So much for the background. Somehow or another, a new Yordan Yotov [former editor in chief of RABOTNICHESKO DELO and chief Bulgarian Communist Party Ideologist] was born, who tried to give a new status to the DEMOKRATSIYA daily. This new Yordan Yotov has taken a stand against the freedom of the press, against the important democratic principle which has seen the light of day because of the fundamental right of people to freely express their thoughts in the struggle for a more just life and their "pursuit of happiness" (Thomas Jefferson, "Declaration of Independence," dated 214 years ago).

The freedom of the press in Bulgaria is a freedom provided by law. If DEMOKRATSIYA changes its status, it will never manage to become a force which is impartial and critical toward the legislative, executive, and juridical powers in the country. DEMOKRATSIYA will also be unable to oppose the mistakes which the SDS coalition will certainly commit in the future, because the newspaper will be governed by the SDS' Politburo. [passage omitted]

On every occasion when the status of a newspaper is restricted, an assault is committed against freedom of speech.

6 September 1990.

Yuliya Lyutskanova, Zhaklin Mikhaylov, Aleksandur Dinekov, Zhivka Atanasova, Lyudmila Dimitrova, Tanya Neshova, Ivaylo Dimitrov, Aleksandur Karaangelov, Iskren Plamenov, Ani Sargavakyan, Radoslav Cherkezov, Maya Krivoshieva, Aleksandrina Georgieva, Lazar Dimov, Galina Tencheva, Petur Iliev, Georgi Andonov, Rumyana Petrova, Rumen Pruvchev, Eva Dimcheva, Plamen Krayski, Kalina Bozeva, Purvan Stoyanov, Iliya Damyanov, Valeriya Kalcheva, Nevena Marinova, Svetla Bobeva, Rositsa Nikolova, Evgeni Goranov, Atanas Spasov, Boyko Nikolov, Dimo Kazulov, and Vladimir Bakhchevanov.

The following members of the editorial collegium assume political responsibility for the publication of this letter: Aleksandur Dinekov, Aleksandur Karaangelov, Boyko Nikolov, Dimo Kazulov, Eva Dimcheva, Plamen Georgiev-Krayski, and Khristo Andreev.

Director Assails Dissident Journalists

AU2609164590 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 19 Sep 90 p 1

[Georgi Spasov, director of DEMOKRATSIYA, article: "Freedom Is Not Only a Right, but Also a Responsibility"]

[Text] "As is well known, the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] 'appointed' a new editor in chief and a new political director for the DEMOKRATSIYA daily and adopted the aggressive decision that the paper should become an organ of the SDS Coordinating Council"—begins an appeal to the readers published in Issue No. 172 of DEMOKRATSIYA on 11 September, under the title "The Ones Responsible for the Situation."

Here we have two lies in a single sentence, which are used to back up a third, namely that the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] has become a totalitarian organization. This is supported by the following sentence, which likens the decision to accept the applications by Yordan Vasilev, editor in chief, and Petko Simeonov, the newspaper's director, to be released from their posts to "semilegal letter of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party" from the period before 10 November 1989.

The members of the editorial collegium Aleksandur Dinekov, Aleksandur Karaangelov, Boyko Nikolov, Dimo Kazulov, Eva Dimcheva, Plamen Georgiev-Krayski, and Khristo Andreev should indeed take the political responsibility for these lies, because they drew

up the appeal and duped some of the journalists into signing it, by lying to them that the Coordinating Council wanted to seize DEMOKRATSIYA's money, close the newspaper down, and distribute its newsprint among the party newspapers of the organizations who are members of the SDS. There is no need to prove that these are blatant lies. In addition, they should also bear the responsibility for the other lies, insinuations, and manipulations deliberately included in the text of their "collective work," which has a strong smell of a rotten cuckoo's egg, and alsosuggests that DEMOKRATSIYA has not attained the high standard of professionalism which its readers expected. However, they refused to accept such responsibility and continue to do so, not only because it is beyond their strength, but also because they have never realized that the freedom of the journalist is not only a right, but also a responsibility.

What are the true reasons for the situation which has emerged?

Making use of the fat that editor in chief, Y. Vasilev, and Director Petko Simeonov were fully tied up with the election campaign, the initiators of this "action," which the Coordinating Council assesses as being directly aimed against the SDS, turned the editorial office into a stage for intrigues and an arena for petty skirmishes for power.

As a result, they succeeded in driving many good journalists out of the editorial office or in forcing them into the background, and took over key positions. High professionalism and creative flair gave way to dilletantism and irrelevance. The failure to analyze the facts and phenomena at this crucial time for the country is a fact to which the SDS Coordinating Council cannot close its eyes. The SDS assumed responsibility to the Bulgarian people to help to implement a peaceful transition in our country from a totalitarian to a democratic organization of society, and is determined to fulfill its mission.

In achieving this goal, the SDS gives an important role to DEMOKRATSIYA. The paper has never been and will not be an organ of the SDS Coordinating Council (as stated in the appeal), but must and will become a daily of the united opposition represented in the Union of Democratic Forces. Freedom of speech and the press is the foundation of democratization and it cannot be utilized by any person or group of persons against the democratization—this is the principle which is the basis of the decision of the SDS Coordinating Council, and the council will not retreat from it, irrespective of who declares against it, no matter when or how they do it!

Price of Alcoholic Drinks To Increase 1 Oct

AU2609110590 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] The price of alcoholic drinks will be increased as of 1 October. Our colleague Mariya Stefanova investigated the reasons for the change in prices. She was told by Rayna Petrova, chief specialist for wine production at the Committee for Prices, that Vinprom informed them of the new prices independently, and that the Committee for Prices performs purely a monitoring function.

Todor Vutov, deputy chairman for economic matters of the Vinprom enterprise, gave us the following details about the price hikes:

[Begin Vutov recording] The increase in the retail prices of these goods was dictated solely by the rise in the prices of the raw materials used in their manufacture. In addition, the prices of fruit for the production of fruit brandies and other liqueurs sold in the country have also risen. The price of the fruit used for the production of the ranges of drinks whose retail prices will be increased on 1 October have risen two or threefold.

The price of fruit brandy will rise from 2.80 to eight leva for an 0.7 liter bottle. The price of vodkas will mainly be in the range of nine leva, as compared with 4.50 leva. Sliven vodka will rise in price from 7.50 to 15 leva a bottle; mastika, from five to 12 leva; gin, from six to 12 leva; and vermouths, from 5-5.70 to 11-11,50 leva. The average increase for this range of products overall is around 100 percent. [end recording]

Dienstbier Attends UN General Assembly Session

Talks With Ukrainian, Irish Ministers

LD2609125690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0830 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] CSFR Foreign Affairs Minister Jiri Dienstbier, who is attending the UN General Assembly session, held bilateral talks in New York with his colleagues on 25 September.

He agreed with Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoliy Zlenko to start talks on direct political and economic relations between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia.

He discussed with Irish Foreign Minister Gerard Collins the possible help by the European Community for the Czechoslovak economy. The Irish minister briefed Jiri Dienstbier on the decision to abolish the visa duty for Czechoslovak citizens. Czechoslovakia will adopt corresponding measures. Collins also spoke in favor of the basing the secretariat of the CSCE in Prague.

Comments on UNGA Address

LD2609141390 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1000 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiri Dienstbier by correspondent Jozef Knizat in New York after his address to the UN General Assembly—recorded; Dienstbier comments in Czech and Knizat comments in Slovak]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] [passage omitted] World press agencies are quoting the Soviet foreign minister, who has warned Iraq of the possibility of military intervention. The threat of war in the two-month conflict in the area of the Persian Gulf is unbelievably close. A decisive stand on this matter, supported by Czechoslovakia's willingness to send a special antichemical warfare unit to this area, has been confirmed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiri Dienstbier. Jozef Knizat, our correspondent in the United States, asked him for a short interview.

[Begin recording] [Knizat] Mr. Minister, you said in your address that the year 1989 was, to a considerable extent, a year of Europe, but the consequence is in fact that the UN organization [UNO] is also experiencing a renaissance. How do you, personally, but also from the point of view of your post, see the future of this organization?

[Dienstbier] I think that the renaissance dwells in the fact that we have started speaking the same language, that both sides, when using certain words, mean the same thing by them, and not as it used to be in the past. It has to be renewed further, and made use of more and more; this will either be successful or not. This depends now on the speed at which stands are united, and on the cooperation in the northern hemisphere. It also depends on what happens in the South, in the developing world.

From this point of view, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has been a serious reminder of what can happen. If the world community is not able to resist this, if the world community does not stand up against it quite united, if this unity should be broken by something, if it should allow Saddam Husayn to keep Kuwait—when he has taken hold of it in such a way—then this could mean the beginning of a whole number of explosions. When the situation in the South, and with regard to the cooperation between the North and South, is acceptable, or promising, only when we all accept common principles of international law and behavior on the international stage.

If some nations want to unite, let them. If some nations want to take part, let them, if it is their real will and wish. But this must not be done only because stronger states, stronger nations, or representatives of stronger religions—by force, by military force, or any form of violence—want to occupy other countries and annex them. This has to end. If the international community wins this struggle then I think this will be very important for the UN's future. It would gain by this a new impulse and new strength.

[Knizat] Mr. Minister, you are talking about the present. What about the future of UNO? What, in your opinion, will be the contribution of Czechoslovakia and the new Czechoslovak foreign policy to this process?

[Dienstbier] Czechoslovakia's contribution will depend on what we will be able to do, what we manage to do. We need above all a favorable international atmosphere and cooperation. This is all very specific: We are entering our reform, and the price of oil has doubled thanks to this Iraqi aggression. If this should continue it could double further. This is bad for everyone, even for the rich countries. It is a very heavy burden, particularly for a country which is entering an economic reform which in itself will mean, will lead to a worsening of living standards, to belt-tightening. If we have to tighten them further because Iraq has attacked Kuwait, then this shows very specifically how a development somewhere in the world affects our domestic situation. We will do everything in our power to contribute to the creation of a favorable international atmosphere. [end recording]

Comment on Ministers' Pact Meeting in Bratislava

AU2009172190 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Sep 90 p 5

[Ivan Horsky commentary: "Will the Pause Help?"]

[Text] At the beginning of this week, a meeting of deputy foreign ministers and general staff chiefs was held by a special committee for disarmament of the Warsaw Pact member states in Bratislava. The GDR delegation, in view of the fact that this country will disappear from the political map of Europe, participated in the discussions only as an observer.

Yet, despite this fact, the GDR was an indirect participant in the game. The issue was, among other things, how the remaining six countries will divide the arms

contingent that was allocated to the GDR within the framework of the Vienna "23" talks. These limits were decided upon prior to this unexpected development.

The issue discussed in Bratislava was even larger: how to allocate the limits to the individual countries. The head of our delegation, Zdenek Matejka, deputy foreign minister and general secretary of the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Committee, said that, despite the efforts made on the Czechoslovak side, the meeting did not bring the solution to this burning problem. Something that we were not used to happened in this bloc, which is almost disintegrated as of today.

While the CSFR, Poland, and Hungary were content with their "arms quota", the other three participants were less content, and their arguments were almost identical: In view of their geographic location, the feeling of being endangered from the outside, and their size, they tried to acquire more for themselves. Probably the most difficult problem will be to determine the quotas of tanks, airplanes, and artillery. The difference between the approved limits in Vienna and real requirements, made by these three states in particular, is between 1,000 and 2,000 pieces. It can be seen that the most complicated problem lies in the category of tanks, since the Soviet delegation demanded for its country up to 14,000 of the overall (Warsaw Pact) limit of 20,000. Due to the fact that, in the area from Sumava and Labe to Urals, the Soviet Union has more tanks than that, it would not be happy if it had—for technical reasons (forced liquidation)—to completely scrap expensive machines. Yet, there is a hitch: A principle has been adopted in Vienna that no member state of the agreement that is being prepared is supposed to have more than 30 percent of the current state. The Moscow negotiators would like to have at least ten [percent] more. Our side, in a goodwill effort to reach a reasonable compromise, suggested a number close to one-third. A similar situation exists in the remaining two categories.

Of course, in the conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Matejka, and also with L. Balcar, head of our delegation at the Vienna talks, I wondered whether such a development would not put in danger the signing of the first agreement on conventional disarmament at the Paris summit of the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act. Their answer was rather optimistic. They were of the opinion that there is enough time left for reaching an agreement, since there are enough political forums for that. The Bratislava talks were, in fact, postponed for a few days, during which the delegations should receive new instructions from their governments in order to be able to solve problematic questions. If this is not achieved, then there is another possibility of solving a whole package of problems on the eve of the talks that will be held among the foreign ministers of 35 CSCE member states—which is planned for the first days of October in New York—while the heads of diplomatic corps will be present at the UNO [United Nations Organization] General Assembly. A principal political agreement should be reached here, which should be approved at the special meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Advisory Committee in Budapest, which is planned prior to the Paris summit of "35." In this connection, it is necessary to remind one that the limits which would be eventually established could not be changed bilaterally. Vienna regulations permit this only on a multinational basis, as consent within a bloc.

In the view of the differences, there is an emerging logical possibility that the agreement will not be reached. There was only one laconic answer to our question about what would happen then: The entire problem would have to be postponed until the Vienna II conference, which will be based on a completely new mandate. However, it will comprise not 23 (or 22, eventually) but 35 (or 34, while it is theoretically possible to count Albania). This would be a pity, however, since the time horizon of the first real disarmament treaty in Europe could be significantly postponed.

It would be a mistake to think that only the Warsaw Pact has problems. NATO also has them, that is to say, all participants in the Vienna talks have them, particularly in connection with the number of U.S. soldiers deployed in Western Europe and with the number of weapons which the overseas superpower has on this part of the continent (the limitations must also pertain to them). The dispute about the air force, and the allocation of its individual components within its agreed upon ceiling of 4,700 pieces, is yet to be solved. The problem is that its structure is different on both sides. According to Ambassador Balcar, the standpoints on this question are coming closer and, basically, a political signal is awaited, which would arise from the just concluded talks between Shevarnadze and Baker in Moscow and at which the Vienna forum was intensively discussed. There is no unified standpoint on the question of inspections, above all on their number and type.

As can be seen, there still is a number of problems, yet the final goal, I hope, will awake the efforts to make Europe an example for the world.

Delegate in Vienna on Pact 'Action Ability'

LD2609185490 Prague CTK in English 1810 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Vienna Sept 26 (CTK correspondent)—The Czechoslovak delegate to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe warned today that unless the "necessary minimal action abilty" of the Warsaw Pact states is ensured, these countries "would not be an acceptable partner in talks with NATO."

In an interview for CTK, Colonel Vladimir Mohyla criticized Warsaw Pact members for forgetting that the talks on conventional disarmament "have started and should continue as talks between blocs, whilst the partner at the table is the Atlantic Alliance constantly strengthening its political and military importance." Mohyla thought that the six Warsaw Pact members (without the GDR) should unite on certain principles,

and in particular they should proceed from common interests in creating European security structures, especially in institutionalizing the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Mohyla also thought that the interest among some Western states in confidence-building measures of the Stockholm type has been declining recently. "One of the reasons is the crisis in the Persian Gulf, which again accentuated the role the USA assigns to its naval forces. This will adversely affect the readiness of the United States to include its forces in these measures," Mohyla said.

Referring to difficulties in talks between Warsaw Pact members about the strength of conventional contingents and weapons, Mohyla said that "the USSR, realizing that the 'sanitary cordon' formed by the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary no longer fulfils its mission, partially or completely, has 'updated' its demands and thus nothing is left from the expected sufficiency level, to be around 33 per cent. The Soviet demands are now around 40 per cent," to the detriment of other member states which are in a situation "of each being responsible for its own defence," Mohyla added.

Slovak Daily Interviews EC's Jacques Delors

AU2609140590 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Sep 90 pp 1, 2

["NO"-signed report: "Breakthrough in Relations"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—EC Commission President Jacques Delors, accompanied by CSFR Premier Marian Calfa, was welcomed by Frantisek Miklosko, chairman of the Slovak National Council, and Vladimir Meciar, premier of the Slovak Republic, at Bratislava Castle yesterday afternoon. [passage omitted]

Before departing Bratislava for home, the EC Commission president met with journalists. [passage omitted] Answering a NARODNA OBRODA question concerning the reinforcement of the EC's military aspect, J. Delors said that it is part and parcel of the increasingly accentuated political unity. Until now, the West European integration has been an economic giant but a political dwarf, which, however, will be changed by the adoption of two new treaties by the end of this year. Answering another question, concerning the promise by the FRG chancellor that neighboring Austria might be able to join the EC around the year 1995, he stressed that this is apparently the position of Bonn but that the adoption of a new member must be approved unanimously by all 12 member countries. A preliminary discussion must be held first, followed by negotiations, which has not yet happened. At present all activity must focus on completing financial, monetary, and political union and only then, after 1992, will a decision on the EC's further expansion be made.

Head of CSFR Delegation Cited on IAEA Conference

AU2509192090 Prague CTK in English 1736 GMT 21 Sep 90

[Text] Vienna Sep 21 (CTK correspondent)—Karel Wagner, who represented Czechoslovakia at the 34th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which ended here today, told CTK that nuclear power will continue to play an important role in Czechoslovakia.

It will, however, be combined with other sources of energy. The main target is that nuclear power brings maximum effect and minimum risks, Wagner said.

He said that the week-long IAEA conference focused on questions of safety of nuclear installations. Most speakers pointed out the increasing role of this UN organization associating 113 countries, mainly in ensuring guarantees of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing the safety of nuclear power stations, and dumping radioactive waste.

The only one to oppose these efforts was Austrian Minister for the Living Environment Marilies Flemming who was not given the floor and therefore announced to the delegates her demands in the form of a letter. She rejected nuclear power and its use and called for deletion of the term peaceful use of nuclear power from the IAEA statutes.

Karel Wagner said Austria has full right to renounce its own nuclear power as well as the right to ask Czechoslovakia and other neighboring countries to use this power with maximum safety but has no right to ask other states to give up nuclear power.

Anti-Chemical Unit Trained for Use in Gulf

AU2609164490 Prague CTK in English 1832 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—An anti-chemical defense unit comprising 170 men is currently being trained in Czechoslovakia in order to be ready for deployment in Saudi Arabia if the president and the government of Czechoslovakia decide so, the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry said today.

The training of the unit follows a statement by President Havel during his current visit to Italy that Czechoslovakia could possibly participate in an international military action against Iraq. The ministry said the unit, capable of providing first aid in an attack involving the use of chemical weapons, consists of Czechoslovak Army volunteers and the deployment of civilians is being considered. The unit will be equipped with 48 automobiles, 10 trailers, and 200 tonnes of material.

Unit Organizer Interviewed

LD2609220890 Prague Television Service in Czech 2022 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Interview with Colonel Jan (Valo), organizer of the Czechoslovak Army volunteer unit to be sent to the Gulf region, by unidentified announcer in the Prague television studio on 26 September—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] I now welcome in the studio Colonel Jan (Valo), organizer of the Czechoslovak unit which is to be sent to the Persian Gulf in the next few days. Good evening to you. I would like to ask the colonel: Had the Army not found out about this unit from the president's pronouncement in Italy?

[(Valo)] This is not at all the case, because otherwise we would not be in the stage of training volunteers, in which we now find ourselves. I would say rather that the Army informed the president about the training of the volunteers, about the present situation and about the state of training of this unit.

[Announcer] Under discussion is a unit comprising 200 or 170 men. In which stage are the preparations—how many of them got registered?

[(Valo)] More than 200 got registerd. They are exclusively volunteers. However, after health checks and prescribed psychological tests were carried out, several of them dropped out. Other specialists got themselves registered, and more men were added to the unit, so that approximately up to 200 men are being trained at the present time.

[Announcer] Colonel, Czechoslovakia will send mainly chemical troops. Do you have an idea of chemical weapons in Iraq's possession? Are they not just by chance our own weapons?

[(Valo)] The chemical specialists who are in this unit have of course a good knowledge of chemical weapons, which could be used—and in no case can these be our chemical weapons. Naturally, one cannot expect or rule out a surprise. But they have been trained and they are specialists in the right area.

[Announcer] Colonel, are these people strictly and exclusively volunteers?

[(Valo)] They are strictly volunteers. This principle was very strictly observed. I personally spoke to the majority of these people, I explained the conditions to them and asked them once again in front of the whole collective in which we were. Because at present they have been split according to their specializations on whether they agreed with their deployment in the Persian Gulf area.

[Announcer] Can you tell us the approximate ratio between the enlisted men and officers?

[(Valo)] It is approximately 50-50.

[Announcer] When do you expect the unit to depart?

[(Valo)] The date of deployment cannot be precisely determined at present, because it is still dependant on the whole number of, I would say, administrative matters—or perhaps agreements on questions of transport, on resolving the questions of transportation, and so on. However, as far as the Czechoslovak Army is concerned, we are already prepared now.

[Announcer] Does the unit already have a commander?

[(Valo)] The commander will be selected from the volunteers according to the principles that he should be the most experienced person, who would correspond to the criteria placed on the commander in this area.

[Announcer] And here is a question which is related to this. To whom will this Czechoslovak unit be subordinated?

[Unidentified correspondent] And in this connection I would like to ask whether this does not contradict our Constitution.

[(Valo)] Its subordination has so far not been determined, because it will depend on an appropriate bilateral agreement. No decision has so far been made as to whether this will be a joint command or whether it will be a part of the civilian defense of a state, which could ask for this protection.

[Announcer] And here is my last question: How long should this unit remain there?

[(Valo)] The unit should remain there a month as a minimum, if it is deployed, depending on the situation. However, its maximum stay should be 10 months. In the case that the unit is required to stay longer, it would be replaced.

[Announcer] Colonel, I thank you for your information and for your visit.

[(Valo)] Thank you.

Vacek Talks With Hungarian Defense Minister

LD2509202690 Prague Television Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 25 Sep 90

[Report on meeting between Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Fur and CSFR Minister of Defense Miroslav Vacek in Bratislava, including statements by both ministers; date not given—Fur recording in Hungarian with superimposed Slovak translation and Vacek recording in Czech]

[Text] [Presenter] A brief but solemn military welcoming ceremony has opened the first working meeting in Bratislava between Lajos Fur, minister of defense of the Republic of Hungary, and Miroslav Vacek, CSFR minister of defense.

A businesslike exchange of views between the two representatives concerned the building of new relations between the neighboring armies in connection with the

democratization processes which also affect changes in the armed forces. They acquainted themselves with the already implemented and planned transfers and with the redeployments of some units from border areas. They agreed to hold regular meetings once a year at the top army level. If need be, they agreed to hold flexible talks and said that the element of importance is regular exchanges between the general staffs of information and data on troop exercises and transfers in the interest of confidence building. In keeping with the Vienna conventional disarmament talks, the defense ministers also exchanged information on the stages and reductions of troop numbers and on the process of disarmament.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Mr. Minister, what is currently happening in the Hungarian Army?

[Fur] Great changes of an organizational and qualitative nature, as well as other changes in this field, are happening in the Hungarian Army. By this I mean not only the changes in disarmament, but also the changes in the spirit of the Army. Shortly, the Hungarian parliament is due to pass a new defense law. And what is its essence? We are now creating a new republic based on more democratic principles than in the past. These changes must also be reflected in the defense law. The Hungarian Army formed on party principles will cease to exist, and the new law will guarantee the emergence of a more democratic Army. [end recording]

[Presenter] The changes caused in certain circles here in Slovakia and also in Hungary by rumors were also discussed. [sentence as heard]

[Begin recording] [?Vacek] The reason for our meeting was to tackle matters in which both ourselves and the Republic of Hungary are interested. This means that we were not trying to avoid problems. As far as deployment and organizational changes are concerned, the Hungarian Army is facing roughly the same problems as we do. Since the predominant part of the Czechoslovak Army was deployed on the border with Germany and since the doctrine, or the conclusions from the June Political Consultative Committee set different tasks for us—i.e. to ensure the defense and the sovereignty of our state by defending the whole republic—we must carry out the necessary deployment changes. The Hungarian Army has already carried out in Hungary some of these changes, which are of similar nature. We have arrived at the conclusion that it would be a good thing if we, the ministers of the two governments, could contribute to stabilizing conditions. And this is why we will exchange preliminary information about all troop transfers, so that unnecessary worries of citizens in border areas both in Hungary and the Slovak Republic will not be raised. [end recording]

Troop Movement Toward Hungarian Border Unfounded

LD2609141490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1330 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Vit Suchy, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, has termed information on the movement of Hungarian Army units toward the frontiers with Czechoslovakia unfounded. Speaking at a news conference, he explained that as in our country, military units are moving from the Austrian border to other localities. According to him, ministers of defense of both countries, General Miroslav Vacek and Lajos Fur, have agreed to keep each other better informed on the relocation of troops in order to prevent similar rumors.

Dlouhy, Japanese Minister Discuss Relations

AU2509185890 Prague CTK in English 2019 GMT 20 Sep 90

[Text] Tokyo Sep 20 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Minister of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama discussed here today the possibilities how to extend the two countries' economic relations and spheres of cooperation.

Dlouhy spoke of Czechoslovakia's interest in signing an agreement on the protection of investments and on the creation of new mechanisms of cooperation on the intergovernmental and business level. The two ministers also discussed the impact of the situation in the Gulf on Czechoslovakia's and Japan's economies.

Earlier today, Dlouhy met with Japanese entrepreneurs and discussed with them various forms of the introduction of Japanese capital into the Czechoslovak economy. He also inspected the biggest Japanese steel works, NKK, in Yokohama.

Tesla, Netherlands' Philips Agree on Cooperation

AU2509182390 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Sep 90 p 3

[CTK report: "Courting Philips"]

[Text] Kolin—Close mutual contacts between Tesla Kolin and the prestigious Netherlands Philips company are presaged by an agreement, in which both partners undertake to seek all possibilities of cooperation in the sphere of command and control systems for machine tools. Mutual contacts will be beneficial to both sides, since computerized control systems have a bright future.

CSFR, French Truck Manufacturers Sign Agreement

AU2509210290 Prague CTK in English 1846 GMT 21 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sep 21 (CTK)—Renault Vehicules Industriels of France and Czechoslovakia's Avia Prague corporation signed today an agreement on industrial cooperation under which production will be modernized in the Czechoslovak motor works.

Renault will provide 500 million French francs for the modernization, 350 million of it will be used for the delivery of French equipment. The agreement on the loan was reached with Renault's President Raymond Levy during the visit of President Francois Mitterrand to Czechoslovakia last week.

Avia and Renault have been partners since 1967 and the Czechoslovak motor works has produced 180,000 2-3.5-ton light trucks under cooperation agreements over these years. After the modernization, production will rise from 16,500 to almost 20,000 vehicles annually, Avia Managing Director Vlastimil Devera told CTK today.

Production of the modernized version of the truck is to begin in 1993 and Avia expects to repay the debt with the vehicles over the next five years.

Bratislava Viewed as Transit Point for Jews

AU2609165290 Prague CTK in English 1735 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Text] Bratislava Sep 24 (CTK)—Slovak Parliament Chairman Frantisek Miklosko received here today Simcho Dinitz, chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel, the World Zionist Organization executive body, who started his visit to Czechoslovakia today.

They discussed possible restoration of the Jewish historical tradition in Slovakia, which was violently interrupted by the fascist occupation in 1939 and in the following years by the communist regime. Under discussion was also development of cultural and economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Israel and studies of Jewish history and the Hebrew language at Czechoslovak universities. After the opening of the Israeli Embassy in Prague, the establishment of an Israeli cultural center in Bratislava could be considered.

Referring to Jewish emigrants coming from the Soviet Union to Israel, the two officials mentioned the possibility of setting up temporary stations for Israelis heading for home in Prague and Bratislava, besides those in Budapest, Bucharest and Warsaw.

Bartoncik Determined To Seek Reelection

AU2609164790 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 21 Sep 90 p 1

["ld"-signed report: "Session of the Czechoslovak People's Party Central Committee Presidium"]

[Excerpts] The Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] Central Committee Presidium met in Prague on Wednesday, 19 September, to discuss preparations for the extraordinary CSL Congress. [passage omitted]

At the close of the session of the CSL Central Committee, Presidium J. Bartoncik, LL.D., announced that, having considered all circumstances, including the fact that the campaign directed against his person is being stepped up again, he has no intention of yielding to any attempts at blackmail and, provided he receives the support of his maternal regional organization in South Moravia, plans again to run for the post of CSL chairman for the forthcoming period. Most members of the CSL Central Committee Presidium present endorsed this decision of his.

Four Parties 'Recommend' Coalitions at Local Level

AU2609135290 Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Sep 90 p 2

[CTK report: "Statement by Four Political Parties"]

[Text] The leaderships of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Green Party, the Agrarian Party, and the Czechoslovak Social Democracy issued the following statement yesterday:

"On 20 September representatives of the four parties listed above met at a working meeting in Lidovy Dum [House of the People] in Prague in connection with the preparation for communal elections. The political parties which attended the meeting criticize the preparation for the communal elections, first and foremost from the viewpoint of the legislation for these elections. They consider the approved electoral law to be too complicated, particularly from the viewpoint of voters' access to information about the voting act and Article 41, which deals with the method of counting votes. They recommend to their members the formation of coalitions with all democratic forces while respecting specific local conditions, even under a common name if and where appropriate. At many places, particularly in Moravia, coalitions of these political forces are already assuming the shape of a third force, which offers itself as an alternative for the forthcoming communal elections and, possibly, the next parliamentary elections as well.

"They stress the need, precisely in view of the complicated nature of the electoral law, for voters to consistently favor those candidates, whose life and work provide a guarantee that they will execute their future posts in a responsible manner."

National Councils Call for 'Authentic Federation'

LD2609165890 Prague CTK in English 1458 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Brno Sept 26 (CTK)—The Presidiums of the Czech and the Slovak National Councils expressed their will to create an authentic federation and called for the autonomy of the Czech and the Slovak Republics at the end of their two-day meeting held in Svratka, South Moravia.

The members of the supreme legislative bodies also agreed to formulate first the basic political decisions on power-sharing within the federation. Individual drafts of the constitutions will be worked out accordingly. This approach is to ensure that the elaboration of the republics' constitutions respects the interests of the federation.

The two-day session was attended by some members of the Federal Assembly Presidium, including Chairman of the Federal Parliament Alexander Dubcek.

General Council Elects New Trade Union President

LD2609155390 Prague CTK in English 1430 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sept 26 (CTK)—The general council of the Czech and the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions accepted the resignation of Igor Pleskot at its session here yesterday, and elected Roman Kovac new president of the confederation until March 31, 1991.

So far, Mr. Kovac was chairman of the Assembly of the Confederation of Slovak Trade Unions.

The general council relieved Borivoj Subrt of his post of the Czech and the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions executive secretary and decided that the new president would fill this post himself.

The Czech and the Slovak Confederation, which associates 58 trade unions (with 6 million members), is the main trade union organization in the country.

Civic Forum Heads Opinion Poll on Elections

LD2609130490 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1030 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] At the beginning of September the public opinion research institute carried out a statewide poll on citizen's views on the forthcoming local elections: A majority of citizens of small villages and towns demanded an electoral system which would enable them to select specific persons.

In reply to the traditional question: Which party or movement would the respondent vote for if the elections were to be held next week, one-third of respondents said they would vote for the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence. In second place is the Coalition of Christian Democrats jointly with the Communist Party—each of them would get eight percent. However, if compared with the results of the parliamentary elections, all the named parties have lost support considerably. On the other hand, the Slovak National Party has gained considerably—at present 24 percent of citizens in Slovakia would vote for it, while in June this was ten percent less.

President Havel's Chief Consultant Dies 24 Sep

AU2609165690 Prague CTK in English 1555 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Text] Prague Sep 24 (CTK)—Chairman of the Council of Consultants and member of the College of the Czechoslovak President Milan Simecka died here today of heart failure, age 60.

The writer, political scientist, publicist, and teacher was born on March 6, 1930 in Novy Bohumin, North Moravia. From 1954 he lived permanently in Slovakia, teaching at Comenius University and Academy of Arts in Bratislava. In 1970 he had to stop teaching and held various worker's professions. He became a signatory of the Charter 1977, the movement calling for the observance of human rights in Czechoslovakia. In 1981 Simecka was arrested, accused of "subverting the republic" and after almost one-year detention, released without trial in 1982. Since that time he worked as a freelance journalist.

Among his most famous works, which were published by exile publishing houses, are "The Renewal of Order," "Our Comrade Winston Smith" and "Circle Defense." He also contributed to samizdat (underground) publications and a number of European magazines.

From January to June 1990, he was deputy to the Slovak National Council (Slovak parliament). In July 1990, he was named chairman of the Council of Consultants and member of the College of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel.

SNS Criticizes Havel's Ideas on Constitution

AU2609135590 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 Sep 90 p 2

[CTK report: "What is Sovereignty?"]

[Text] Bratislava—The executive committee of the Slovak National Party [SNS] presented a statement to CTK yesterday, in which it reacts to some ideas on the constitutional arrangement of our state presented by the CSFR president in the Federal Assembly on 17 September 1990. It states, inter alia: "Slovaks entered the state bond with the Czech nation voluntarily with the aim of forming a common state, whereby they expressed their sovereignty of a state- forming nation. A constituent part of the national and state sovereignty of a nation is the possibility to leave this bond. If this possibility is not provided, it is impossible to speak about full-fledged sovereignty, be it national or state sovereignty. It must therefore be the natural right of both nations to leave this bond at any time."

Bilateral Talks on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2609121290 Budapest MTI in English 1025 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 25 (MTI)—Hungarian-Soviet talks are in progress in Budapest this week, regarding the settlement of financial and economic issues related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. The Hungarian delegation is led by Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, and that of the Soviets by Konstantin Katushev, minister of external economic relations.

The two sides differ in the way they view the matter of proprietory rights regarding both the movable property and real estate used by the Soviet troops, in their evaluation of the environmental damage to the barracks and vicinity quitted, and in their ideas about how to value the objects already returned, and decide on the order and date of their payment.

According to the Hungarians, determining the damage caused, and its cost, together with cleaning up after it, could take a long time. However, the first analyses suggest that it will all pose major burdens for the Hungarian economy, which, Hungarians argue, should come from the Soviet pocket.

The two ministers believe that a compromise agreement will be reached.

Soviet Union Oil Deliveries Suspended

LD2609183790 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] We learned on 24 September that the Soviets had closed the oil tap; we learned yesterday they had opened it; and this morning we heard on the radio that they had not been the ones to close it. What is the truth?

[Unidentified correspondent] The news heard this morning on the radio was based on incorrect information. In practice it is true that when the Soviet Union closed the tap last week, they said that one of the reasons was that we had not fulfilled our crude oil transit delivery obligations during August.

[Announcer] Where should we have forwarded Soviet crude oil?

[Correspondent] We have fulfilled a delivery contract for years with the Soviet Union, in the transit of crude oil from the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia. Considering the Soviet Union significantly reduced its delivery obligations to Hungary this year, however, Hungary was forced to purchase crude oil from the Arab world.

This oil can only be brought in through the Arab pipeline, and this was being brought in during the first few days of the month.z Under these circumstances, we did not have the power to deliver the crude oil transit in the opposite direction.

[Announcer] [passage omitted] This morning they closed it again. Why, this time?

[Correspondent] We have not received direct information from the Soviet Union, but through the Lvov directorate the Hungarian side was informed that, at the instruction of the Soviet Ministry of Commerce, for the month of September 1990, they wish to deliver only 235,000-240,000 tonnes of crude oil to Hungary. Up to the present day, the deliveries at Fenyeslitke have reached this figure, and this is why deliveries were stopped.

Ambassador to Moscow on Bilateral Relations

AU2609131190 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 22 Sep 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Sandor Gyurke, ambassador to Moscow, by Andras Szanto; place and date not given: "The Change of Regime Is No Source of Conflict"]

[Excerpts] "The evident significant modifications in Soviet-Hungarian relations did not start yesterday. The root of the modifications goes back to the beginning of the changes that are accelerating and developing nowadays. In Hungary, the change of regime has become a reality, and in the Soviet Union, radical reconstruction is also on the agenda. All this has made subjective and objective changes necessary in our relations; however, the fundamental changes spring from the development of the situation." That was how Sandor Gyurke began our discussion on the development of Soviet-Hungarian bilateral relations.

"As far as we are concerned, in connection with these changes, our main objective is to try to actively initiate bilateral relations that correspond to the change of regime. Our leading politicians have made it clear that, due to our return to Europe, the amount of cooperation and the areas of cooperation will be modified, and there will be reductions that can be objectively explained," the ambassador said.

Gyurke stressed that Hungary did not want the reduction to involve drastic cuts, or a separation. Our aim is clear: We want to restore fair ratios in our foreign relations, in accordance with our historical traditions. We think that it is important to introduce ratios which correspond to our geopolitical situation, and to the guidelines of our future development. [passage omitted]

The ambassador stressed that during our change of orientation, we are trying to free our continuing political and economic relations from ideological ties, but at the same time, we are trying to remain on the Soviet market. We are trying to make sure that nothing stops our supply of fuel and raw materials, and we hope to place our products in this huge country. [passage omitted]

"The change of regime does not constitute a source of conflict in itself," the ambassador continued. "The Soviet leadership has acknowledged the changes. All this

was formulated in an honest and fair way when President Arpad Goncz and Prime Minister Jozsef Antall met Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov in Moscow in June 1990.

"They acknowledged that Hungary really is trying to reestablish its sovereignty, and this does not worry Moscow. Hungary's efforts have their place in the changing developments of our region; indeed, domestic changes within the Soviet Union are also based on these changing developments." [passage omitted]

In the Soviet leadership, opinions differ as regards the assessment of Hungary's situation and of Hungarian-Soviet relations. The ambassador continued: "The Soviet public opinion and the forces that support democratization and market economy observe the Hungarian change of regime with empathy and interest. At times they even try to draw their own conclusions. We have witnessed an increased interest in Hungary in the Ukraine, in the Baltic republics, in some Asian republics, and most of all, in the political and economic radical reform forces of the Russian Republic." [passage omitted]

Antall on Pact Withdrawal, Future Security Role

PM2709082090 Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Sep 90 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by Jean-Paul Picaper; place and date not given]

[Text] Budapest—[Picaper] Mr. Prime Minister, can you confirm that your country will not be taking part in the November Warsaw Pact maneuvers? Can we deduce that Hungary is to leave the Eastern countries' military alliance?

[Antall] We have announced that we will not be taking part in these maneuvers. We are withdrawing the Hungarian Armed Forces from the Pact's military command. Furthermore, if the Warsaw Pact's military organization has not ceased to exist, we will leave it by the end of 1991 at the latest. The National Assembly and the government have decided to start talks and have called for a comprehensive reappraisal of the Pact.

[Picaper] Is your move not reminiscent of General de Gaulle's with respect to NATO?

[Antall] There is a certain similarity. We do not believe that we need the Warsaw Pact in its entirety.

[Picaper] According to the press, you said: "The Warsaw Pact only exists militarily. It no longer exists either physically or politically...."

[Antall] I have not read the remarks attributed to me. I only know that it is necessary to act very cautiously with regard to everything having to do with the Pact, and that these moves must take place within the context of a security system for the whole of Europe. This affects our negotiations this year within the Warsaw Pact's consultative council and later within the CSCE in Paris.

[Picaper] Between 19 and 21 November in Paris the CSCE will set out a new architecture for Europe. Should this European system some day replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact or only the Warsaw Pact?

[Antall] How can I know what will happen in the years to come? The only certainty is that it is necessary to create this security system for the whole of Europe and that there will be a more limited system of European countries within it. This could mean an enlargement of the WEU [Western European Union]. It is also possible to envisage for our Central European region another organization that would work in parallel with the WEU, but within an extended conception of security nothing challenges NATO's raison d'etre. While going deeper into European thinking, it is necessary to extend Atlantic thinking. Europe's security, therefore, cannot be guaranteed without the United States' and the USSR's involvement. There is no security without Russia, but no guarantee of this security without an American presence in Europe.

[Picaper] Are you planning to join NATO?

[Antall] Hungary's NATO membership is not on the agenda at this time. If we are admitted to the EEC, as we very much hope, we will be integrated into a European security community. Because we will be very pleased to accept all the implications of our EEC membership. The Hungarian Armed Forces have been equipped by the Warsaw Pact. For technical and financial reasons, we cannot modify this equipment: The Armed Forces must remain operational. Our foreign policy must take account of all the factors in a world that used to have two poles, but that now has many poles. Bear in mind also that the Soviet Union and its increasingly autonomous republics are still our neighbors. The USSR remains a major factor in our foreign policy. Another factor has emerged: German unification could create a new kind of balance on our continent.

[Picaper] Imre Nagy provoked the Russians' anger by demanding in his 1 November 1956 speech that Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact and become a neutral country. Do you think that the idea of neutrality has been devalued since then?

[Antall] Things have changed a great deal. We are dealing with a different Soviet Union. In that Europe of 1956 there was no other issue for us apart from neutrality. The example to be followed was the 1955 State Treaty whereby the USSR imposed neutrality on Austria in exchange for sovereignty. So the only feasible model for avoiding confrontation was neutrality between the two military blocs. At the time there was talk about Switzerland's traditional neutrality and Finland's neutrality, which was then very fashionable. Furthermore, Imre Nagy was motivated by despair: The Soviet troops were intervening, calling on the Warsaw Pact. Now neutrality would be less useful. A declaration in favor of

it would hinder our accession to the EEC. Indeed, we want to participate in European security.

[Picaper] Your recent speech on the years of Soviet occupation has been much criticized in Moscow. Are you able to forgive the Soviets for what they did to Hungary?

[Antall] During World War II our people had no wish to take part in the fighting against the Soviet Union. We were forced to do so. Then the victors integrated us in the zone of Soviet influence. In addition to POW's, thousands of civilians—sometimes the whole male population of certain villages—were deported to camps in the USSR. Prisoners still return today from the Soviet Union, 45 years after the armistice. Then, in 1956, the Russians shelled Budapest. Despite all that, we should maintain proper relations with the USSR, but on an equal footing.

[Picaper] Hungary has asked an Austrian bank for advice on the privatization of its industry. What would you think of a Danubian confederation with Austria and Bavaria?

[Antall] I do not think a confederation is possible; however, this region can cooperate closely within European unity. We are very close economically and politically. I will also mention another possible direction: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy.

[Picaper] Austria-Hungary belongs to the past then?

[Antall] I think so.

[Picaper] Could these two countries not constitute, with French support, a counterweight to German economic might?

[Antall] All this should be resolved as part of the economic integration of Europe. It is not useful to revive old German-French conflicts. It is necessary to extend Franco-German reconciliation to our region.

[Picaper] France exercises a cultural fascination on Hungary, but you also want to strengthen economic exchanges. The year 1989-1990 was, for Hungary, the year of Germany. Will 1990-1991 be the year of France?

[Antall] During the past year events in Germany have been at the forefront. While maintaining our relations with Germany, we wish to develop those with France. The GDR and the FRG figure among our top three economic partners: 40 percent of our debt is to Germany, and German investment and joint ventures are fundamental to our economy. Economic relations with Germany will always be essential, but we want to preserve a certain balance. I issue an appeal to French investors. We want them part of our privatization program.

[Picaper] Hungary was the first of the former people's democracies to dismantle the barbed wire on the iron curtain, on 2 May 1989, and then, on 10 September that same year, the first to open its western border to East German refugees. Did your country not set German unification on its way?

[Antall] It contributed to it. We took down the first stone from the Berlin Wall.

[Picaper] Did Hungary consult the USSR before making these decisions?

[Antall] It was an independent, fully sovereign decision. The Hungarian Government of the time assumed its responsibilities. It did so in complete accord with the Hungarian opposition, which has since become the majority.

[Picaper] Do you feel in harmony with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Lech Walesa?

[Antall] We all want a parliamentary system and a market economy, but our points of view on democratic pluralism can differ. I feel close to the German Christian Democrats and place myself somewhere between Jacques Chirac and Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

[Picaper] You have said that it was necessary to be "a fanatic, a missionary, or a madman" to take on the Government of Hungary....

[Antall] I am not a fanatic. I am not mad yet. I do, however, have the qualities of a missionary.

Agreement With CSFR on Nuclear Cooperation

LD2109104190 Budapest MTI in English 1007 GMT 21 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 21, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Mr Gyorgy Vanda, deputy chairman of Hungary's National Nuclear Energy Committee, and Karel Wagner, the head of the Czechoslovak Nuclear Energy Committee, signed an agreement at the annual meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna concerning closer cooperation between the two countries in matters of nuclear security and information.

The agreement is of particular importance for Hungary because of the Czech nuclear power stations already operating or being built near the border with Hungary.

After the Chernobyl disaster, several multilateral cooperation agreements were signed by IAEA members pledging information and assistance in the event of a nuclear accident and both Hungary and Czechoslovakia joined these agreements.

The new agreement supplements this general agreement and contains specific obligations such as informing the other country of any nuclear programme, planned and functioning nuclear facilities and the results of routine radiation checks in the area of nuclear power plants.

Nuclear Safety Agreement Signed With FRG

LD2609183690 Budpaest MTI in English 1742 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 26 (MTI)—A bilateral Hungarian-German agreement was signed in Budapest on Wednesday on cooperation in nuclear safety and preventing radiation.

Similar to other agreements in this area, the new accords with the FRG states that the sides will notify each other of any accident in their nuclear power plants, and exchange information of nuclear programmes and new legislation in the area of nuclear safety which affects people and the environment.

They will also pool experience gained during the building and operation of nuclear reactors, and inform each other about measures concerning the limitation of radioactive agents in their countries.

The agreement would help Hungarian nuclear safety culture and standards keep abreast of international development.

Horn Discusses Unification, Refugees, Borders

AU2709092890 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 Sep 90 p 6

[Interview with Gyula Horn, former foreign minister and current chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Janos Nemes; place and date not given: "The Man Who Opened Hungary's Borders Admonishes Budapest"]

[Excerpt] [Nemes] Mr. Horn, what were your motives when one year ago you made the decision to let the GDR refugees leave the country?

[Horn] At that time we were confronted with a situation which could be solved only generally and radically. Tens of thousands of GDR citizens were in Hungary hoping to be permitted to leave for the FRG and their number was increasing by the day. They did not want asylum in Hungary, they wanted to go on. A few hundred managed to cross the green border illegally, but this could not be a solution for all the rest. Thus, we decided to take this radical step, the preparation of which took us all of two weeks.

[Nemes] Was this decision coordinated with the other Warsaw Pact states—in particular, with the Soviet Union?

[Horn] It was not coordinated with anyone. We informed the Soviets practically at the last minute in order to avoid any countermove. On 31 August we told the GDR what we would do on 11 September. There was no question of consultations.

[Nemes] At that time, were you able to predict the consequences of this decision as they are today? After all, it was here in Budapest that the first stone was knocked out of the Berlin Wall, if you would like to put it that way.

[Horn] I would be boasting if I claimed that I predicted what happened. The enormous speed of developments surprised me, too. I was sure, however, that things would take a new course, that it was not to be expected that the Warsaw Pact would close ranks to prevent humanitarian solutions. Even if he had wanted to, Honecker would not have been able to do anything about this anymore. The floodgates could no longer be closed.

[Nemes] German unification is imminent. What role should and could Germany play in Europe?

[Horn] In my view, after unification Germany will be the world's third largest power and will catch up with the United States and Japan also in economic terms—not to speak of the outstanding political role which it will have in Europe. I believe that the solution of the German question will determine the all-European unification process. It is a process which is unprecedented since World War II and opens up new prospects for solving some problems, in particular concerning the relationship between Central Eastern Europe and the West of the continent. Furthermore, what is particularly important for us is that Germany can provide important stimuli to bring about Hungary's acceptance into the EC and the Council of Europe, but also for an independent and more effective Europe. Thus, Europe can gain an extremely important role as a result of the contribution of power by Germany.

[Nemes] Would more intensive contacts on Hungary's part with the future united Germany not have a detrimental effect on the contacts with the Soviet Union, whose reformed foreign policy was in fact the factor that facilitated the changes in Eastern Europe and, thus, also in Hungary?

[Horn] I do not think that these contacts could cause any disturbances in our relations with the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Antall Talks With Spanish Defense Minister

LD2609183190 Budapest MTI in English 1753 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 26 (MTI)—Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall met Narcis Serra Serra, Spanish minister of defence, in [the] parliament building on Wednesday.

Antall sketched the main points of Hungary's foreign policy and its position on the Warsaw Treaty for the information of his guest.

The minister spoke briefly about the Spanish army and defence law.

The sides exchanged views on the constitutional status of armies in the Spanish and Hungarian scenarios.

The meeting was attended by Luis de la Torre, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Spain to Hungary.

Reportage on Antall's Visit to France

WA2609185590

For reportage on the visit by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to France, including reports on his talks with Prime Minister Michel Rocard, please see the France section of the 26 September West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

British Magnate Buys Budapest Paper

LD2609203490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1800 26 Sep 90

[Text] Robert Maxwell, British press magnate, has purchased ESTI HIRLAP for 45 million forints. The editors of the paper, the British Mirror Group, and the Newspaper Publishing Enterprise will form a limited company to publish the afternoon paper. The newly formed joint stock company would like to improve the technical standard of ESTI HIRLAP; therefore, it will deliver its own printing press to Budapest.

Secretariat for Citizens Living Abroad Analyzed

AU2609141290 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Sep 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Dr. Geza Entz, political state secretary of the prime minister's secretariat for Hungarians living abroad, by Oszkar Fuzes; place and date not given: "The Responsibility of the Motherland Does Not Equal Nationalism"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Excerpts] Dr. Geza Entz was born 41 years ago in Kolozsvar [Cluj]. He is a historian and an art historian, and he tells us that it was the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia that prompted him to deal with our neighboring people, and with the Hungarian minorities who live with them. He is one of those people who has always considered the issue of national minorities as a common Eastern and Central European question. Since the beginning of the opposition movement in Hungary, Entz has been the national minority expert of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and that is why he was placed at the head of the secretariat for Hungarians living abroad.

[Fuzes] Please tell us about your office.

[Entz] Our main task is to coordinate a modern policy for Magyars. This is a new category, and it encompasses tasks which can only be dealt with at a government level. The issue affects several ministries, and our task is to control the strategy, so to speak. That is why we collaborate with the prime minister. (By the way, under the previous government, a similar body, led by Csaba Tabajdi, came to the same conclusion.) Our first aim is to elaborate information related to Hungarian minorities abroad, and our other aim is to represent government policy in this field, both to a broad public opinion, and in our diplomatic relations. I must stress that we do not merely cooperate with the office for minorities living in Hungary; our offices treat both areas in exactly the same way. Nevertheless, the separation of the two offices is justified, because one is related to interior policy, and the other to foreign policy, and in practice, different tasks arise. I repeat that the principles are identical. Both offices aim for the respect of individual and collective minority rights, for the acknowledgement of a right to cultural autonomy, and for the acceptance and implementation of the responsibilities of the mother-nation. As for the aforementioned secretariat, it is an expert body of a few selected people who have a vast knowledge of languages and national cultures. [passage omitted]

[Fuzes] How do you explain that in our region, the development of democracy was immediately accompanied by revived nationalism? To what extent does that apply to our country?

[Entz] It is difficult to give a short answer to that question. I think that this happened because the traditions of democracy are much weaker than the roots of nationalism—although this also varies a lot from country to country. It is also a fact that in many places, the easiest way to mobilize people politically is to raise national sentiments. Furthermore, this was to be expected after the homogenization efforts of the previous regime, and the historical traditions from even longer ago. As far as Hungary is concerned, I do not think that nationalism is a leading political trend in our country, and no party has nationalist elements in its program. It is rather in the course of open democratic proceedings that disturbing statements are made. [passage omitted]

[Fuzes] Let us return to our neighbors. It seems that nationalism is almost an official policy in Serbia, and this affects Hungarians living in Serbia.

[Entz] The problems in Kosovo largely influence the current situation in Serbia. Belgrade is trying to centralize. However, one has to see that nowadays, Hungarians living in Serbia have their own independent organization, and their own press; they did not have these before. In some areas, the centralizing acts of the Serbian parliament have a detrimental effect on Hungarians. We also sense other alarming signs of nationalism. That is why it is also important that Belgrade has recognized that the responsibility of the motherland does not equal nationalism, and that the Hungarians in Vojvodina are not the "tool of the expansionist efforts" of Budapest. I found out from my talks in Belgrade and Vojvodina, that, together with us, people there are working for the free crossing of borders, and for economic and other forms of cooperation between border areas.

[Fuzes] What is the situation in Romania?

[Entz] The Hungarian Government supports the efforts of the Hungarian community in Romania to survive. It is, of course, the Hungarians in Romania who have to obtain an improvement of their situation, but we support them politically. Incidentally, Romania is still undergoing constant change in its domestic policy. We

do not want the isolation of Romania; on the contrary, we want it to join Europe as soon as possible, and Europe demands that human and minority rights be recognized.

[Fuzes] What is the situation in Sub-Carpathia?

[Entz] The Ukrainian Foreign Minister came to visit me, and he assured me that the independent aspirations of the Ukraine were not directed against minorities, including Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia. [passage omitted]

Bod on Energy Issue, Hong Kong Immigrants

LD2609180190 Budapest MTI in English 1737 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 26 (MTI)—Visiting the Budapest International Fair on Wednesday, Minister of Industry and Trade Peter Akos Bod spoke about the energy situation of the country.

Bod told journalists that Hungary sought to eliminate its one-sided dependence on Soviet energy deliveries, making up 95 per cent of energy imports today. The minister said Hungary should be integrated into the West European electricity grid.

Concerning the rumour that about 8,000 investors are to arrive from Hong Kong in Hungary by 1997, the minister said that some agencies did visit Hungary to map the conditions of reception. Since they set unacceptable preconditions—the immigrants would like to live under the law of their own—no concrete agreement has been reached.

Hungary's linguistic isolation makes things even more difficult, so no major immigration drive is expected, Bod said. The immigration of Hong Kong people, however, would entail several advantages, for instance their investment would create plenty of job opportunities here, the minister said.

Government Publishes Three-Year Economic Program

LD2609115990 Budapest MTI in English 1032 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 25 (MTI)—The three-year programme of the Hungarian Government has just been published.

Outlining the main features of the Hungarian economy for the future, the document, over 200 pages long, posits the creation of a modern, European social market economy based on private property as a priority. Laying down competitive rules, and liberalising production factors is projected to take a few years, thereby making a genuine external economic opening possible. Maintaining the equilibrium will continue to be the main goal. Achieving internal economic balance, and stopping inflation are related to this. Success in these depends on the radical transformation of the budget, budget management, and the re-organization of the welfare system.

Taking into consideration the fundamentals that limit its scope of activity and decision-making, the government sees its main tasks in the first period to be those of overcoming the existing crisis, and forestalling further upset. In this stage, expected to last until the end of 1991, the government will endeavour to stabilize the country's payments situation, stop the inflation that has been spiralling ever upwards since 1988, bring about democratic and efficient order in central state administration, set up local authorities, which are important in terms of the operation of the national economy. It is to continue the process of "state retreat" from the economy, and the elimination of bureaucratic rules. For instance, it will encourage ventures by amending the tax system, and using economic diplomacy.

The basic principle of privatization is that all assets which promise higher profits than the leasing fees when converted into capital, should be sold.

As the state sector will retain a prominent position for some time, the conditions for a responsible and rational operation of public assets will be created. Companies are expected to be transformed into public limited companies in growing numbers. In general, the government does not support returning former properties in their exact original form. Regarding cultivated land, the aim is an agrarian economy which relies on privately owned land and on free association. Above all, the government wishes to pledge land to the bracket of countryfolk engaged in agricultural activity and land cultivation. Instead of returning properties (factories, units, shops and workshops), the government will offer a partial compensation in the form of securities.

The programme supports the investments of foreigners in Hungary, and their participation in the privatization of state assets. The government promises the rapid elimination of adminstrative, permitting and other obstacles in the way of foreign investments.

An important aim of the programme is to withdraw the state from public property, and, as a result of privatization, for the proportion of private property to be 30-35 per cent of the entrepreneurial assets, and for the share of state property to decline to under 50 per cent, taking the institutional owners into consideration as well. An economy in genuine mixed ownership will thus come about.

A combined policy will be applied to fight inflation, and it is the conviction of the government that the qualitative changes taking place in economy, the boom in enterprise, and the growing confidence shown for the forint will help break the probable inflation.

The three-year programme creates the conditions for the more rapid-paced, and lasting growth of economy. In this period, however, Hungarian economy is expected to show only a modest growth, and only at the end of the third year at that. The impoverishment of wide strata will be prevented by applying a welfare net.

The government declares that Hungary does not initiate the rescheduling of its debts, the country is solvent and will always take—as it has done in the past—economic policy measures to ensure solvency.

Over the next three years, the restricted convertibility of the forint applying to the economic sphere will be created.

In foreign economy, the government sets the aim of concluding an associate contract with the european communities which links Hungarian economy into the regional programmes, and also gradually creates the possibility of full-right membership. It first strives to gradually create so-called asymmetric free trade, within two or three years. However, a fundamental interest is to uphold the East European and the Soviet market.

As compared to 1990, convertible exports in 1993 should increase by 30 percent.

The government programme sets down in detail the demands for the reform of the state budget, and the development of the tax system, and discusses the financial sources of the local governments, the main areas of subsidy cuts, the principles of industrial, and competition policy. It outlines the main goals of energy policy, home trade, tourism, and agricultural policy, and gives special emphasis to the tasks of eliminating infrastructural backwardness.

Regarding welfare, the main aim of the government is to make it possible for those who live below the subsistence level to overcome poverty, and to prevent those who face the danger of sinking below the level from this happening. A means for this is to renew the system of social support. Every citizen has the right to the minimum, socially determined conditions of existence, in the interest of which the system of welfare assistance will be renewed. At the same time, the aim is to create the welfare security of the majority of the families with incomes from work, rather than through aid. The state accepts responsibility for minimum provisions in the transitory period.

With respect to public administration, the document also discusses the situation of the minorities in Hungary. It terms as necessary to create a new, active minority protection policy. a separate chapter discusses the tasks of national security, defence, and foreign policy.

Students Demonstrate at Education Ministry

LD2609153890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Peter Szorenyi report]

[Text] [Announcer] Let us hear the details about the national student demonstration. At the moment, events are not only taking place in the big provincial towns as this morning, but also in Budapest, in front of the Ministry of Education building. Peter Szorenyi reports from the scene:

[Szorenyi] Some 10,000-13,000 students gathered here, in the vicinity of the Ministry of Education. On their posters, the following slogans can be read: We want bread too, not just circuses; Andrasfalvy [the minister of education], it is time to go. As I learned from the demonstrators, they would also like to negotiate with officials about their demands, that is, about the increase of grants and the one-third participation of students in the faculty councils. According to them, the latter would guarantee a true change of regime in the universities and high schools.

Naturally, there were some IDSZ [expansion unknown] members present according to whom this whole event is an antigovernment protest before the elections. On top of this, the masses are being manipulated by a minority.

Negotiations To Follow Rallies

LD2609220790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Negotiations will begin by next Friday [5 October] between the Ministry of Culture and Education and the representatives of university students. This is the final result of today's nationwide student demonstrations. Almost 50,000 students took part in the protest, which started at the same time this morning in several large towns and ended this afternoon in front of the ministry building in Budapest. In the capital, over 50,000 people gathered. [passage omitted]

Next year, there will probably be more money for education from the budget. This was promised by the political state secretary at the Ministry of Culture and Education at the meeting of the presidium of the Teachers' Trade Union. Kata Beke said that when negotiations on next year's budget are held, the ministry will endeavor to extensively represent the interests of the teachers. Although the state secretary condemned the university students' demonstrations, saying that they had not thought through what it is they are demanding, the Teachers' Trade Union assured the protesting students of their solidarity.

Democratic Forum News Briefing on Campaign

LD2609141290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Janos Hollos report]

[Text] As you will hear, the coalition parties have reached an agreement on the sort of behavior they recommend for their supporters and sympathizers. Janos Hollos reports on the press briefing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum:

[Hollos] The government parties will mutually support each other against candidates from the coalition in the election campaign, and in the second round they will unanimously support the candidate in the most favorable position. This is what the call in which the three parties announce political cooperation contains. The

document, inscribed with the signatures of the party presidents, is, of course, not compulsory for the local organizations. This is because—as it was said at the press briefing—on a national scale, the government parties have two or three local organizations which have entered into an election alliance with oppositionist organizations against which they have nothing to say. The call, by the way, is for the carrying out of a positive campaign, which should be directed to emphasizing their own values and objectives, not to attacking the opposition candidates.

Official on Intelligence Service Reorganization

AU2609122790 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 22 Sep 90 p 4

[Interview with Minister Without Portofolio Peter Boross by Peter Balla; place and date not given: "Reorganization and Layoffs at the Intelligence Agencies—The Times of Romantic Espionage Activity Are Over"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] According to information from a person close to the National Security Office, 39 people in leading positions will be fired from the office beginning 1 October 1990. We asked Peter Boross, the most competent official, about the reorganization of, and the reduction of personnel at the civilian intelligence services.

[Balla] Is it true that more than 30 members of the National Security Office will be laid off? If so, what is the reason behind this layoff?

[Boross] Just as in the case of the Information Office of the civilian intelligence services, a process of reorganization has taken place in the National Security Office. In its current form, this organization was an illogical body set up very quickly in the wake of the Danube-gate scandal [involving alleged bugging of opposition parties' telephones and their headquarters by the Socialist Workers Party]. In addition to the exaggerated hierarchy and extremist decentralization, one could also discern other aspects which showed that this organizations was established for the benefit of various persons, and not the other way around. I have been dealing with organizational issues all my life, so, from the very beginning, I was struck by these deficiencies. We expect to conclude the reorganization of this body by the end of this year or the beginning of next year. The fact that we will no longer need the contribution of some 30 people is part of the change in our structure, but I must add that, with this step, we want to strengthen public confidence. Following my taking up of this post, for months I received thousands of signed and anonymous letters which made it clear that the change in the regime was not in harmony with the personnel composition of the National Security Office, particularly its leadership. The overall number of employees here will decrease by some 20 percent.

[Balla] I know that every intelligence service is very interested in concealing its organizational structure, but I ask you to give some details about the essential features of this structure.

[Boross] The exaggerated hierarchy proved to erode and also distort information. As for decentralizations, it is better to think in terms of regions, rather than county organizations in the future.

[Balla] Does that mean that Hungary has given up collecting information by means of secret services?

[Boross] There, of course, can be no such thing, but we will no longer carry out such activity against the secret service of a host country....

[Balla] Is it true that you will also consider the reservations of "some NATO countries" in selecting your staff working abroad?

[Boross] I firmly deny this; all the more so because our national self-esteem cannot tolerate other countries interfering in such affairs.

[Balla] Will the Information Office also carry out a reduction of personnel?

[Boross] Yes, a similar number of people will also be dismissed here. However, I would like to stress one thing: Once these dismissals are carried out, as a minister in charge of secret services, I can guarantee the stability.

[Balla] Will this reduction in personnel also affect the members of the Information Office who are working abroad?

[Boross] Given the change in the regime, the personnel of the Hungarian secret service who are working abroad will carry out other tasks in future. The goal is to maintain legal contacts and cooperate with the staff of the host country's secret services. We must accept the fact that, for Hungary, the times of romantic espionage known from novels are over for good. Our personnel working abroad are required to reveal their identity to the host country's secret services and to cooperate with their colleagues there.

[Balla] Is it justified to fear that the reorgnization process might reduce the efficiency of our secret services?

[Boross] I would say that, this way, no inefficient organization could be reorganized. However, I made it a strict requirement for the heads of various offices to make sure that daily activity is not hindered by the reorganization process.

[Balla] Have those people who have been dismissed now been compromised in the Danube-gate affair, or are they professionally incompetent?

[Boross] Neither, but, in connection with the latter, it indeed happened that certain positions were manned by people who are not the most suitable ones to fill such positions. I would also like to add that the dismissal here means very advantageous retirement or relatively high sums of separation pay.

Skubizewski Attends 45th UN Assembly Session

Meets With Diplomacy Chiefs

LD2609153590 Warsaw PAP in English 1425 GMT 26 Sep 90

[By PAP correspondent Adolf Reut]

[Text] New York, Sept. 26—Leader of the Polish delegation for the 45th session of the UN General Assembly Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski held a series of meetings in New York with diplomacy chiefs from various countries. He spoke to PAP about the topics touched upon during his talks. Excerpts:

My first meeting was with Minister Genscher. We talked about Polish-German relations which are acquiring a totally different character when Germany is unified. We also talked about treaties to be signed after the formal unification of both German states in early October. My continuous contact with Minister Genscher is very necessary and we shall maintain it mutually.

My second meeting, a very long one, was with Minister Shevardnadze. I am planning a visit to Moscow in October. This conversation was very necessary to explain certain questions which have recently amassed in the Polish-Soviet relations and which have not always had good undertones. I told it very clearly to Minister Shevardnadze what I thought of the anti-Polish article published by the Moscow-based PRAVDA daily on September 22. Minister Shevardnaze had made a statement in this connection, and in that conversation—which was very warm-hearted to us— indicated that it is not the Soviet Government's views involved here, and that was important.

I also talked with Minister Shevardnadze about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. His opinion is that the era of stationing foreign armies on territories of other states is ending.

My next conversation was with Foreign Minister of Ireland Gerard Collins. Ireland has done a lot for Poland during its presidency in the EEC which ended last june. We talked about the European problem, especially the visa question, or to be more exact, the question of lifting the visa obligation for Polish citizens, which involves 12 EC countries. Here too, I found a very warm-hearted approach not for the first time, however, with no ensuing results because the whole matter must be settled by the 12 EC countries. Yet, in this matter Minister Collins is our ally, Skubiszewski said.

I tackled the same problems with Belgian Minister Eyskens.

I also held a talk with Foreign Minister of Iran 'Ali Akbar Velayati. This was our first contact for a long time, Skubiszewski said.

I talked as well with France's Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas. Here the relations are very friendly, he added.

I also met with the chairman of the 45th session of the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister of Malta Guido de Marco, Skubiszewski continued, who is full of admiration for Poland and her achievements last year. He expressed his great sympathy for the Solidarity.

I saw as well UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. During the meeting I touched upon some questions of the international law, Polish foreign minister said.

While at the UN secretary general's, he continued, I conveyed two documents to him. One is historical, as concerns Poland and her approach to the law. I handed over a document on Poland's adoption of the obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, commonly termed in Poland the International Tribunal of Justice.

Poland has returned to the road of solving some of her disputes with other states by a court. And this is important as the role of international tribunals should be greater, Skubiszewski opined.

I submitted also another document concerning adoption by Poland of a certain procedure in regard to protection of human rights by the United Nations, Minister Skubiszewski said.

Speaks on Gulf Involvement

AU2709082890 Warsaw PAP in English 2100 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Text] New York, Sept. 25—Following are excerpts of the statement delivered by Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski at the 45th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on September 24, 1990:

During the year that has elapsed since the last session we have witnessed the end of the cold war. The world has changed beyond recognition. However, we now face a novel danger. It is the armed conflict in the Gulf region which constitutes an immense challenge to the delicate fabric of new global relationships.

In considering the effects of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait we should realize that it is the very sense and the very purpose of our organization that are at stake. We are at a critical moment. Yet we have some reasons for optimism.

Another reason for satisfaction is the international response to the Security Council resolutions dealing with the Iraqi aggression.

Poland fully implements them and she will take any further action that might be ordered or authorized by the Security Council. We have prevented imports from and exports to Iraq and occupied Kuwait and we have taken other measures in conformity with the Security Council decisions. It should be noted that Polish companies and enterprises have lost a lot of business through the interruption of trade with Iraq and Kuwait.

Our support for, and participation in, the United Nations action has cost us, as of today, $570 million and we expect this sum to increase, at the end of the year, to $2.4 billion. These losses come at a moment which is crucial to our economic reform and they are a serious blow to our national effort.

Indeed, Poland regrets that up till now the conflict could not have been resolved by peaceful means within the family of Arab nations. With that family we have always had friendly relations and various ties and we wish to maintain them provided the international rule of law is respected.

However, the more immediate answer lies today in the application of the United Nations Charter. The problem, politically and economically, is global. Here we come to the international dimension of solidarity, i.e., solidarity among peoples and nations.

In this spirit Poland has decided to participate in the multinational effort and to send a hospital ship and a field hospital to the Gulf area.

Let me finally say that in our eyes Kuwait continues to exist as a state in spite of the invasion and in spite of what has happened after it. It is a rule of both United Nations law and general international law that "no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."

The contradiction between rich countries and poor countries, between abundance and poverty is another fundamental challenge to the United Nations.

External indebtedness stands in the forefront. In our view there is an urgent need for imaginative debt reductions including schemes aimed at preventing further polarization between creditors and debtors and at reintegrating debtors in the world economy and trade.

Many countries have suffered heavy losses as a result of the present conflict in the Gulf area. One should think of an international mechanism whereby the additional proceeds of oil exporters would be transferred, in part, to those oil importing countries which have suffered acutely from the conflict.

Finally, I wish to say a few words about the changes in Central and East Europe.

The resistance to totalitarianism in my country as an expression of the longing for freedom, dignity and independence led to the rise of the Solidarity trade union. The Solidarity trade union rejected the use of force and yet the movement for reform was victorious. The process thus started has by now become irreversible, despite hardships inherent in the transition. Poles as a nation and Poland as a state have become sovereign again. We speak with our own voice and have taken our future back into our own hands.

A year ago, after a long period of economic stagnation, Poland embarked upon the difficult road to the market economy at the cost of unemployment, temporary recession and the ensuing decline in living standards. Primarily, the transition is a responsibility of our own. Nonetheless, when the success of an unprecedented evolution and peaceful change is at stake—just as is the stability in our part of Europe—external support may prove critical. As the political rift in Europe is fading away, it would be an all too great mistake to allow economic divisions to consolidate.

Discusses Latvian Relations

LD2609103490 Warsaw PAP in English 0941 GMT 26 Sep 90

[By PAP correspondent Adolf Reut]

[Text] New York, Sept. 26—Polish and Latvian Foreign Ministers Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Janis Jurgens met here to discuss prospects for developing Polish-Latvian relations and long traditions linking the two befriended countries.

Both sides paid much attention to cooperation in economy and culture, to be developed, and to reviving Polish schools in Latvia. Poland is very much interested in this as about 60,000 Poles live in Latvia.

The two ministers voiced great satisfaction at the meeting and decided to maintain further contacts on the level of foreign ministers and other levels.

Balcerowicz Participates in Annual IMF Conference

Discusses Economy at Session

LD2609232390 Warsaw PAP in English 2141 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Washington, Sept. 26—Addressing this year's conference of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, IMF General Director Michel Camdessus yesterday mentioned Poland along with Hungary and Yugoslavia as countries which have gathered "positive or rather positive" experience in their pioneer-like economic undertakings.

The Polish delegation, comprising Vice Prime Minister and Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, President of the National Bank of Poland Wladyslaw Baka and Economic Minister Witold Trzeciakowski each day hold numerous meetings with their counterparts who arrived for the session.

Today, which marks the mid-point of the plenary debates and long series of bilateral meetings, Vice Prime Minister Balcerowicz told PAP correspondents that the participants in the session show understanding for Polish problems and sympathy for the vigour and firmness with which Poland pursues the difficult reforms. "Poland presents the stance that cutting the burden of the Polish foreign debt is necessary for the success of the operation which no one carried out before, that its moving from a centrally planned economy to a market one," he said.

Balcerowicz also said Poland was seeking access to funds now being gathered by Western states and crude oil

exporters as compensation for countries which suffered losses in the wake of the Middle East crisis.

Balcerowicz, Baka and Trzeciakowsi met with the president of the New European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Jacques Attali. They discussed the role which this bank could play in solving problems stemming from transformations of the Polish economy.

The Polish side stated that it was interested in the bank speeding up operations and in gaining credits as soon as possible. This is associated with the envisaged rate of reforms.

Vice Prime Minister Balcerowicz met with Canada's Finance Minister Charles Wilson who also chairs the IMF executive committee.

Balcerowicz and Trzeciakowski met with U.S. Congressman David Obey who heads the House of Representatives Subcommittee for Foreign Operations. This June Obey appealed to the Congress for a reduction of Poland's debt stating that Poland was the key to the American strategy in East Europe and that if the Polish experiment failed, one could not count on perestroyka succeeding in the Soviet Union.

The two also met with Dan Rostenkowski who heads the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee. Rostenkowski is the co-author of a letter to President Bush appealing for the United States to take over the initiative in efforts to reduce the Polish foreign debt.

Sees Progress on Debt Problem

LD2709112390 Warsaw PAP in English 1005 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Washington, Sept. 27—After a round of talks with finance ministers, bankers, and politicians of Western states, Polish Vice Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz said Wednesday night that he saw clear progress in understanding the significance of solving the problem of the Polish debt, although readiness to do more than to make general states of friendliness and to draw practical conclusions from this "is still insufficient."

The vice prime minister told reporters that the trouble was that the two groups of Poland's Western creditors—governments and private (commercial) banks—played a game in which every side looked at the other and did not want to make the first move.

After his meetings here, Balcerowicz plans to go to Germany and hopes also to hold talks in Italy. "I have talks with representatives of the main governments and think that they start to understand that this deadlock should be broken."

Leszek Balcerowicz met the U.S. and British treasury secretaries and the Japanese and the Canadian finance ministers here.

Mazowiecki Cited on Baltic Environment Meeting

PM2709090590 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 4 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Report on progress of Ronneby conference on protection of environment in Baltic zone, by DZIENNIK BALTYCKI reporter Adam Grzybowski; report includes reporter's account of his interview with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki on 3 September after conclusion of conference and signing of joint document]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] After the conference was declared closed and the joint document, entitled "The Baltic Sea Declaration" signed, there followed a news conference attended by the heads of all state delegations, during which Prime Minister Mazowiecki once again expressed his regret in connection with the absence of the Lithuanian delegation.

Later, Tadeusz Mazowiecki met with a group of Polish reporters who had been covering the conference. I asked him, among other things, whether all the official and unofficial objectives of the conference were effectively achieved.

"It will take a while before we can conclusively say whether the economic objectives have been achieved," the prime minister replied, "since representatives of a number of large financial institutions declared their readiness to offer us assistance and it is on this that the effective implementation of our projects will depend. Generally speaking, the targets we had aimed for before the conference have been achieved, even though Lithuania's absence from the conference was a considerable drawback; I would very much wish to see Lithuania participate in all our future work. As far as we are concerned, the most important thing is that we cooperated in organizing the conference and that the working group set up at it will start its operation relatively soon. The main concern is that we should be present in it and that we should put forward our proposals within its framework. We should also take advantage of the present favorable atmosphere to ensure that Polish environmental protection projects are taken into consideration with all seriousness."

In this connection I asked Prime Minister Mazowiecki how he envisaged the practicalities of implementing the letter of the "Baltic Sea Declaration," considering that the different issues discussed in it remain under the competence of a number of different ministries. Was it possible that a new, comprehensive "superministry" would be set up to cope with this problem? Alternatively, should we not appoint a new, specialized minister to tackle all these issues as an integrated scheme?

"I believe," my interlocutor answered, "that ministers should be prepared to have to deal with 'cross-ministerial' subjects. Consequently, in my view there is no need to appoint a special vice minister or a new deputy prime minister; at the same time, the environment minister has been instructed to coordinate all matters with his colleagues in other sectors. We have committed ourselves seriously in a number of areas and we must not betray that commitment."

Commenting on the bilateral talks conducted at the conference, Prime Minister Mazowiecki stressed that all discussions with prime ministers of the Nordic countries included the question of abolishing entry visas for Polish citizens. The governments of the Nordic countries are at present consulting among themselves on this matter, and it is possible that they will make a joint decision about it. "In addition to ecological concerns, we also discussed other issues," the prime minister told us. "For example, we had talks with the Norwegians on the proposed construction of a gas pipeline to carry North Sea gas. This was received with interest by our partners, who will give due consideration to the proposal. There are also other examples illustrating a favorable attitude toward Poland on the part of the Nordic countries. This is why I have decided to delay my return to Poland by several hours and pay a visit to Stockholm, where I will conclude the talks with Prime Minister Carlsson. Among other concrete subjects, our discussion included a joint Polish-Swedish proposal to expand communications between North and South, which could enhance Poland's standing in this area. As regards the matter of regional political cooperation, which we initially proposed—to the full approval of the international community—we should spare no effort to bring about a conference on the subject, possibly in Gdansk."

The considerable number of interesting details gleaned from the conference enabled me eventually to piece together an answer to the question which was put to the Polish and Swedish prime ministers Saturday, concerning Prime Minister Ryzhkov's absence. If talks between him and our prime minister had been held, they would most certainly have included the questions of our debt, oil supplies, and the introduction of the system of hard currency accounting. Of course, talks were still held with representatives of the USSR delegation. They involved the subject of supplies of consumer goods in exchange for oil, gas, and electric power.

In addition, on Sunday an unofficial meeting took place between T. Mazowiecki and GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere. No statement was issued about the subject of their discussion.

And so, a very busy and fruitful conference came to an end.

Jaruzelski Letter to Bush Cancels U.S. Visit

LD2709122990 Warsaw PAP in English 1142 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 27—President Wojciech Jaruzelski received U.S. Ambassador Thomas Simons and handed him a letter addressed to President of the United States George Bush.

"I attach great attention to your invitation, Mr. President," writes Jaruzelski in his letter. "This is first of all because of the traditional links between our nations, because your friendly attitude to Poland, and the businesslike and friendly atmosphere surrounding our talks during your two visits in this country.

"As you know, I have asked the Polish Sejm to cut short my term of office.

"I came out in favour of general presidential elections and transmission of my office with respect to the constitution and political culture norms observed in democratic countries.

"The decision of the Polish Parliament obviously affects the previously planned undertakings in which I am going to take part.

"One of those commitments is the announced official visit to the United States of America. The situation which has evolved persuades me to resign from that visit."

In conclusion of the letter Wojciech Jaruzelski wished President Bush further success in consolidating security and peace, in building a new international order, and he articulates the conviction that the U.S. President will be an advocate of further development of the Polish-American relations.

Iraq Sanctions Cause Sustained Economic Losses

LD2609183890 Warsaw PAP in English 1745 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 26—According to the Central Planning Office Poland's losses sustained in result of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq and suspension of the economic cooperation with Iraq and Kuwait will total 2.9 billion dollars.

Summing up the economic consequences of the war in the Persian Gulf, the planning office added that the halting of current exports of commodities and services to both countries caused losses of 541.5 million dollars.

Possible losses stemming from breaking up negotiations on further deliveries should be added to the sum. In case of a positive course of the talks, contracts would be worth some 1,680 million dollars.

Poland broke the trade negotiations to fulfill her political obligations stemming from the UN Security Council resolution of August 6. Although it does not ban exports of services, the realization of contracts is impossible when exports of commodities are prohibited.

The consequences of breaking the negotiations concern both this year and the coming ones.

Trade With USSR Expected To Drop 30-40 Percent

LD2609181690 Warsaw PAP in English 1730 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 26—Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Cooperation Dariusz Ledworowski commenting on his recent Moscow talks told PAP:

The talks dealt with the wording of an agreement on the conditions of economic cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union. It is to be based on world prices set in

hard currencies. The signing of the agreement is planned during a visit to be paid by Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz to Moscow at the end of October.

The old form of trade contacts with the Soviet Union, that is arrangements at government level, will become only a part of the entire turnover with that country which will be dominated by turnover with respective republics and enterprises.

One should expect a downfall in Polish-Soviet turnover by 30 to 40 per cent during the next one or two years, said Ledworowski.

Referring to his talks with Prime Minister of the Russian Republic Ivan Silayev, Ledworowski said: We agreed to prepare an agreement on economic cooperation between Poland and that republic. Our intention is to sign similar agreements with other republics. Political frames of this attempt will be outlined by a visit of Poland's Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to the Soviet Union planned for the second half of October.

Mazowiecki on 'Warm Climate' of Spain Talks

LD2609165390 Warsaw PAP in English 1511 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Madrid, Sept. 26—The warm climate of the talks held by the prime ministers of Poland and Spain was reflected on Tuesday evening in the atmosphere of the official reception given by Felipe Gonzalez in honor of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the Polish official delegation.

Having delivered a toast, Tadeusz Mazowiecki addressed his hosts and pointed in an improvised speech to the Polish-Spanish spiritual community and sense of responsibility.

"I would like to say a few words being impressed by this day," he said, "impressed by our honest and open talks. They had nothing of the diplomatic limitations and diplomatic restraint. We talked sincerely and openly, like people united by the same concern.

"Your experiences are very valuable, we are deeply interested in them. I experienced this during the royal visit when I had an opportunity to talk with the king on those changes which impressed me very much. Our talks today deepened this impression," the Polish prime minister stated.

Reportage on Mazowiecki's Visit to Spain

WA2609173090

For reportage on the visit by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to Spain, including reports on his talks with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, please see the Spain section of the 26 September West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Skubiszewski Comments on Results of Danish Visit

AU2609123490 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 20 Sep 90 pp 1, 7

[Teresa Stylinska report: "Visas Are a European Problem"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, returned to Warsaw from Copenhagen on Wednesday 19 September and replied to several questions put to him by a RZECZPOSPOLITA reporter. One of the questions was on the growing problem of Poles having to get visas if they want to travel to West Europe:

I only touched on the visa question between Poland and Denmark in the broadest sense. I told Ellemann-Jensen, Denmark's foreign minister, who is a great friend of Poland, that things could not continue in this way. It is becoming an all-European problem. Poland is not getting visa concessions while other East and Central European countries are. I am waiting for the opportunity to raise this issue among a wider audience of West European foreign ministers. Politics lie at the root of the visa problem. Why are they being abolished for some countries and not for others? There are particular cases like Austria, where, without doubt, our people were involved in illegal trading and this harmed our case. My approach to this issue seemed to make a favorable impression on my interlocutors and I think that many West European governments will find themselves in an embarrassing predicament. On the one side they talk about the independence of travel and freedom, but as regards their attitude to Poland, their behavior is totally different.

I talked about many things in Denmark, namely, the Gulf crisis, the way Poland and Denmark were adhering to the UN Security Council resolutions, the mutual obligation to exchange information on this issue, and the losses that the Polish economy is suffering and will suffer as a result. We also discussed the relationship between Poland and the EC. Denmark has promised to support Poland in the upcoming talks on a treaty of association between Poland and the EC and our efforts to become a member of the European Council. With the upcoming free elections to the Polish parliament this issue is looking very promising.

Environmental protection of the Baltic was another issue we discussed. We are receiving aid from Denmark that is earmarked for environmental protection and we are elaborating further joint projects. Another problem that links Denmark with Poland is the matter of a German national minority. In Denmark this matter has been resolved and the Danish experience will be very helpful to us.

Finally, economic issues. In our talks the Danes questioned the further relevance of the joint Polish-Danish commission for economic and technical and scientific cooperation. According to Denmark, Poland is now moving to a market economy and in the new situation it will be relations between individual companies and not government agencies that will be crucial. However, Denmark did not insist on pursuing this matter further for the

time being. I also raised the question of the reinstatement of Danish export credit guarantees. Previously, the system functioned well and Danish firms are still interested in investing in Poland. This should be encouraged, but because conditions attached to credits have become much tougher, I suggested that we should start again on conditions that applied previously. The other vital matter of concern to Poland is the establishment of a direct telephone link along from Copenhagen through Koszalin to Warsaw and even further south to Czechoslovakia. Next, there was the matter of Polish-Danish agricultural cooperation. A lot is already being done on this front, but there is scope for much more. I talked about these issues with Denmark's minister of agriculture.

Danish parliamentarians expressed some anxiety about the construction of Polish assault vessels. I explained that these are destined solely for defensive purposes and the number being built has been reduced. It is good that I was able to explain this matter, as Danish public opinion had begun to regard it unfavorably.

We discussed numerous other things. Denmark is not our immediate neighbor, but seen across the Baltic, the distance is not very great. Denmark is a member of NATO and the EC and for these reasons it is a very important partner for Poland.

PAP Reports Opening of Sejm Session

LD2709111890 Warsaw PAP in English 1011 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 27—A Sejm meeting started here today after 10.00 a.m. The first moments in the debate were devoted to procedural questions concerning the agenda of the debates.

Solidarity Citizens Committee Meets Sep 23

AU2609142290 Warsaw PAP in English 1839 GMT 23 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 23—The citizens committee of the Solidarity leader stated at its meeting here today that the Constitution of the third Republic of Poland should be adopted by a parliament chosen in a free election. Hence, this parliament should be a constituent assembly, and its subsequent terms of office should be counted from the first Sejm (lower house) elected by virtue of a new constitution.

Leader of the committee Zdzislaw Najder stated that the organization is also an electoral committee of Lech Walesa.

The essential question whether to unequivocally support Walesa in his presidential campaign provoked discussion, in which prevailed the suggestion that one should avoid making the impression the support for Walesa is a duty of every committee member.

The compromise solution was adopted suggesting that citizens committees and their provincial structures that support Walesa for president should voice their readiness to participate in Lech Walesa's National Electoral Committee.

No decision on the composition of the committee was taken. From among 63 people who declared their withdrawal from it last June, 41 have not submitted their written resignations. On the eve of the meeting the committee received a letter from Father Henryk Jankowski (who was among the 63) apologizing for his absence.

Meanwhile, 29 new members joined the committee in September, Andrzej Ajnenkiel, Andrzej Bober, Maciej Ilowiecki, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Antoni Macierewicz, Marek Rostworowski, Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, Andrzej Tymowski, Wojcieh Ziembinski, among them.

The committee's political commission has started contacts with various political groupings and social organizations. The Union of Real Politics, the Christian National Union, the Christian Democratic Labor Party, the Liberal Democratic Congress, and the Faithfulness to the Republic Party joined the citizens committee.

The committee got acquainted with draft laws on amending the Constitution and on presidential election, and a draft electoral law to the Sejm. In the discussion, shortened because committee members wanted to attend a mass, most of them supported a proportional election law to the parliament and a general election of the president.

The committee adopted a resolution referring to the 50th anniversary of the genocide crime on Polish officers from the camps of Kozhelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov. The resolution postulates that the Polish Government should intensify efforts with a view to speeding up exhumation of graves of Polish soldiers, founding Polish military cemeteries in the Soviet Union, and calling the living perpetrators of the murder to account.

In other resolutions the committee expressed concern about the government's failure to take up legislative initiative in regard to ecology and proposed to make necessary organizational changes in the functioning of mass media so they may perform their role during the electoral campaigns in tune with social expectations and the rules of democracy.

The next committee meeting is to be held on October 27.

TV Chief Makes Statement on Election Impartiality

LD2609215390 Warsaw PAP in English 2056 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 26—"Last autumn we were told that we are too little pro-government and on the other hand there were opinions that we were too much. Now we were able to arrive at information balance," President of Polish TV and Radio Andrzej Drawicz stated at a meeting with members of the parliamentary floor group of the Democratic Left.

Drawicz stated that pressure exerted on the range of information programs and their contents was being repulsed as much as possible.

The TV and radio chief said that the TV tried to treat everyone objectively and would treat all candidates in the upcoming electoral campaign equally, Lech Walesa inclusive.

Raw Materials, Outdated Technologies Reported

AU2609140690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1055 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—The Romanian economy is facing a number of problems—raw materials shortages, outdated technologies, inability to shatter past structures, production indiscipline, absenteeism, etc. Adding to them is another: large-scale theft in industrial and commercial units, and on farms.

Inspections conducted from 1 to 15 September in 1,273 manufacturing and commercial units confirmed the situation: 8.7 billion lei worth of raw and subsidiary materials, spare parts and others had been stolen, adding to which were 188 million lei worth of commodities that had been taken out of normal trade, leading to an artificial shortage of products in low supply or in high demand.

In another departure from legal regulations, 52 million lei worth of products were delivered otherwise than on the basis of contracts and quotas.

Illegal exports or imports are another way of undermining the national economy: 4.5 million lei worth of such exports and imports were confiscated adding to which are 7.4 million lei worth of commodities that were intended for the black market.

Senate Views President's Role, Children's Rights

AU2609184690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1808 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—The Senate resumed its proceedings in plenum on Wednesday [26 September] at noon. After several days of activity by special commissions the senators observed a moment's silence in memory of the December revolution heroes, on nine months since that event.

Then, after the government representative's preamble and the special commissions' reports and approvals and on the basis of a general discussion, the Senate passed the bill on ratifying the convention on children's rights.

The second bill under discussion referred to conclusion and ratification of treaties.

The talks focused again on the first paragraph under the first item which read: "Romania's president represents the Romanian state in internal and international relations and may in his capacity as head of state conclude international treaties on Romania's behalf or give power of attorney to the prime minister, the foreign minister or to Romania's diplomatic representatives, as the case may be. The most controversial question was whether Romania's president represented the Romanian state only in international relations or also in internal relations, as stipulated by the bill.

When several attempts to define that item had failed, the Senate decided to postpone discussion of that bill.

The Senate further discussed a bill amending Romania's Code of Penal Procedure.

At the end of three hours' heated debates the senators voted a great number of items regulating the relations between the citizens and the legal power.

The Senate also validated a bill on the ratification of the charter of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Deputies Assembly Resumes Meetings 27 Sep

AU2709114390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1023 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 27/9/1990—Thursday morning the Assembly of Deputies resumed its work in plenum in the presence of three hundred and four.

After the approval of the agenda which includes debates on the administrative bill and its putting to the vote, a representative of its initiators listed the reasons that make this law necessary and asked the Assembly of the Deputies to approve it as a means of defending the citizen's rights.

Referring to this bill, Dan Martian, speaker of the Assembly of Deputies said the law is extremely important, with a big impact on the existence of a state of law, expressing the degree of freedom in society, the way in which the citizen can influence and control the state.

The session continues.

Army Majors Put in Reserve for Insubordination

AU2609105490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0916 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—Major Viorel Tocan and Major Constantin Chiticaru have been put in reserve says a press release of the Ministry of National Defence. The rebellious attitude of these officers, their insubordination have puzzled and aroused indignation among the Romanian military and public opinion which made it impossible for the military authorities to keep them in active service.

Despite the interdiction issued on 15th June on any illegally constituted groups or committees within the Armed Forces, the two officers attended the 7th September meeting at Brasov and 17 September meeting at Timisoara where they took the floor as representatives of the Action Committee for the Democratization of the Army (CADA) a body that was disbanded by ministerial ordinance and therefore no longer exists, says the communique.

At the same time, the communique rejects the allegations of Mr. Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, of the Former Political Prisoners' Association, in a statement to the BBC on 16 September in which he insinuates that the Minister of Defence "is aware of and leaves to their discretion the participation in such events and comments on certain problems" by members of the former CADA.

Pana Testifies in Former RCP Leaders' Trial

AU2609201690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1949 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—The trial of the former members of the Executive Political Committee [PEC] of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] on charges of genocide continued on Wednesday September 26 with the hearing of defendant Gheorghe Pana.

With regard to the defendant's participation in the December 17, 1989 PEC session the indictment mentioned that during the investigations he made sincere statements, pleading guilty of consenting to the use of fire arms against Timisoara demonstrators. In his review of the main moments of that session he said that Ceausescu demanded firm action to be taken and all of the participants gave their consent, either tacitly or explicitly, to having Ceausescu's orders obeyed.

The indictment also mentions that over December 18-22 Gheorghe Pana, following the orders received, took measures to prevent the revolution from spreading in Brasov.

The defendant fully rejected those charges, declaring that the investigators had used intimidation, putting down statements that he had not made but that he had accepted because he had been in no moral state to defend himself. He claimed he had been threatened by the investigating bodies.

He supported the statements previously made by all the other defendants heard in court Gheorghe David, Miu Dobrescu, Gheorghe Oprea, Constantin Radu and Iosif Szasz that Ceausescu had made an inaccurate report of Timisoara events, blaming them on groups of declasse elements assisted by foreign agents who attempted to damage Romania's independence and sovereignty.

Gheorghe Pana, 63, was, in December 1989, chairman of the Committee for the People's Councils, and had formerly been inter alia, first secretary of Brasov County Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and mayor general of Bucharest.

After a five hours' hearing of the defendant, the panel chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Justice Gheorghe Ciobotaru adjourned the session, postponing the hearing of Constantin Olteanu to a date to be further set.

The proceedings were deferred for September 28 when defendant Ion Stoian, is to be heard.

Two Defendants Released in Brasov Trial

AU2609184290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1757 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—In the town of Brasov the county tribunal resumed the trial of 4 members of the former County Party Committee Secretariat. The fifth of the group, Elena Schuster now in hospital, will appear in court in 3 months.

Since no more evidence was required, substantial debates were initiated. As a result of the evidence several charges in the indictment were withdrawn. Defendants Ioan Furcoiu and Maria Cebuc were acquitted by the prosecutor for some offences. Since the other charges against them are covered by legal provisions on amnesty, the two defendants have already been released.

The sentence will be pronounced on Tuesday, October 2, 1990 for defendants Petre Preoteasa, ex-prime secretary, and Gheorghe Dogaru, both still in investigative custody.

Journalists Association Issues Protest

AU2609185590 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Sep 90 p 1

["Protest" by the Directing Committee of the Association of Romanian Journalists]

[Text] The Association of Romanian Journalists has learned, with great concern, about the fact that pressure against nongovernmental publications, which express a critical stand against those in power, have expanded lately. The recent communique of the Romanian Information Service and the stand of the President Ion Iliescu at his latest television interview show that the intimidation of the independent press and of the opposition party publications is being pursued, while all those forces which are hidden under various names wish to reinstate the old system of the press that is subservient to those in power. Respecting the institutions of the state of law and the freedoms of citizens, the Association of Romanian Journalists, in the spirit of democracy, does not admit any forums—at governmental or parliamentary level—to lead, direct, or influence the press or to draft a press law—no matter who advances it—without previously consulting with the over one thousand journalists who have been registered so far in our professional organization.

We draw the government's attention to the fact that any attempts to obstruct the freedom of press, directly jeopardizes democracy and, inevitably leads to the destabilization of the country.

The Directing Committee of the Association of Romanian Journalists

Official on Relations With Common Market

AU2609140490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1048 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—"The Common Market decision to sign the agreement of commerce, commercial and economic cooperation with Romania is rejoicing for us but is no surprise though" stated to daily ADEVARUL Napoleon Pop, secretary of state, head of the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism. "The green light" given to Romania in this way is in fact the result of an objective reasoning of the Common Market Ministerial Council. The decision made, the respondent says, takes account of the transformations wrought in Romania

which show that the social and political life follows a real way of democratization, and the process of transition from a centralized, petrified economy to a market economy of free competition is irreversible.

The signing of this agreement will allow for the speeding up of the implementation of the program of reforms pursued by Romania. Moreover, the Common Market decision bears major significance as to Romania's option to rejoin Europe and, by this, the world economy. In a whole string of domains, the positive effects of the development of the commercial and economic relations between Romania and the EEC will show directly and immediately. The signing of the agreement entails the elimination of the discriminatory treatment in the EEC-Romania relations. On the other hand, the agreement stipulates new liberalization with the import of Romanian products, through a mechanism of annual rise in the current amounts of Romanian exports to the Common Market.

In a wider context, the signing of the agreement provides a more favorable framework for the commercial facilities the Common Market can grant to Romania, especially in customs preferences. The agreement as such opens new prospects and ensures the diversification and improvement of the present legal framework of Romania's relations with the Common Market. Also, it will allow for the materialization of wide-scale commercial and economic cooperation ventures, as a result of the establishment of a climate of confidence, stability in the relations between the Romanian and Common Market economic operators. Last, but not least, the signing of the agreement may lead to a reassessment of the stand of the group of 24 in the relations with Romania, the Romanian minister concluded.

Chief Rabbi in Favor of Receiving MFN Status

AU2609132690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1117 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—"Not giving Romania the MFN [most favored nation] status is detrimental to democracy" Dr. Moses Rosen, chef rabbi of Romania's Jewish Community, emphasized in an interview with the daily "LIBERTATEA". "We do our best," added Moses Rosen, "to persuade influential American circles that the course of events in Romania no doubt leads to democracy and that within this context it is natural for Romania to be given back the most favored nation status. We, the Jews, can bring our contribution to establishing truth and to overpass difficult moments" the chief rabbi said.

Speaking about the situation of the Jewish Community in Romania during the 50 years of communist rule, Dr. Moses Rosen said that, although communism was tightly related to anti-Zionism, communists did not admit Jewish education and religious culture [sentence as received]. "As the Jews in Romania were given such rights since the first years of communism the whole world welcomed that and Romania enjoyed favorable opinions. That is but another proof of Romania's hospitality, which was a constant of its people's history."

Roman Statement on Departure for Geneva

AU2709132990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1000 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Statement made by Prime Minister Petre Roman on departure for Geneva on Thursday, 27 September; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Prime Minister Petre Roman left this morning for Geneva. Before his departure, he made a short statement to our radio station:

[Begin Roman recording] In preparation for the UNICEF world conference scheduled for the end of the month in New York—that is, in about three days—and in view of the very great and growing interest of the world community in the situation of the abandoned and handicapped children in Romania, a news conference will be organized at the UN headquarters in Geneva—at the World Health Organization headquarters within that body. On that occasion, I will present a report on the current situation in this respect and on everything that has been done since the revolution to improve the lot of these children who suffered so much before the revolution. At the same time, I will strive to establish contacts which could prove to be interesting and useful, to pool these international efforts to help Romanian children. We will attempt to channel this aid and bring it home through both governmental and nongovernmental bodies. The EEC in particular seems to be most eager to contribute to improving the situation of these children.

In this respect, I will also have a meeting with Mr. Jacques Delors, the current EEC chairman. More details will be provided when I return from this trip. Thank you. [end recording]

Martian Receives French Parliamentary Delegate

AU2609140390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1306 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 26/9/1990—The speaker of Romania's Assembly of Deputies, Dan Martian, received Wednesday morning at Parliament Palace, Xavier Deniau, member of the French National Assembly.

The guest was told about Romania's parliamentary activity about the complex law-making process to ensure the democratization of society and create the legal setting for a market economy.

The role of parliaments in the strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the two states and peoples was emphasized during the dialogue. The guest advanced one idea on that line for consideration, namely that Romania's Parliament join the international association of French-speaking parliamentarians, as one way to closer cultural cooperation.

Defense Ministry Denies Sending Planes to Iraq

LD2609124890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1103 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Defence Ministry said today that not a single Iraqi plane which was in Yugoslavia for repairs at the time of the outbreak of the crisis in the Gulf has been shipped to Iraq.

The Defence Ministry stressed that the United Nations resolution is being strictly adhered to and that there will be no shipments of planes or anything else to Iraq as long as it is [word indistinct]

The ministry strongly denied allegations by "certain foreign and malicious domestic circles who are tendentiously spreading doubts as to the respect of the UN resolution."

The statement did not explain who this related to but said that there was particular speculation regarding the Iraqi planes on overhaul in Yugoslavia.

Croatia Accuses Presidency of Breaking Sanctions

LD2709134290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1153 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—At the session held on 27 September, the Croat Government issued a protest to the SFRY Presidency over a violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the blockade of Iraq, which the SFRY is obliged to observe, the Croat Information Ministry stated today.

"Despite the fact that Yugoslavia has an obligation to adhere to the resolutions, military aircraft with Iraqi symbols are carrying out trial flights over Zagreb. They are taking off from the Zmaj Air and Technical Repair Institute. The government therefore protests to the SFRY Presidency as the supreme commander of the SFRY Armed Forces, and demands that responsibility be established for the breach of the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

"Since the resolutions are being violated over the territory of the Croat Republic, the government regards them as provocations aimed at harming the sovereignty and standing of the Croat Republic, especially when the president of the Croat Republic, especially when the president of the Croat Republic is visiting the United States and Canada as head of a Croat state delegation," the statement concludes.

Loncar Meets With Israeli, Japanese Counterparts

LD2709004990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2213 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] United Nations, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar, who is attending the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, met today with the foreign ministers of a number of countries and with them discussed bilateral relations and major international questions.

The talk between the Yugoslav foreign secretary and his Greek counter-part Antonis Samaras brought to light the need for and the possibility of restoring mutual trust and discussing all questions outstanding in relations between the two countries.

In Loncar's talk with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi it was noted that major headway has been recorded in the development of mutual economic, cultural, sports and other ties. The Israeli side expressed understanding for Yugoslavia's positions regarding the re-establishment of mutual diplomatic relations.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama showed special interest in the further course of Yugoslavia's economic and political reform. Nakayama noted that the results of the reform to date opened good prospects for expanding mutual economic cooperation.

Japanese Economic Delegation Visits Croatia

LD2609184890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1802 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 26 (TANJUG)—A Japanese economic delegation, which is visiting the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, today exhibited an interest in joint ventures on the Adriatic coast and in promoting cooperation in industry and agriculture.

The delegation, comprising 35 businessmen from 25 firms, is paying a several-day visit to Yugoslavia, during which it has already visited Belgrade. Tomorrow, the delegation will attend a session of the two countries' joint committee on Lake Bled, in the Yugoslavia Republic of Slovenia.

In his talks with officials of the Croatian Chamber of the Economy, co-chairman of the joint committee and head of the delegation Hideo Suzuki said he was convinced that, after major economic and political changes in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav firms would be satisfactory partners of the Japanese economy.

President of the Croatian Chamber of the Economy Jozo Petovic acquainted the Japanese businessmen with the main directions of Croatian development. Petovic pointed out that, in the coming period, this Yugoslav republic was giving priority to the construction of roads with the help of foreign capital and the development of tourism.

Trade Secretary Horvat on Relations With FRG

LD2609184790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1745 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Bonn, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Germany supports Yugoslavia's efforts to join European integrations. This stems from today's talks held by

Yugoslav Foreign Trade Secretary Franc Horvat at the close of his two-day visit to Bonn.

Bonn assessed highly the results of the economic reform of the government of Prime Minister Ante Markovic and political democratization in Yugoslavia, which is marked here as a precondition for Yugoslavia's gradual inclusion in the Council of Europe, the European Community, and other forms of European cooperation.

Ratification instruments were exchanged putting in force the previously signed inter-state agreement on protecting investments from non-commercial risks, [word indistinct] Bonn assesses this [word indistinct] big stimulus to the already intensified German investments in Yugoslavia.

In the first eight months this year, 1,729 contracts on joint investments worth 1,248 million DM [Deutsche mark] were signed in Yugoslavia with foreign partners, including 247 contracts worth 330 million DM with German partners.

According to German figures, Yugoslavia's exports to Germany went up 14.9 percent in the first five months this year against the same period last year, reaching a value of 2,993 million DM. In the same period, Yugoslavia imported 3,394 million DM worth of goods from Germany, or 24.5 percent more than in the same period of 1989.

Germany's unification was on this occcasion assessed by both sides as a chance for Yugoslavia to step-up cooperation with this partner. The question of war reparations, Horvat said, was not given special consideration.

Market Inspectors Seal Up 2,000 Kosovo Stores

AU2709094590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 90 p 3

[B. Lazukic report: "Two Thousand Stores Sealed Up"]

[Excerpt] In a comprehensive operation to punish abuse in trade of importance for the normal functioning of life and work in Kosovo in the period from 3 September (the day of the general strike) to 18 September, the republican market inspectorate of Serbia confirmed a series of misdemeanors and economic infringements on 10,060 business premises on the territory of this province. On an order from the market inspectorate, 2,000 shops in the social and private sector were sealed up on the spot.

The inspectors' check involved 96 market inspectors from Serbia and Vojvodina, and the coordinator of the republican market inspectorate for the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was the Novi Sad inspector, Mladen Drazetin, who yesterday gave us details of the results of this comprehensive action.

The largest number of willfully closed shops was registered in the communes of Pec (900), Urosevac (800), Gnjilane and Titova Mitrovica (around 600), Pristina (1,700), Djakovica (1,200), Lipljan (200), Orahovac (331), Istok (233), Prizren (around 500), Glogovac (400), Kacanik (160), and Kosovska Vitina and Vucitrn (around 300). Cases of the willful closure of shops were also reported in many other communes, except for Zubin Potok and Leposavic. After investigating the situation, market inspectors began processing the cases, after which more than 5,000 requests will be submitted to misdemeanor judges for the confiscation of work permits for up to 12 months. [passage omitted]

Further Allegations on Kosovo School 'Poisoning'

LD2609174490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Pristina, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The Presidium of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [Demokratski Savez Kosova—DSK] claims in a statement issued today together with other associations rallying Albanians, that "poisoning" of Albanian schoolchildren has allegedly continued. They claim that this is "an organized poisoning unhindered by the authorities" and that this, as they put it, "criminal activity aims to ruin the health of young men and women."

"If poisoning continues, then, despite the enormous importance of school education, we shall be forced to propose a temporary stoppage of lessons in all schools in Kosovo," the statement made by the DSK Presidium, the Committee for the Protection of Human Liberties, the Peasant Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo, which are not registered, announces.

The signatories stress that "indifference displayed by the federal state bodies" toward "poisoning" is forcing them to urgently demand that appropriate international organizations come to Kosovo "to assess the situation, intervene, and provide the needed help."

The renewed focus on "poisoning," which a competent Yugoslav commission established as non-existent and as "phenomenon caused by widespread fear," that is, the so-called induced psychological reaction, raises the question of whether some new moves of the so- called Albanian alternative are imminent in the province. This seems even more likely in light of the fact that during the summer holidays there were hardly any cases of "poisoning."

Serbs Planning 'Judicial Farce' in Kosovo

LD2609125890 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 25 Sep 90

[Text] In Kosovo the police are looking for representatives of the majority nationality supposed to form some sort of a nucleus of the so-called Albanian nationalism and separatism. They are trying especially hard to uncover and detain the delegates of the former Kosovo Assembly who in Kacanik proclaimed Kosovo a republic and also members of the former provincial government and the former director general of Kosovo Radio and Television. There is every indication, Marijan Drobez, our special correspondent in Pristina says in his report,

that preparations have begun for a new court case involving the well-known Albanian nationals.

[Drobez] Serbian politicians would appear to be hatching a new judicial farce of the kind which took place, to give an example, before the district court in Titova Mitrovica involving Azem Vlasi and his associates. The decision to set in motion an investigation against the president and six members of the former Kosovo Executive Council and against the former director general of Kosovo Radio and Television, signed by Dobrica Lazic, an investigating judge in the district court in Pristina, lists and makes an evaluation of the actions allegedly committed by the suspects which in a truly rule-of-law governed state with an independent judiciary would have been classified as political and public activity and which therefore could not have been subject to legal and judicial sanctions. The result is that the conversations which the former president and members of the former Executive Council held among themselves have been evaluated as secret meetings of a conspiratorial group who were trying to change the borders of Serbia, give life to other anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav plans and objectives, and create a climate and the conditions in which Kosovo could be proclaimed a republic.

The investigating judge himself originated and formulated the suppositions concerning the aforementioned suspects and gave these suppositions and constructions the force of proofs, with the result that today's suspects have in fact become tomorrow's defendants. There is the obvious intention of proclaiming the acts committed and the decisions taken by the suspects while they still were Executive Council members or were provincial secretaries responsible for various departments to be retrospectively illegal and therefore punishable.

Muhamed Bicaj, former provincial secretary for education, science and culture, should answer for the talks he allegedly had in Ljubljana. Agim Malja, former director general of Kosovo Radio and Television, should appear in court because in the Croat radio and television he allegedly tried to arrange for the introduction of half-hour broadcasts in the Albanian language. To the investigating judge in Pristina it is immaterial that this initiative followed the ban on the transmission of radio and television broadcasts in Kosovo in the Albanian language.

In terms of its content and spirit the decision to institute an investigation against seven members of the former Kosovo government and of Kosovo Radio and Television is in fact an indictment merely to be nodded through during a court hearing. The Serbian media have already started to create a climate for a new possible judicial farce, that is, for a new trial in Kosovo with Stalinist attributes. According to the Pristina JEDINSTVO, the group of former Kosovo senior officials who are Albanian nationals allegedly were direct organizers of the meeting in Kacanik and were in general responsible for Kosovo being proclaimed a republic. Jusuf Zejnulahu, former president of the Kosovo Executive Council, and Jusuf Karakusi, former Kosovo minister of the interior, are alleged to have been most active in this matter.

The Serbo-Croatian media reported today that five suspects in the group of Kosovo senior officials who are on the run are either in Croatia or in Slovenia. However, the papers have not produced any evidence for this claim.

Statement on Kacanik Meeting Deemed Hypocritical

AU2609123390 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 90 p 2

[Nikola Solic commentary: "Looking Through One Eye"]

[Text] The federal government—which had refrained for a long time from handing down a judgment on the terror and repression of the Serbian "rule-of-law" state in Kosovo—did not take long to react to the adoption of the Kacanik Constitution and the proclamation of Kosovo as a republic. In its statement, this same Federal Executive Council assesses that "the holding of the secret meeting of ethnic Albanian citizens on 7 September in Kacanik....is yet another unconstitutional act and a direct attack on the territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia." However, the government did not react in this way when the legal Assembly of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was dissolved or when Serbian special forces took over the buildings of Pristina television and RILINDJA.

The Federal Executive Council concludes further that "these and similar activities in any part of the country lead to further confrontations within Yugoslavia and the further exacerbation of interethnic relations" without considering how, even after the notorious eighth session, Gazi Mestan and, if you like, Knin too, national relations had begun to run their course, while this joint government of ours nodded its head as if this was not happening. Now, the action of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly "objectively speaking, disrupts and halts the course of the political and economic reform in the country." Has this reform not hitherto been halted by tanks, the army, and the police in Kosovo? Did the victims of this terror also not deserve to participate in the reforms?

The part of the statement which says that "the Federal Executive Council considers that the problems in Kosovo and Yugoslavia must and can only be resolved through the continued implementation of the program of reforms, the democratization of social relations, multiparty pluralism, and multiparty elections" also sounds hypocritical while in Kosovo villages, under the pretense of searching for arms, special units of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of Serbia have been shooting at the (un)deserving citizens of our common state. Even more hypocritical, because the government is also fighting for a multiparty system and parliamentary democracy, is the reexamination of the registration of

the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo because of a statement made by its leader. Did the Federal Executive Council react in such a way to the statement made by Slobodan Milosevic at Gazi Mestan?

All this is possible in a country in which the government—in concerning itself only with "major economic tasks"—did not for a long time want to see the political events in different parts of the country which had been producing different results. Thus, even the firm promise that the government will "resolutely take all measures to guarantee the equality of peoples and nationalities in Yugoslavia" is very late for at least one of its peoples—the Albanians, which is not even strange considering that the Federal Executive Council continues to call the legally elected assembly of the province that was unconstitutionally dissolved during its term of office, a "citizens' meeting."

Serbia Declared Democratic, Not Socialist State

LD2609204890 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpt] According to the new Serbian constitution, endorsed at the beginning of the three-day session of the Serbian Assembly, from today Serbia is no longer a socialist state. It is defined as a democratic state of all citizens living in it, a state grounded on human and civil rights and liberties, the rule of law and social justice. The constitution will be proclaimed on Friday [28 September]. [passage omitted]

Serb Assembly Discusses Republican Constitution

LD2609211490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1010 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The new constitution of the republic—a short and clear document rid of all ideological guidelines and political programs—defines Serbia as a democratic state of all the citizens living in it who enjoy the liberties and the rights of men and citizens. The constitution inaugurates a single state throughout its entire territory and in this way meets the demand for correcting great historical injustice committed toward the Serbian nation. This was stressed by Zoran Sokolovic, president of the Serbian Assembly, at a session today of all three chambers of the Serbian Assembly devoted to Serbia's new constitution. The session is also being attended by Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, and by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Presidency of Serbia.

The constitution—Sokolovic said in his introductory report—explicitly guarantees personal freedoms and rights, political freedoms and rights, and economic and social rights. The notion of freedom has been expanded to include an explicit ban on the censorship of the press and other forms of public information media. The freedoms and rights restricted by the consitution have been reduced to a minimum. The constitution gives equal status to all forms of ownership and provides for free enterprise and the free exchange of goods, labor, and capital. In this area the functions of the state have been reduced to the smallest number possible.

The autonomous provinces are defined as forms of territorial autonomy which cannot have the characteristics and the rights of a state. Although it was suggested during the public debate that the term "nationality" be replaced by the notion of "national minority," the Assembly decided not to implement this change, because the term "nationality" has been used for years as an instrument for positive political identification. The current name of the language has also been retained since Serbo-Croat is a single language. The constitution does not contain any specific proposals for state symbols. This will be decided upon at a later stage. Employees are guaranteed that their employment can be terminated against their will only under the conditions and in the way expected by law and collective agreements. Having stressed that the Serbian constitution was an historic act which will restore the republic's historical and state dignity, Serbian Assembly President Zoran Sokolovic said in conclusion that from economic, political, national, and any other point of view the republic's constitution satisfied the interest of all its citizens.

The discussion on the constitution of the Serbian Republic started with the suggestion by Zarko Jokanovic, a delegate in the Socio-Political Chamber of the Serbian Assembly, that all the militiamen who blocked the area around the Assembly and the Serbian Presidency building because of an imminent opposition meeting, should be withdrawn. He proposed that the representatives of the opposition parties be allowed to get into the Assembly building and speak.

These proposals were greeted with catcalls, and were not accepted.

Commenting on Jokanovic's proposal, Batric Jovanovic said that the Serbian Assembly is not a single-minded and one-party parliament. A great number of its delegates are not only not League of Communist members, but are on the side of the opposition. This is why it is inane to claim that the constitution has been written and approved by one party, he said. [passage omitted]

The floor was then taken by Mihalj Kertes who said that Serbia is not the state of the Serbs alone; it is the state of everyone living in it. Nationalities cannot be classified as national minorities. The two expressions do not mean the same thing. Do take this into account, because it could happen that because of the transposition of the terms we could lose Vojvodina, was the warning served by Kertes. [passage omitted]

Budimir Kosutic spoke in favor of adopting the constitution and surmounting ideological complexions. Speaking of state symbols, Kosutic said that there is no way the monarchy can be restored.

Dragan Todorovic expressed his belief that the powers of the president of the republic must be curtailed as far as

the dissolution of the national assembly is concerned. It appears that his authority is the same as that held by the king in 1903.

Supporting the adoption of the constitution, Marko Jesic stressed that the previous constitution—which was very unfavorable for Serbia—had been devized by Josip Broz, and consequently he demanded that during the voting Tito's bust be removed.

During the break, the coordinating body for the preparation of the constitution adopted its positions on remarks, proposals, and suggestion regarding the Serbian constitution. Afterwards, the Assembly delegates were briefed about these stands. Justifying the stands of the coordination body, Ratko Markovic stressed that the majority of proposals were put forward in the public discussion.

The proposal was accepted that the republican president has the power to proclaim a state of war, but only if the Assembly is unable to meet, and exclusively at the government iniative and not on his or her own. [passage omitted]

Following the 10-hour session, the Serbian Assembly has endorsed the proposed republican constitution, with eight votes against. The document will be sent to the Vojvodina Assembly for approval, following which the constitution will be proclaimed. [passage omitted]

The Serbian Assembly endorsed the proposed constitutional law on the enforcement of the constitution of the Republic of Serbia.

The delegates of all three chambers at the session today adopted the initiatives put forward by Batric Jovanovic. The action of the Kosovo Assembly delegates, who proclaimed in Kacanik the constitution of republic of Kosovo, is to be condemned, as well as the decision of the Croatian authorities to ban a gathering in Jasenovac; and a protest over secret meetings between Senator Dole and Ambassador Zimmermann and Sqhiptar secessionists in Kosovo is to be lodged with the U.S. Congress.

Kucan Speaks on Defense Issues in Slovenia

LD2609142390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1226 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—During his interview with Slovene Television last night, Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, spoke of the transfer of jurisdiction in national defense and territorial defense matters to the republic, about "indications of the evacuation of Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] weapons from Slovenia, and about the Yugoslav Presidency initiative for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

According to Kucan, very soon, after the changes in the constitutional and legal system in the republic have been passed, Slovenia will hold all jurisdiction not only in the territorial defense but in the national defense area as well.

Answering a question put to him by the interviewer, Ljerka Bizilj, that during the session of the republican presidency yesterday Kucan" implied that the JNA was evacuating weapons from Slovenia," Kucan said that this was a years-long dispute about the essence of the federation and the role of the army in our society. In connection with "arms evacuation," he stressed that there were indications two weeks ago of JNA arms, especially heavy armaments, being moved. The following day Kucan raised this question during the Yugoslav Presidency session, and yesterday he got an answer from the federal secretary of national defense.

According to Kucan, Veljko Kadijevic replied that the move was a unit-organizational transfer and rearmament of the JNA troops on Slovene territory.

Kucan answered the interjection by the interviewer that this "in fact is a truth which cannot be proved", by saying that judging by Kadijevic's answer this cannot be claimed, but that the experience with much inaccurate information we had had so far suggests that it would be worthwhile clarifying this matter.

"I do not want to speculate or even insinuate since I have no evidence but, who knows, perhaps these are the preparations for a scenario which we discussed at great length in the republican Presidency", Kucan said.

Kucan went on to speak of the initiative by Yugoslav Presidency stressing that the starting bases are good but that later, during their implementation, they are virtually transformed into their opposite.

The starting point is acceptable that the current federal Constitution cannot be the framework to resolve the relations in the country. What is problematic is that the modalities for the resolution of the crisis should nonetheless be sought within the framework of the present Constitution. The stance that the federation must give the republics the legal basis for the proceedings for fresh negotiations to be set in motion is controversial. The question of the successor rights of the federation, should a republic no longer wish to be its member is also problematic, especially the stance that those who stay will decide the conditions of "someone's departure."

According to Kucan, Slovenia proposes that the protagonists of the new historic agreement on our life together should be the republics which, as he said, is supported also by the president of the Croat Republic. The Presidency proposal is supported by Serbia and Vojvodina. The Kosovo representatives were not in a position to be consulted, while Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina endorse the stand on a modern federation. However, Bosnia-Hercegovina is making this contingent on the sovereignty of every Republic and on all its present members remaining in the federation. Should this not happen, Bosnia-Hercegovina would review its position,

said Kucan, mentioning in this context that the representatives of this republic stressed at the same time that it was very important that both Serbia and Croatia should stay in this future community.

Military Command Denies Slovene Rumors

AU2609163290 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Rumors have spread lately in some media as well as in some official institutions, and suspicion has been expressed to the effect that heavy weapons and other military equipment have been moved from the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. The command of the Fifth Army Region, with its seat in Zagreb, resolutely denied these reports today.

The statement stresses that suspicions are completely unfounded and that they only serve some individuals or groups, who began to spread such rumors, to attain their political aims.

Drnovsek Considers Leaving Federal Presidency

AU2609195090 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Sep 90 p 2

[Z. Odic report: "I Am Thinking About Leaving the SFRY Presidency"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 22 Sep—Only three days after his interview on Slovenia Television—when he said in the Focus program that, despite misunderstandings and even clashes in the SFRY Presidency, he considered his work in the highest state organ as useful and necessary—Janez Drnovsek, member of the SFRY Presidency from Slovenia, stated in the third news program of Slovenia Television on Friday [21 September] night that he is thinking about leaving the Presidency. What is behind this statement?

On Thursday [20 September], the SFRY Presidency held a session at which it discussed the situation in Kosovo and the adoption of the Kacanik Constitution. Although Dr. Drnovsek did not say it on television explicitly, it is obvious that this Presidency session and the formulation of the statement for the public are the reason for Dr. Drnovsek' thoughts about withdrawing. Judging by what he said, another reason is that the Presidency no longer has (or has very little) influence on events in the country, particularly on the events in Kosovo, which are pushing the country closer and closer to a civil war thanks, as Drnovsek said, to such stands of the SFRY Presidency. Dr. Drnovsek drew attention to different criteria that the SFRY Presidency uses in assessing the situation in the country. The suspension of the Kosovo Assembly, its dissolution, and the arrest of its delegates and officials are also unconstitutional acts, but the Presidency does not have the courage to admit it. On the other hand, it immediately reacted to the adoption of the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in Kacanik and declared it separatist, an act of breaking up Yugoslavia, even though this was only the consequence of the aforementioned unconstitutional and illegal act of suspending the Kosovo Assembly, arresting people, and preparing new political trials under the pretext of the "rule-of-law" which is only called upon when repression needs to be applied in Kosovo.

Another reason for Dr. Drnovsek's almost certain withdrawal from the SFRY Presidency is the recent assessment of the top republican officials (Bucar and Peterle) that the SFRY Presidency and the SFRY Assembly are not real partners for talks about the future of the country because they are giving in under political pressure and threats from Serbia; that they are without the representatives of one autonomous province which, according to the SFRY Constitution, is still a constituent part of the federation; that they did not oppose the suspension of the Kosovo Assembly and autonomy in the province, and so forth. In other words, by behaving in this way these two organs have lost their legality.

In his interview to Slovene Television on Friday night, Dr. Drnovsek, speaking about the last session of the SFRY Presidency, stressed that he was not the only member who drew attention to the absurdity of the assessments of the situation in Kosovo, but that he was the only one who openly expressed his views. Some other members of the SFRY Presidency (Drnovsek did not say which) did not agree with the formulation of the statement issued from the session either, but they gave in under pressure, and did not speak their minds. Does this mean that relations in the SFRY Presidency are indeed such that a rational conversation and mutual dialogues among it members are impossible; that its members no longer promote the interests of the country as a whole, but protect the interests of their own republics—that is, the interests of their republican oligarchies.

If this is the case, then it is good that Dr. Drnovsek has issued such a drastic warning about the situation. If this does not help either, there will be only six members left (because Kosovo does not have its representatives) to think about whether it is worth staying in a body with such an honorable name but which does not obviously behave correspondingly.

Decides To Remain

AU2609200590 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] What will be the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis or rather what will be the relations in a future Yugoslavia, if it is to exist at all? This is the central question posed in Yugoslavia at the beginning of a hot political fall. This was the central subject of the discussion in our broadcast, Studio at 1700, in which Janez Drnovsek, member of the SFRY Presidency from Slovenia, was the guest.

The present relationship among the powers in Yugoslavia is best indicated by the relationship among the powers in the SFRY Presidency. In his reply to the

question of whether he indeed intends to resign as a member of the SFRY Presidency, Janez Drnovsek (?further explained) the situation in the SFRY Presidency.

[Begin Drnovsek recording] (?I am glad) that this is much talked about lately, and that it is also written about. Probably, or rather surely, the talk arises from my statement to Slovene Television—I think I made it last Friday [21 September]—in which I said in a way that I am no longer prepared to participate in such sessions and in such activities of the Presidency, as was the case in the latest Presidency session when we discussed the Kosovo situation.

(?Unfortunately) [the] Presidency issued some dry statement to the public to the effect that the Presidency was in fact requested to take a stand as if something had happened, for instance this illegal—we may say—proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo, or the preceding Declaration of Independence, and similar events. In the meantime, I initiated and requested on several occasions a discussion, a substantial discussion of Kosovo and of how the situation should be politically resolved, so that it will not deteriorate and lead to an inevitable confrontation, as it appears it is doing.

However, these proposals did not meet with a ready response—I may say—and the majority in the Presidency voted against a discussion at all, being of the opinion that these matters are an affair of Serbian internal policy. In fact, therefore, the policy is conducted by somebody else, and the Presidency then serves as a cover for the consequences when they arise. Of course, I am indeed unwilling to participate in such a cover-up.

If I am to characterize my statement I would say that it was a very serious warning. My future reactions depend of course on the development of the situation and the way things occur. As it appears at the moment, I am receiving numerous telegrams and various requests—I may say—urging me not to resign. In the situation that reigns at the moment in Yugoslavia, I myself see the sense of my further activities primarily in representing Slovenia through the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis, during the shaping of a new agreement, and especially in negotiations in this regard and on finding the way out.

I think that this makes sense. Even if somebody else were to take my place, he would probably experience considerable problems during his initiation, and so I feel some responsibility in some way in this situation, responsibility for Slovenia. [end recording]

Foreign Journalists Hold Yugoslav Reform Seminar

LD2609164890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1552 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The issue of internal shares, intended at reprivatization of social property, has already begun in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Government member Veselin Vukotic pointed out at a seminar on the Yugoslav reforms, which was organized for foreign journalists on Wednesday [26 September].

Social ownership is not being transformed administratively and without compensation, said Vukotic. This is aimed at providing greater economic efficiency, firms' additional capital, management based on participation in the capital, and development of democracy in the area of ownership, Vukotic said.

All republican and provincial assemblies are expected to give their consent to the proposed amendments for changing the country's Constitution by the end of the month. This would make possible the holding of multiparty elections for the federal [word indistinct] by the end of the year, said federal secretary for administration and justice Vlado Kambovski.

No party will be allowed to re-tailor the borders, Kambovski added.

Interest in human rights in Yugoslavia is not regarded as interference in the internal affairs and every well-intentioned delegation is welcome, said Kambovski.

The federal government had ordered the competent organs of the Republic of Serbia to review a decision on the expulsion of a [words indistinct], which recently visited the Kosovo Province, Kambovski said. The delegation was temporarily banned from entering Yugoslavia.

Markovic Addresses Conference

LD2609215690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2054 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, Sept 26 (TANJUG)—The federal government is aiming to transform the entire Yugoslav system, aware that the crisis cannot be overcome through partial measures and convinced that the reforms are bringing the country closer to the European integration processes, Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic said on Wednesday [26 September].

The success of the reforms is also the best way to remove the obstacles to their realization, Markovic told some 30 journalists from major world papers who are attending a two-day seminar on the results and further implementation of the Yugoslav economic and political reforms.

The recent successful results—lowering of the 60-percent monthly inflation to zero inflation without causing major social problems, convertibility of the national currency, foreign currency reserves exceeding ten billion dollars and the liberalization of 90 percent of imports and 92 percent of prices—permit other major moves, such as those regarding the structure of the predominant social property and the political system, Markovic set out.

He underscored that the privatization and the management of enterprises on the basis of participation in the capital, should be carried out soon.

The social owned firms are already changing the character of the property, and 40,000 private, mixed and joint firms have been founded since the start of the year.

The prime minister said, however, that there is opposition to the transformation of property both in republics which did not hold multiparty elections and which want to retain social ownership, and in those which, after holding the elections, aim to turn social property into private ownership.

It is also necessary to introduce tax reforms and graduate slowly to the value added tax (V.A.T.) system of taxation, in order to react the level of the West European market economies, Markovic added.

He recalled that his government proposed changes to the Yugoslav Constitution to enable the holding of multiparty elections for the federal parliament by the end of the year.

The new parliament would thus be able to offer new solutions regarding the relations in the country which would be optimal for all citizens, republics and provinces, Markovic concluded.

Agrees to Helsinki Delegation Visit

LD2609224790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2127 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 26 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia's Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic has announced that the federal government would reply to the Helsinki conference to the effect that "there is no reason for its members not to visit Yugoslavia".

Markovic announced the government's consent to a visit by a new group of the conference in answer to a question put to him during a talk with a group of some thirty reporters for prominent foreign newspapers who had in the past two days taken part in a seminar on the results to date and the (?future) implementation of the economic and political reform in the country.

According to Markovic, the federal government has requested of the competent organs to lift the ban on a visit from a Helsinki group which has recently toured Yugoslavia's restless southern province of Kosovo, which is part of the biggest Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

The government of Serbia had announced on September 8 that the "decision to deny hospitality to this group of foreign tourists was prompted by the fact that police had found a large quantity of medicaments and propaganda material in their possession".

The federal government cannot lift the ban on a visit by the Helsinki group, as it lies outside its competence, but expects the competent republican judicial organ to do so, Prime Minister Ante Markovic added.

Markovic Meets With Cooperative Movement Members

LD2609175990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1653 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—There can be no successful continuation of the current economic reform without a change in property relations, Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic said during talks with representatives of the Yugoslav Cooperative Movement in Belgrade on Wednesday [26 September].

As announced by the Federal Secretariat for Information, Markovic urged that the Cooperative Movement in Yugoslavia also be transformed in keeping with the principle of market orientation. There are no legal obstacles to this any more, he said, adding that farmers can now found their own cooperatives.

The representatives of the Cooperative Movement upheld the federal government's economic programme. They also welcomed constitutional changes and the adoption of a new federal law on cooperatives, which will make possible their founding in areas in which they have not been present so far.

Yugoslav's Cooperative Movement will hold its first congress in Belgrade on November 9-10.

Constitutional Court Views New Republican Laws

AU2709094690 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 90 p 12

[B. Oprijan-Ilic report: "On the 'Military Dispute'—Later"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—Discussing the initiative of Colonel General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, concerning an assessment of the constitutionality of Slovenia's law on suspending misdemeanor proceedings, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia elected Branislav Ivanovic reporting judge for this case. He will submit a proposal to either initiate or not initiate a procedure dealing with the contentious regulation at the next session. [passage omitted]

The Constitutional Court yesterday rejected the request to order a stay of execution of the provisions of the Law of the Socialist Republic of Serbia on the Actions of the Republican Organs Under Special Circumstances. The judges unanimously decided that there are no grounds for the adoption of a temporary measure which would impose a stay on this regulation.

Regarding the initiative for assessing the constitutionality of the Law of the Socialist Republic of Serbia on the Cessation of the Work of the Assembly of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Provincial Executive Council, the proposal was adopted that the initiatives of the proposers (the Djakovica Communal Assembly and the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia) be submitted to the Assembly of Serbia for a response. [passage omitted]

Rifts Within New Parties in Republics Noted

AU2609133290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 90 p 2

[Ivan Torov commentary: "Driven Crazy According to a Model"]

[Text] The public has recently been confronted with a series of political rifts which have been quite equally distributed from Belgrade via Sarajevo and Knin to Zagreb and whose joint origin may be seen in the slogan that "everybody has his Eighth Session [of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in September 1987]". Let us start from the beginning.

If the disintegration of the infamous (pro)-Chetnik coalition Draskovic-Jovic-Seselj of some time ago has shown in the best way that exercises in political pluralism and democracy can be reduced to a mere clash over dollars and the "leadership over all Serbian bearded men," then the latest hint at the possible rift within the top leadership of the Democratic Party of Serbia between the advocates of bourgeois democracy and supporters of the narrow national option confirms the old rule that under the conditions of an undeveloped, that is, a chaotic democracy, a political party can hardly resist the temptation of single-mindedness and ideological unison. The party thinks it is logical to seek the way out in having one or the other option overcome, something which inevitably leads to blind subjugation and failure to acknowledge any differences, different opinions, or factions. The compromise made with the apparently spectacular move of putting up Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic as candidate for president of all Serbs, only shows the degree of preoccupation with one's own powerlessness and with one's having minimum chances to win elections in Serbia. To what extent the election of the "most Serbian Serb" who possesses neither Serbian nor Yugoslav citizenship (which he first must make an effort to acquire) can conceal the real conflict of concepts within the Democratic Party top leadership will perhaps become clear in the coming days.

However, it is not only political inferiority that can produce such and similar outcomes of interparty struggles. The latest war waged and the falling out among the leaders of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action, which many people in Bosnia-Hercegovina consider to be the superior party, on the whole yields similar results. The idea of the possible triumph at elections due to the size of the Muslim nation in this republic has whetted the appetite of the leaders and turned them into inviolable and "God-given" creators and interpreters of truth and the only dilemma is who will be the first to deal a stronger blow to the other. The aims set from the very beginning—democracy, equality, Yugoslavia—are, spontaneously or not, becoming marginal and the only thing surfacing is an unquenchable thirst for power without competition. The extent such policy can assume can be see in the example of the Croatian Democratic Community whose single-mindedness, arrogant aggressiveness, and haughtiness following the success in the elections is exceeding all the "achievements" of the Serbian Eighth Session and "exploits" of the Bolshevist uniformity that lasted for decades. It confirms the thought pronounced recently that with some parties, "the extent of success is measured by the number of unmasked enemies."

When one has to get into specific problems and, as it can be seen these days, the Croatian Government has to face a real problem, such as what to do with social property, one can then see how easy it can be—with ordinary national and nationalist manipulations, loud noise, and a large number of facilely made promises—to rally the nation and draw it over to one's side and thereby divert it from real topics for consideration, turn it against the others, and virtually push it into a blind alley, but how difficult and painstaking it can be to solve a definite economic program without causing a rift within one's own ranks. And the whole thing would boil down to the problem of authority: The one who lets the material power of property out of his hands must reckon with losing the helm of power too, whether he wanted to or not. After the division between Kalodjera and Babic, the Croatian Government would have to face the following dilemma: It is either going to solve the ownership relations in the right way, or will continue to deal—with a lack of restraint typical of it—with the "Serbian problem," with changing names to squares and streets, and with a new ideological-national symbols. The (un)expected resignation of Opacic, Peric, and Zelenbaba from the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party of Knin can be interpreted in several ways: as a glorious victory of Jovan Raskovic who has overcome; as a logical maneuver after Milosevic "rehabilitated the culprits" for Serbian troubles—Slovenia and Croatia; or as a logical outcome of the clash between the current support for the Serbian Renewal Movement, which sees most of Croatia as a Serbian territory, and a relatively milder one which admits that Croatia is "the homeland of the Serbs, too." What remains, however, also in the case of Knin, is the realization that the phrases mentioned so often (by both sides)—"honor," "honesty," "principles," "dignity," "belief in God," and "democracy at all costs"—are only a decoration meant to cover up the Balkan mentality which seems rather primitive compared to European standards and which works according to the style "it should be known who is who" or "democracy is for credulous and naive people. What we need is an unquestionable leader." The fact that the confused, worried, and justifiably extremely distrustful Serbian people in Croatia will again find themselves being driven crazy does not particularly worry all those present and future, coming and outgoing "people's spiritual tribunes." To be on the safe side, the weapons taken away will not be returned.

FEC To Propose Increase in Federal Budget

LD2609170690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1234 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—The Federal Executive Council [FEC] today announced it will propose that the Yugoslav Assembly approve an increase in this year's federal budget from 75.3 billion to 100.7 billion dinars. During a press conference Nevenka Pecar-Sindjic, undersecretary in the Federal Secretariat for Finance, said that this will be the first rebalance of the federal budget this year since the previous FEC proposal about two months ago failed to obtain support from all the republics and provinces.

The federal government has explained that the unrealistic assessments of the social product at the beginning of the year, when the budget was approved, were the reason why a supplementary budget increase is required. However, since then prices too have increased more than anticipated.

If the latest FEC proposal gets the green light in the republics and provinces, and also in the Yugoslav Assembly, 48.4 billion dinars will be set aside to finance the Yugoslav People's Army, 27.3 billion for regulation in the economy, 7.2 billion for pensions and veteran disability welfare, 6.4 billion for the requirements of the federal organs, 4.6 billion for the underdeveloped republics and provinces, and about 2 billion for social programs.

Since the draft of the rebalanced budget is already being studied in the republics and provinces, the delegates in the Federal Assembly are expected to give their views on it in mid-October.

Belgrade Unions Say Peace, Order Must Be Ensured

LD2609175190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Sep (TANJUG)—Public order and peace and unhampered production process in Belgrade must be ensured. This was stressed in today's statement from the trade union city committee, issued in connection with increasingly frequent and often aggressive party rallies.

The Presidium of the committee wants the appropriate organs to consistently carry out their commitments so that the implementation of the regulations can be ensured, and safety guaranteed for all citizens. Among other things they insist on consistent compliance with the law on political organizations. However, party rallies cannot be equated with workers' protest meetings, stresses the statement.